A Unified Model of International Business Cycles and Trade*

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Abstract

We present a unified dynamic framework to study the interconnections between international trade and business cycles. We show an aggregate equivalence between a competitive, representative firm open economy model that has production externalities and dynamic trade models that feature monopolistic competition, heterogeneous firms, and costs of entry and exporting. The production externalities in the representative firm model have to be introduced in the intermediate and final good sectors so that it is isomorphic to the dynamic trade (Krugman and Melitz) models that embody love for variety and selection effects. We assess whether standard dynamic trade models lead to significantly different international business cycle statistics compared to the standard international business cycle (IRBC) model. Using our theoretical results, we show why the business cycle implications of the IRBC and the standard dynamic Krugman and Melitz models are very similar: the implied externalities are small, positive, and tightly restricted across factors. In a quantitative exercise, we show that to improve the fit of the dynamic trade models with the data and to resolve some well known empirical puzzles in the literature, the most important ingredient is negative capital externalities in the intermediate goods production.

Key words: International business cycles; Dynamic trade models; Heterogeneous firms; Production externalities; Monopolistic competition; Export costs; Entry costs

JEL classifications: F12; F41; F44; F32

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1 Introduction

The standard international business cycle model (e.g., Backus et al. (1994) and Heathcote and Perri (2002)), the IRBC model, has been extensively used to answer quantitative questions. While successful on many fronts, the model has difficulty matching some important aspects of the data such as a higher international correlation of output compared to consumption, the positive cross-country correlations of investment and hours, and the low cyclicality of the real exchange rate.

The basic IRBC model features a representative firm and perfectly competitive product markets. A natural question that arises then is whether extensions that introduce heterogeneous firms and monopolistic competition as well as costs of entry and exporting (e.g., Ghironi and Melitz (2005)), lead to a better fit with the data. In other words, are margins identified in the modern international trade literature important for international business cycles dynamics? If so, how do these dynamics and transmission mechanisms differ from the representative firm neoclassical benchmark? We provide a unified model of international business cycles and trade that can address these questions, both theoretically and quantitatively.

On the theoretical side, our key result is that from an aggregate perspective, models that incorporate heterogeneous firms, monopolistic competition, sunk cost of entry, and fixed cost of exporting, are isomorphic to the perfectly competitive model with a representative firm once external economies of scale in particular sectors are introduced. Thus, the representative firm model, with an aggregate production functions augmented with specific externalities, leads to the same aggregate dynamics as the dynamic new trade models. Such aggregate equivalence holds even though these richer dynamic trade models have very different micro-foundations from the standard IRBC model.

In particular, we formulate general, dynamic versions of Krugman and Melitz models, where the Krugman model features endogenous entry and differentiated varieties produced under monopolistic competition while the Melitz model additionally features heterogeneous firms and fixed cost of exporting.\footnote{We explain in detail in the paper why our set-ups are more general than standard models in the literature and precisely how we generalize them. Here, we simply point out that these generalizations are needed to establish isomorphisms between the unified, competitive model and the dynamic trade models. These generalizations are particularly useful to explore how to improve model fit with the data, as we discuss soon.} We then show that for the representative firm model to be isomorphic to the standard dynamic Krugman model, positive external economies of scale need to be introduced in the intermediate good sector production function. The total externality in the intermediate good production function is
governed by the love for variety effect, with the split of this externality across factors determined as function of model parameters.

Next, for the representative firm model to be isomorphic to the standard dynamic Melitz model, positive external economies of scale need to be introduced both in the intermediate good sector and the final good sector production functions. The total externality in the intermediate good production is governed only by the selection effect, with the split of this externality across factors determined as function of model parameters, while the new externality in the final good production function is governed by an interaction of the scale effect with the love for variety effect. Finally, in both the dynamic Krugman and Melitz models, the dynamics of the stock of varieties of goods plays the same role as the dynamics of the capital stock in the IRBC model.\(^2\)

Given the theoretical result, we then undertake a quantitative exercise. First, we show that standard dynamic trade models are not able to resolve the key empirical puzzles related to cross-country output, consumption, investment, and hours correlations. We provide an interpretation based on our theoretical results: standard formulations and calibrations of these models lead to relatively small and positive externalities, which are in turn tightly restricted in terms of splits of these externalities across factors. This then leads to transmission mechanisms and aggregate second moments very similar to the standard representative firm business cycles model with no externalities.\(^3\) In fact, we show that often the business cycle fit of the standard dynamic trade models is worse than the standard IRBC model.

Second, we use our theoretical results to pinpoint the key feature needed to achieve a better fit with the data. This is possible because we set up both the dynamic trade models and the competitive representative firm model in a general way that allows for any level of total externalities and any split of those externalities across factors. In other words, the generalized dynamic trade models we present relax the tight restrictions on parameters governing externalities implied by the standard ones in the literature. We show that an

\(^2\)For completeness, we also formulate a general version of the competitive model of Eaton-Kortum with capital accumulation, but in that case, the equivalence with the IRBC model is very direct as there are no externalities.

\(^3\)In addition to assessing international correlations, we also explore the fit of the various models with the data in terms of domestic correlations with output of key open economy variables, such exports, imports, real exchange rate, and the trade balance. We find again that dynamic versions of the standard trade models lead to very similar moments as the standard competitive model. The reason is again the small externalities implied by these models. There is also a subtle but important point on cyclicity of the trade balance in open economy models depending crucially on whether the investment sector uses home labor or the final aggregate good in production. As we explain later in the paper, standard formulations of dynamic trade models imply the use of only home labor, which actually would counterfactually lead to a pro-cyclical net exports. We fix this issue by allowing for use of the final aggregate good to produce the investment good.
Essential feature to improve fit with the data is negative capital externalities in the intermediate goods production. This reveals then that since standard dynamic trade models imply positive capital externalities in intermediate goods production, they often provide a worse fit to the data compared to the IRBC model for several key moments.

What is the key reason that negative capital externalities in production of intermediate goods help to achieve better fit with the data? The main empirical puzzles associated with the IRBC model involves co-movement across countries in output, consumption, hours, and investment. In the standard model, the co-movement of consumption is counterfactually higher than output. Also, while in the data labor hours and investment co-move positively, in standard calibrations of the IRBC model, they co-move either weakly positively or, for investment, negatively.

A common source behind all these cross-country patterns is the tendency in the IRBC model for a positive shock in the home country to induce reallocation of factors of production away from the foreign country. Thus the foreign country cuts down on its labor supply and investment. This effect is compounded by the lack of endogenous spillovers of shocks in the baseline IRBC model. With negative capital externalities, from the perspective of individual firms, it is as if the aggregate country-specific shock is less persistent, but with the same initial impact. This is because, in future, due to positive capital accumulation from a positive shock, the productivity faced by the firms is lower than the exogenous component of the shock. This endogenous decrease in persistence acts against the reallocation of factors away from the foreign country, and helps generate co-movement more in line with the data. In addition, negative capital externalities also lead to endogenous correlation of productivity, even when the exogenous shocks are uncorrelated, further improving the fit.

We show that our quantitative results and basic mechanisms behind them hold for two shocks: a canonical intermediate good productivity shock used in the IRBC literature, as well as a final good productivity shock. In a final result, we then undertake an

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4 High co-movement of consumption across countries is not only due to perfect risk-sharing. In the paper, we consider all three common variants of international risk-sharing: complete financial markets, bond economy, and financial autarky.

5 The final good productivity shock is new and provides a robustness check on the numerical results. But more importantly, it is unique to an open economy environment that this shock leads to basic domestic comovements that look the same as that due to the standard intermediate good productivity shock. That is, it leads to a co-movement of within-country consumption, output, hours, and investment, thereby generating a domestic business cycle. In a real economy like in this paper, it is well understood in the close economy literature that such domestic comovement is hard to generate for any shock other than the intermediate good productivity shock. The open economy environment however, due to a relative price effect, allows the final good productivity shock to operate and lead to co-movement of consumption, output, hours, and investment domestically. We explain the details behind this result later in the paper. Note that our theoretical isomorphism results hold for any shock.
estimation exercise, where we estimate the model with these two shocks, which are not exogenously correlated across countries, while matching several second moments from the data, including not just cross-country correlations, but also volatility and cyclicality of domestic and open economy variables. We show that negative capital externalities are important for fit, also in this comprehensive quantitative exercise.

Our paper is related to several strands of the literature. The most direct relation is to the vast literature on IRBC models, in which each country produces a unique tradeable good. This literature is represented, among others, by Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1994), Heathcote and Perri (2002) and Fitzgerald (2012). In formulating a dynamic international business cycles model that incorporates the margins of the modern international trade literature, we are also clearly building on seminal trade contributions of Eaton and Kortum (2002), Krugman (1980), and Melitz (2003). In particular, Ghironi and Melitz (2005), Fattal Jaef and Lopez (2014), and Eaton et al. (2016) also develop dynamic models similar to ours and assess how important international trade features are for aggregate dynamics and business cycles moments. Our first theoretical contribution is to formulate a general competitive model with production externalities that is isomorphic to various versions of such dynamic trade models. This result then for instance, helps to understand the numerical, quantitative findings of Fattal Jaef and Lopez (2014) that firm heterogeneity and costs of entry and exporting do not matter quantitatively for aggregate dynamics. Our second theoretical contribution is to generalize the dynamic trade models such that there is complete isomorphism between them and the general competitive model.

Our result about the isomorphism is related to a similar result in a static environment demonstrated in Kucheryavyy et al. (2017). Kucheryavyy et al. (2017) present a version of the Eaton-Kortum model with multiple manufacturing sectors that feature external economies of scale in production. They show that their model is isomorphic to generalized static versions of multi-industry Krugman and Melitz models. Here, we focus on dynamic versions of Eaton-Kortum, Krugman, and Melitz models that have only one manufacturing sector and additional “non-manufacturing” sectors: final aggregate, investment and consumption. Extension of the isomorphism from static to dynamic environments is non-trivial, adds several new features such as the split of externalities between labor and capital and the need to account for endogenous labor supply, and constitutes one of our main theoretical contributions. We then use the general model for quantitative evaluation of business cycle statistics and transmission mechanism.

Note that we do not use any data moments based on autocorrelations directly. This is deliberate as we want to emphasize that persistence of shocks can be identified from cross-country correlations, which is at the heart of our paper and mechanism behind the results.
Our paper is also related to the closed economy literature. In the closed economy endogenous growth literature, for instance, Romer (1986), growth is generated by increasing returns in production, where externalities in the production function are modeled in the capital input. In our general open economy model, production externalities exist in both capital and labor. In closed-economy business cycle analysis, Benhabib and Farmer (1994) introduced production externalities to the standard neoclassical business cycles model to generate the possibility of multiple, bounded equilibrium. Also in a closed economy set-up, Bilbiie et al. (2012) discuss how firm dynamics and entry in a closed-economy model with monopolistic competition and sunk cost of entry (thus similar to the closed economy dynamic version of the Krugman model we develop in this paper) look similar to capital stock dynamics and investment in the standard competitive business cycles model. Our general model provides a similar interpretation as well, while additionally, showing formally how a competitive open economy set-up with different levels and types of production externalities is in fact isomorphic to various versions of monopolistic competition models with firm heterogeneity and costs of entry as well as exporting.

2 Unified Model of Trade and Business Cycles

We present a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with multiple countries and international trade. Time is discrete and the horizon is infinite. The world consists of $N$ countries with countries indexed by $n$, $i$, and $j$. Each country has four production sectors: intermediate, final aggregate, consumption, and investment. Intermediate goods are produced from capital and labor. Final aggregate is assembled from intermediate goods. Consumption good is produced directly from the final aggregate. Investment good is produced from the final aggregate and labor. All markets are perfectly competitive. Labor is perfectly mobile within a country between the sectors where it is used. Technology of production of intermediate goods and final aggregates features external economies of scale. There are three exogenous shocks in the economy — they are aggregate productivity shocks in the intermediate, final aggregate, and investment sectors. Only intermediate goods can be traded. Trade is subject to iceberg trade costs. International financial markets structure can be one of the three standard alternatives: financial autarky, bond economy, or complete markets.

We now describe the model in detail.

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7In all our quantitative exercises we focus on the case of $N = 2$ as is standard in the business cycles literature. But there is nothing that prevents us from formulating the theoretical framework with any number of countries. Moreover, following the modern quantitative trade literature, we prefer to set up the environment in terms of a general $N$. 

6
2.1 Intermediate Goods and International Trade

Output of a country-$n$’s intermediate good producer that in period $t$ employs $k_{X,nt}$ units of capital and $l_{X,nt}$ units of labor is given by $S_{X,nt}^{\alpha_{X,K}} K_{X,nt}^{\alpha_{X,K}}$, where $\alpha_{X,K} \geq 0$ and $\alpha_{X,L} \geq 0$ with $\alpha_{X,K} + \alpha_{X,L} = 1$, and

$$S_{X,nt} \equiv \Theta_{X,n} Z_{X,nt}^{\psi_{X,K}} K_{X,nt}^{\psi_{X,K}} L_{X,nt}^{\psi_{X,L}}$$ \hspace{1cm} (1)

is aggregate productivity. The aggregate productivity consists of two parts: exogenous productivity, $\Theta_{X,n} Z_{X,nt}$, and endogenous productivity, $K_{X,nt}^{\psi_{X,K}} L_{X,nt}^{\psi_{X,L}}$. The term $Z_{X,nt}$ in the exogenous productivity part is an aggregate productivity shock, while the term $\Theta_{X,n}$ is a normalization constant that is introduced to later show isomorphisms between the current setup and dynamic versions of trade models. The endogenous productivity part captures external economies of scale in production of intermediates, and it is taken by firms as given. The terms $K_{X,nt}$ and $L_{X,nt}$ are the total amounts of country $n$’s capital and labor used in production of intermediates. Parameters $\psi_{X,K}$ and $\psi_{X,L}$ drive the strength of external economies of scale. Perfect competition in production of intermediates implies that the total output of intermediates in country $n$ in period $t$ is given by

$$X_{nt} = S_{X,nt}^{\alpha_{X,K}} K_{X,nt}^{\alpha_{X,K}} L_{X,nt}^{\alpha_{X,L}}.$$

Let $P_{X,nt}$ denote the price of country $n$’s intermediate good in period $t$. Let $W_{nt}$ and $R_{nt}$ be the wage and capital rental rate in country $n$ in period $t$. Again, due to perfect competition,

$$K_{X,nt} = \alpha_{X,K} \frac{P_{X,nt} X_{nt}}{R_{nt}} \quad \text{and} \quad L_{X,nt} = \alpha_{X,L} \frac{P_{X,nt} X_{nt}}{W_{nt}}.$$

Moreover,

$$P_{X,nt} = \frac{R_{nt}^{\alpha_{X,K}} W_{nt}^{\alpha_{X,L}}}{\Theta_{X,n} Z_{X,nt}^{\psi_{X,K}} K_{X,nt}^{\psi_{X,K}} L_{X,nt}^{\psi_{X,L}}},$$ \hspace{1cm} (2)

where $\overline{\Theta}_{X,n} \equiv \alpha_{X,K}^{\alpha_{X,K}} \alpha_{X,L}^{\alpha_{X,L}} \Theta_{X,n}$.

Intermediate goods are the only traded goods, and trade in these goods is costly. Trade costs are of the iceberg nature: in order to deliver one unit of intermediate good to country $n$, country $i$ needs to ship $\tau_{ni,t} \geq 1$ units of this good. To guarantee absence of arbitrage in the transportation of goods, we require that trade costs satisfy the triangle inequality: $\tau_{ni,t} \tau_{ji,t} \geq \tau_{ni,t}$ for any countries $n$, $i$, and $j$. This implies that the price of country $i$’s intermediate good sold in country $n$ is given by $\tau_{ni,t} P_{X,nt}$.
2.2 Final Aggregates and Consumption Goods

Final aggregate is produced by combining intermediate goods imported from different counties. Let $X_{ni,t}$ denote the amount of intermediate good that country $n$ buys from country $i$ in period $t$. The total output of final aggregate in country $n$ at time $t$, $Y_{nt}$, is given by

$$Y_{nt} = S_{v,nt} \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{N} \left( \omega_{ni} X_{ni,t} \right)^{\frac{1-\sigma}{\sigma}} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}},$$

where $\omega_{ni} \geq 0$ are exogenous importer-exporter specific weights, $\sigma > 0$ is an Armington elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods produced in different countries, and $S_{v,nt} \equiv \Theta_{v,n} Z_{v,nt} \left( \frac{P_{v,nt} Y_{nt}}{W_{nt}} \right)^{\psi_{v}},$ (3)

is aggregate productivity with $P_{v,nt}$ being the price of the final aggregate.\(^8\) As in production of intermediates, productivity in production of the final aggregate has two parts: exogenous productivity, $\Theta_{v,n} Z_{v,nt}$, and endogenous productivity, $\left( \frac{P_{v,nt} Y_{nt}}{W_{nt}} \right)^{\psi_{v}}$ with $\psi_{v}$ driving the strength of external economies of scale in production of the final aggregate. The term $Z_{v,nt}$ is an aggregate productivity shock. We do not put any restrictions on its correlation with the shock $Z_{x,nt}$ in the intermediate goods sector. The term $\Theta_{v,n}$ is a normalization constant introduced for convenience. The endogenous part of $S_{v,nt}$ captures external economies of scale in production of the final aggregate, and it is taken by firms as given. $(P_{v,nt} Y_{nt}) / W_{nt}$ is the number of country-$n$’s workers that produce the same value as the value of the final aggregate.\(^9\)

Perfect competition in production of the final aggregate implies that the price of the final aggregate, $P_{v,nt}$, is given by

$$P_{v,nt} = \frac{\left[ \sum_{i=1}^{N} \left( \tau_{ni,t} P_{x,ni,t} / \omega_{ni} \right)^{1-\sigma} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}} {\Theta_{v,n} Z_{v,nt} \left( \frac{P_{v,nt} Y_{nt}}{W_{nt}} \right)^{\psi_{v}}}.$$  (4)

\(^{8}\)Recall that we assume that labor is perfectly mobile within a country between sectors where it is used. So, there is only one wage per country.

\(^{9}\)The particular form in which the externality in production of the final aggregate is introduced is chosen to later show isomorphism with the Melitz model. This term appears in the Melitz model because of the fixed costs of serving markets that are paid in terms of the destination country labor.
and country n’s share of expenditure on country i’s intermediate good is given by

$$\lambda_{ni,t} = \frac{\left(\tau_{ni,t} P_{X_{it}} / \omega_{ni}\right)^{1-\sigma}}{\sum_{j=1}^{N} \left(\tau_{nj,t} P_{X_{jt}} / \omega_{nj}\right)^{1-\sigma}}. \quad (5)$$

Final aggregate in country n is used directly as the consumption good in this country as well as in the production process of the investment good, which we describe next.

### 2.3 Investment Goods

Let $I_{nt}$ denote the total output of the investment good in country n in period t, and $P_{i,nt}$ the price of this good. Investment good is produced from labor and the final aggregate with the production technology given by

$$I_{nt} = \Theta_{i,n} Z_{i,nt} L_{i,nt}^{\alpha_i} Y_{i,nt}^{1-\alpha_i}, \quad (6)$$

where $0 \leq \alpha_i \leq 1$. Here $L_{i,nt}$ and $Y_{i,nt}$ are the total amounts of labor and final aggregate used in production of the investment good, $Z_{i,nt}$ is an exogenous aggregate productivity shock, and $\Theta_{i,n}$ is a normalization constant introduced for convenience. We do not put any restrictions on correlation of $Z_{i,nt}$ with the shocks $Z_{X,nt}$ and $Z_{Y,nt}$ in the intermediate and final goods sectors.\(^{10}\)

Perfect competition in production of the investment good implies

$$L_{i,nt} = \alpha_i \frac{P_{i,nt} I_{nt}}{W_{nt}}, \quad \text{and} \quad Y_{i,nt} = (1 - \alpha_i) \frac{P_{i,nt} I_{nt}}{P_{Y,nt}}.$$ 

Moreover,

$$P_{i,nt} = \frac{W_{nt}^{\alpha_i} P_{Y,nt}^{1-\alpha_i}}{\Theta_{i,n} Z_{i,nt}}, \quad (7)$$

where $\tilde{\Theta}_{i,n} \equiv \alpha_i^{\alpha_i} (1 - \alpha_i)^{1-\alpha_i} \Theta_{i,n}$.

### 2.4 Households

Each country n has a representative household with the period-t utility function given by

$$U(C_{nt}, L_{nt}),$$

where $C_{nt}$ and $L_{nt}$ are the household’s consumption and supply of labor in

\(^{10}\)In the standard business cycles model, investment is made directly from the final good. This standard technology can be obtained from (6) by setting $\Theta_{i,n} = 1$, $Z_{i,nt} = 1$, and $\alpha_i = 0$. As we will see later, the technology for producing the investment good in the standard versions of Krugman and Melitz models corresponds to setting $\alpha_i = 1$ and having $\Theta_{i,n} Z_{i,nt} \neq 1$. These differing choices can have non-trivial implications for the cyclicality of net exports as we show later and therefore, we take a general approach.
period $t$. The household chooses consumption, supply of labor, investment, and holdings of financial assets (if allowed) so as to maximize the expected sum of discounted utilities, $E_t \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \beta^s U (C_{n,t+s}, L_{n,t+s})$, subject to the budget constraint and the law of motion of capital, where $\beta \in (0, 1)$ is the discount factor, and $E_t$ denotes the expectation over the states of nature taken in period $t$. The law of motion of capital is given by

$$K_{n,t+1} = (1 - \delta) K_{nt} + I_{nt},$$

where $I_{nt}$ is the household’s choice of investment in period $t$, and $\delta \in [0, 1]$ is the capital depreciation rate. Depending on the international financial markets structure, households face different budget constraints. Below we consider three standard alternatives for international financial markets: financial autarky, bond economy, and complete markets.

### 2.4.1 Financial Autarky

In the case of financial autarky, there is no international trade in financial assets. Households in country $n$ then face the following flow budget constraint

$$P_{Y,n} C_{nt} + P_{I,n} I_{nt} = W_{nt} L_{nt} + R_{nt} K_{nt}.$$

Observe that, since the consumption good is directly produced from the final aggregate (and there are no shocks in the consumption goods sector), the price of the consumption good is equal to the price of the final aggregate, $P_{Y,n}$.

First-order conditions for the household’s optimization problem are given by

$$P_{I,n} = \beta E_t \left\{ \frac{P_{I,n}}{P_{Y,n} R_{n}} \cdot \frac{U_1 (C_{n,t+1}, L_{n,t+1})}{U_1 (C_{n}, L_{n})} [R_{n,t+1} + (1 - \delta) P_{I,n,t+1}] \right\},$$ (8)

$$\frac{U_2 (C_{n}, L_{n})}{U_1 (C_{n}, L_{n})} = \frac{W_{nt}}{P_{Y,n}},$$ (9)

where $U_1 (\cdot, \cdot)$ and $U_2 (\cdot, \cdot)$ are derivatives of the utility function with respect to consumption and labor, correspondingly. Condition (8) is the standard Euler equation that equates the price of investment today with the expected price of investment tomorrow. Condition (9) equates the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labor with real wage.
### 2.4.2 Bond Economy

We consider a bond economy where each country issues a non-state-contingent bond denominated in its consumption units. The representative households in each country chooses holdings of bonds of all countries. Holdings of country $i$’s bond by country $n$ are denoted by $B_{ni,t}$. The household’s flow budget constraint is given by

$$P_{yt}C_{nt} + P_{yt}I_{nt} + \sum_{i=1}^{N} P_{yt} \left( B_{ni,t} + \frac{b_{adj}}{2} B_{ni,t}^2 \right)$$

$$= W_{nt}L_{nt} + R_{nt}K_{nt} + \sum_{i=1}^{N} P_{yt} (1 + r_{i,t-1}) B_{ni,t-1} + T_{nt}^B,$$

where $r_{i,t-1}$ is period-$t$ return on country-$i$’s bond, and $T_{nt}^B \equiv \frac{b_{adj}}{2} \sum_{i=1}^{N} P_{yt} B_{ni,t}^2$ is the bond fee rebate, taken as given by the household. Here $b_{adj}$ is the adjustment cost of bond holdings, which is introduced to ensure stationarity. First-order conditions are given by conditions (8) and (9), plus an additional set of Euler equations:

$$P_{yt} U_1 \left( \frac{C_{nt}}{P_{yt}} \right) (1 + b_{adj} B_{ni,t}) = \beta E_t \left\{ \frac{U_1 \left( \frac{C_{n,t+1}}{P_{yt,t+1}} \right) + P_{yt,t+1} (1 + r_{it})}{P_{yt,t+1}} \right\},$$

for $i = 1, \ldots, N$.

International trade in bonds allows unbalanced trade in intermediate goods. Define country $n$’s trade balance $TB_{nt}$ as the value of net exports of intermediate goods:

$$TB_{nt} \equiv P_{yt} X_{nt} - P_{yt} Y_{nt},$$

and define country $n$’s current account $CA_{nt}$ as the change in this country’s net financial assets position:\footnote{Using markets clearing conditions (described later), it can be shown that trade balance and current account can also be written as}

$$CA_{nt} \equiv \sum_{i=1}^{N} P_{yt} \left( B_{ni,t} - B_{ni,t-1} \right).$$

$$TB_{nt} = W_{nt}L_{nt} + R_{nt}K_{nt} - P_{yt}C_{nt} - P_{yt}I_{nt}, \text{ and } CA_{nt} = TB_{nt} + \sum_{i=1}^{N} r_{i,t-1} P_{yt} B_{ni,t-1}.$$
2.4.3 Complete Financial Markets

To introduce the household’s budget constraint in the case of complete markets, we employ notation for the states of nature in period $t$, denoted by $s_t$, and history of states in period $t$, denoted by $s_t^t$. In each state with history $s_t^t$, countries trade a complete set of state-contingent nominal bonds denominated in the numeraire currency. Let $B_{n,t+1}(s_t^t, s_{t+1})$ denote the amount of the nominal bond with return in state $s_{t+1}$ that country $n$ acquires in the state with history $s_t^t$. Assuming that there are no costs of trading currency or securities between countries, we can denote by $P_{B,t}(s_t^t, s_{t+1})$ the international price of this bond in the state with history $s_t^t$. Country $n$’s budget constraint is given by

$$P_{Y,t}(s_t^t) C_{nt}(s_t^t) + P_{I,t}(s_t^t) I_{nt}(s_t^t) + A_{nt}(s_t^t) = W_{nt}(s_t^t) L_{nt}(s_t^t) + R_{nt}(s_t^t) K_{nt}(s_t^t) + B_{nt}(s_t^t),$$

where

$$A_{nt}(s_t^t) \equiv \sum_{s_{t+1}} P_{B,t}(s_t^t, s_{t+1}) B_{n,t+1}(s_t^t, s_{t+1})$$

is country $n$’s net foreign assets position in period $t$. First-order conditions in the case of complete markets are given by conditions (8) and (9) (with the state-dependent notation added to them), plus an additional set of conditions:

$$P_{B,t}(s_t^t, s_{t+1}) = \beta \pi_{t+1}(s_{t+1}^{t+1}) \cdot P_{Y,t}(s_t^t) \cdot \frac{U_1(C_{nt}(s_t^t), L_{nt}(s_t^t))}{U_1(C_{n,t+1}(s_{t+1}^{t+1}), L_{n,t+1}(s_{t+1}^{t+1}))},$$

$$Q_{ni,t}(s_t^t) = \kappa_{ni} \cdot \frac{U_1(C_{nt}(s_t^t), L_{nt}(s_t^t))}{U_1(C_{0t}(s_0^0), L_{0t}(s_0^0))}, \text{ for each } i,$$

where $\pi_t(s_t^t)$ is the probability of history $s_t^t$ occurring in period $t$,

$$Q_{ni,t}(s_t^t) \equiv \frac{P_{Y,nt}(s_t^t)}{P_{Y,it}(s_t^t)}$$

is the real exchange rate, and

$$\kappa_{ni} \equiv \left( \frac{U_1(C_{0t}(s_0^0), L_{0t}(s_0^0)) / P_{Y,0t}(s_0^0)}{U_1(C_{0t}(s_0^0), L_{0t}(s_0^0)) / P_{Y,0t}(s_0^0)} \right)^{-1}.$$
By dropping the state-dependent notation, we can write the conditions compactly as

\[
P_{\gamma,nt} C_{nt} + P_{\gamma,nt} I_{nt} + A_{nt} = W_{nt} L_{nt} + R_{nt} K_{nt} + B_{nt},
\]

\[
A_{nt} = \beta E_t \left\{ \frac{P_{\gamma,nt}}{P_{\gamma,n,t+1}} \cdot \frac{U_1(C_{n,t+1}, L_{n,t+1})}{U_1(C_{nt}, L_{nt})} B_{n,t+1} \right\},
\]

\[
Q_{ni,t} = \kappa_{ni} \frac{U_1(C_{nt}, L_{nt})}{U_1(C_{it}, L_{it})}, \quad \text{for each } i.
\]

(10)

Condition (10) is the standard Backus-Smith condition that says that the real exchange co-moves with the ratio of marginal utilities. As in the case of the bond economy, trade balance is defined as net exports of intermediate goods, and current account is defined as the change in net foreign assets position,

\[
TB_{nt} = P_{\gamma,nt} X_{nt} - P_{\gamma,nt} Y_{nt},
\]

\[
CA_{nt} = A_{nt} - A_{n,t-1}.
\]

2.5 Market Clearing Conditions

The labor market clearing condition is given by

\[
W_{nt} L_{\omega,nt} + W_{nt} L_{i,nt} = W_{nt} L_{nt} + a TB_{nt}, \quad \text{for } n = 1, \ldots, N,
\]

(11)

where \(a\) is a constant. When \(a = 0\), we have a standard labor market clearing condition. The extra term \(a TB_{nt}\) is introduced to later show isomorphism with the Melitz model, for which \(a > 0\), and for which this term appears only if trade is unbalanced. The rest of the market clearing conditions for the economy are standard. Since capital is used only in production of intermediate goods, we have

\[
K_{\omega,nt} = K_{nt}, \quad \text{for } n = 1, \ldots, N.
\]

The final aggregate is used in consumption and production of the investment good

\[
C_{nt} + Y_{i,nt} = Y_{nt} \quad \text{for } n = 1, \ldots, N.
\]

Demand for intermediate goods is equal to supply

\[
\sum_{n=1}^{N} \tau_{ni,t} X_{ni,t} = X_{it}, \quad \text{for } i = 1, \ldots, N,
\]
In the case of the bond economy and complete markets we also have the sets of bond market clearing conditions, which are given by

$$\sum_{n=1}^{N} B_{ni,t} = 0, \quad \text{for } i = 1, \ldots, N,$$

for the bond economy, and by

$$\sum_{n=1}^{N} A_{nt} = 0$$

for complete markets.

For convenience, the full set of equilibrium conditions is provided in Appendix A.1.

2.6 Discussion

The unified model described in this section is a generalization of the standard real business cycles model studied in the previous literature. For example, a two-country model studied by Heathcote and Perri (2002) can be obtained as a special case of the unified model by shutting down externalities, requiring that capital investment uses the final aggregate only (i.e., it does not use labor), leaving exogenous shocks only in production of intermediate goods, and dropping the additional term $aTB_{nt}$ in the labor market clearing condition. Formally, this requires setting $\psi_{X,K} = \psi_{X,L} = \psi_Y = 0, \alpha_I = 0, Z_{i,nt} = Z_{i,nt} = 1, \Theta_{X,n} = \Theta_{Y,n} = \Theta_{I,n} = 1,$ and $a = 0$. We further need to remove iceberg trade costs (i.e., set $\tau_{nt,t} = 1$) in order to obtain exactly the environment considered by Heathcote and Perri (2002).

3 Generalized Versions of the Standard Trade Models

We next present the key elements of generalized dynamic versions of the workhorse international trade models: Eaton-Kortum, Krugman, and Melitz. The focus of this section is to present the elements of these models that differ from their standard expositions, as they appear in the literature. Thus, our presentation omits all the derivations, which are provided in Appendix B. Perceiving isomorphisms between the unified, Eaton-Kortum, Krugman, and Melitz models, we use the same notation for parameters and variables of these models that map into each other. To mark some of the parameters and variables as being specific to a particular model, we use superscripts “EK” for the Eaton-Kortum model, “K” for the Krugman model, and “M” for the Melitz model.
3.1 Generalized Dynamic Version of the Eaton-Kortum Model

Household’s problem is identical to the one in the unified model. Moreover, as in the unified model, the production side consists of intermediate, final, consumption, and investment goods. All markets are perfectly competitive. The intermediate goods sector here is different from the intermediate goods sector in the unified model — it consists of a continuum of varieties indexed by $v \in [0, 1]$. Any country has a technology to produce any of the varieties $v \in [0, 1]$. The production technology of variety $v$ in country $n$ in period $t$ is given by

$$x_{nt}(v) = S_{X, nt}z_{nt}(v)k_{X, nt}(v)^{\alpha_{XX}}l_{X, nt}(v)^{\alpha_{XL}},$$

where $k_{X, nt}(v)$ and $l_{X, nt}(v)$ are capital and labor used in production of variety $v$, $z_{nt}(v)$ is the efficiency of production of variety $v$, and $S_{X, nt} \equiv \Theta_{X, n}Z_{X, nt}K_{X, nt}^{\psi_{X}}L_{X, nt}^{\psi_{L}}$ is aggregate productivity. All terms of $S_{X, nt}$ have similar meanings as the corresponding terms of the aggregate productivity in the intermediate goods sector in the unified model given by expression (1). In particular, $K_{X, nt}$ and $L_{X, nt}$ denote total amounts of capital and labor used in production of all varieties in country $n$ in period $t$.$^{12}$ As in the unified model, aggregate productivity $S_{X, nt}$ captures external economies of scale in the production of varieties and is taken by firms as given.

Efficiencies $z_{nt}(v)$ are drawn from the Fréchet distribution given by its cumulative distribution function

$$\text{Prob} \left[ z_{nt}(v) \leq z \right] = e^{-z^{-\theta_{XX}}}. $$

Varieties are traded. Trade is costly and is subject to iceberg trade costs $\tau_{ni,t}$.

Varieties are combined into the non-tradeable final aggregate:

$$Y_{nt} = S_{Y, nt}^{\psi_{Y}} \left[ \int_{0}^{1} \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{N} \omega_{ni}x_{ni,t}(v) \right] \frac{d^{\psi_{XX}}}{\sigma_{XX} + \sigma_{XX} - 1} dv \right]^{\psi_{Y}},$$

where $x_{ni,t}(v)$ is the amount of variety $v$ that country $n$ buys from country $i$ in period $t$, $\omega_{ni} \geq 0$ are exogenous importer-exporter specific weights, and, similarly to the unified model,

$$S_{Y, nt}^{\psi_{Y}} \equiv \Theta_{Y, n}Z_{Y, nt} \left( \frac{P_{nt}Y_{nt}}{W_{nt}} \right)^{\psi_{Y}}.$$

$^{12}$This production technology generalizes the production technology used in Kucheryavyy et al. (2017) by introducing capital in addition to labor as a factor of production and adding capital externality in addition to labor externality. This generalization is a natural extension of the static environment of Kucheryavyy et al. (2017) with no capital to the dynamic environment of the current paper with capital accumulation.
is aggregate productivity. All terms of $S_{Y_{nt}}^{EK}$ have similar meanings as the corresponding terms of the aggregate productivity in the final goods sector in the unified model given by expression (3). Production function for $Y_{nt}$ implies that varieties produced by different countries are perfect substitutes in production of the final aggregate. Hence, producers of the final aggregate in country $n$ buy each variety $\nu$ from the cheapest source (taking into account taste parameters $\omega_{ni}$). We can then derive the price of the final aggregate

$$P_{Y_{nt}} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} \left( \frac{\tau_{ni,t} P_{x_{it}}}{\omega_{ni}} \right)^{-\theta_{EK}}}{\Theta_{Y_{nt}} Z_{Y_{nt}} \left( \frac{P_{Y_{nt}} Y_{nt}}{W_{nt}} \right)^{\psi_{Y}}, (12)$$

where $\Theta_{Y_{nt}} \equiv \Gamma\left( \frac{\theta_{EK} + 1 - \sigma_{EK}}{\theta_{EK}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma_{EK} - 1}} \Theta_{Y_{nt}}^{EK}$ with $\Gamma(\cdot)$ denoting the gamma-function, and

$$P_{x_{it}} \equiv \frac{R_{it}^{\alpha_{x,k} W_{11}^{\alpha_{x,l}}}}{\tilde{\Theta}_{x_{it}} Z_{x_{it}} K_{x_{it}}^{\psi_{x,k}} L_{x_{it}}^{\psi_{x,l}}}, (13)$$

with $\tilde{\Theta}_{x_{it}} \equiv \alpha_{x,k} \alpha_{x,l} \Theta_{x_{it}}$. Price $P_{x_{it}}$ can be interpreted as the price of the output of varieties in country $i$ in period $t$. The expenditure share of country $n$ on varieties produced in country $i$ is similar to the corresponding expression (5) in the unified model and is given by

$$\lambda_{ni,t} = \frac{\left( \frac{\tau_{ni,t} P_{x_{it}}}{\omega_{ni}} \right)^{-\theta_{EK}}}{\sum_{i=1}^{N} \left( \frac{\tau_{ni,t} P_{x_{it}}}{\omega_{ni}} \right)^{-\theta_{EK}}}.$$

The final aggregate is used for consumption and investment. As in the unified model, the consumption good is directly produced from the final good, and so the price of the consumption good in country $n$ is $P_{r_{nt}}$. The technology of production of the investment good is also assumed to be the same as in the unified model, i.e., it assumed to be given by expression (6). Hence, the price of the investment good is the same as in the unified model and is given by

$$P_{l_{nt}} = \frac{W_{nt}^{\alpha_{l} P_{l_{nt}}^{1-\alpha_{l}}}}{\tilde{\Theta}_{l_{nt}} Z_{l_{nt}}}, (14)$$

The complete set of equilibrium conditions for the generalized Eaton-Kortum model is provided in Appendix B.1.
3.1.1 Discussion

A straightforward extension of the standard static version of the Eaton-Kortum model to a dynamic version with intertemporal investment decisions — along the lines of, for example, Eaton et al. (2016) — can be obtained from the generalized Eaton-Kortum model by shutting down externalities, requiring that capital investment uses the final aggregate only, and leaving shocks only in production of varieties. Formally, this is achieved by setting $\psi_{x,k} = \psi_{x,l} = \psi_y = 0$, $\alpha_i = 0$, and $Z_{v,nt} = Z_{i,nt} = 1$.

3.2 Generalized Dynamic Version of the Krugman Model

Production side of the Krugman model is different from the unified and Eaton-Kortum models: production of intermediate goods uses only labor, intermediate good producers are engaged in monopolistic competition and pay sunk costs of entry into the economy. We describe the Krugman model in the following subsection.

3.2.1 Production of Varieties, International Trade, and Final Aggregate

Each country $i$ produces a unique set of varieties $\Omega_{it}$, which is endogenously determined in every period $t$. Let $M_{it}$ be the measure of this set. All varieties can be internationally traded. Let $p_{ni,t}(v)$ denote the price of variety $v \in \Omega_{it}$ produced by country $i$ and sold in country $n$. Assuming iceberg trade costs and no arbitrage in international trade, we have that $p_{ni,t}(v) = \tau_{ni,t} p_{ii,t}(v)$.

Countries use varieties to produce non-traded final aggregates. Technology of production of the final aggregate in country $n$ is given by the nested CES production function

$$Y_{nt} = S_{i,nt} \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{N} \left[ M_{it}^{\psi_{Y,M}} \frac{1}{\sigma - 1} \left[ \int_{v \in \Omega_{it}} (\omega_{ni} x_{ni,t}(v))^{\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}} d\nu \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1}} \right]^{\frac{\eta - 1}{\eta}} \right]^{\frac{\eta}{\eta - 1}}, \quad (15)$$

where $x_{ni,t}(v)$ is the amount of variety $v \in \Omega_{it}$ that country $n$ buys from country $i$ in period $t$, $\omega_{ni} \geq 0$ are exogenous importer-exporter specific weights, and

$$S_{v,nt} \equiv \Theta_{v,n} Z_{v,nt} \left( \frac{P_{v,nt} Y_{nt}}{W_{nt}} \right)^{\psi_y}. $$

All terms of $S_{v,nt}$ have the same meaning as in the corresponding definition (3) in the unified model. The nested CES structure of (15) implies that the elasticity of substitution
between varieties produced in one country, given by $\sigma^k$, is different from the elasticity of substitution between varieties produced in different countries, given by $\eta^k$. We assume that $\sigma^k > 1$ and $\eta^k > 1$. The term $M_{it}^{\phi_y,M - \frac{1}{\sigma^k - 1}}$ introduces correction for the love-of-variety effect, which is the only source of externalities in the standard Krugman model with CES preferences. As is discussed in Benassy (1996), parameter $\phi_y,M$ governs the taste for variety in the Krugman model (the standard Krugman model implies that the strength of the taste for variety is $1 / (\sigma^k - 1)$). At the same time, as we shall see later, in the unified model, parameter $\phi_y,M$ governs the strength of economies of scale by capital in production of intermediate goods. Having this parameter is critical for showing the full isomorphism with the unified model.

Assuming perfect competition in production of the final aggregate, we get the usual CES demand:

$$x_{ni,t} (v) = S_{y,nt}^{-1} M_{it}^{\phi_y,M - \frac{1}{\sigma^k - 1}} \omega_{ni}^{\sigma^k - 1} \left( \frac{p_{ni,t} (v)}{P_{ni,t}} \right)^{-\sigma^k} \left( \frac{P_{ni,t}}{P_{y,nt}} \right)^{-\eta^k} Y_{nt}, \quad (16)$$

$$P_{ni,t} = M_{it}^{-\left(\phi_y,M - \frac{1}{\sigma^k - 1}\right)} \left[ \int_{v \in \Omega_{nt}} \left( \frac{p_{ni,t} (v)}{\omega_{ni}} \right)^{1-\sigma^k} dv \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma^k}}, \quad (17)$$

$$P_{y,nt} = S_{y,nt}^{-1} \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{N} P_{ni,t}^{1-\eta^k} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\eta^k}}. \quad (18)$$

Production of variety $v \in \Omega_{nt}$ requires only labor and is given by

$$x_{nt} (v) = S_{x,nt}^k l_{nt} (v), \quad (19)$$

where $l_{nt} (v)$ is the amount of labor used in production of variety $v$, and $S_{x,nt}^k \equiv \Theta_{x,n} Z_{x,nt} L_{x,nt}^{\phi_{x,l}}$ is the aggregate productivity in production of varieties. The aggregate productivity $S_{x,nt}^k$ consists of two parts: exogenous productivity, $\Theta_{x,n} Z_{x,nt}$, and endogenous productivity, $L_{x,nt}^{\phi_{x,l}}$. Here $\Theta_{x,n}$ is a normalization constant, $Z_{x,nt}$ is an exogenous shock, and $L_{x,nt}$ is the total amount of labor allocated to production of varieties in country $n$ in period $t$. The endogenous part of the aggregate productivity is an additional source of external economies of scale (on top of the love-of-variety effect) and is taken by firms as given. Having this

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13A combination of the nested CES production technology with the monopolistic competition environment is also used in Alessandria and Choi (2007), Fattal Jaef and Lopez (2014), Feenstra et al. (2018), and Kucheryavyy et al. (2017), among others. As Kucheryavyy et al. (2017) show, interpreted through the lens of a competitive framework with external economies of scale, having $\eta^k \neq \sigma^k$ in the static environment allows one to separate the value of trade elasticity, given by $1 - \eta^k$, from the strength of economies of scale induced by labor and given by $1 / (\sigma^k - 1)$. In the dynamic environment of the current paper, having $\eta^k \neq \sigma^k$ allows us to separate the trade elasticity, also given by $1 - \eta^k$, from the share of labor used in production of the intermediate good, given by $1 - 1 / \sigma^k$. 

18
additional source of externality is critical for showing the full isomorphism with the unified model.

Producers of varieties $\nu$ are engaged in monopolistic competition. Hence, the price of variety $\nu \in \Omega_{it}$ is

$$p_{ni,t}(\nu) = \frac{\sigma^k}{\sigma^k - 1} \cdot \frac{\tau_{ni,t}W_{it}}{S_{x,iti}},$$

the bilateral price index is $P_{ni,t} = \tau_{ni,t}P_{x,iti}/\omega_{ni}$, where

$$P_{x,iti} \equiv \frac{\sigma^k}{\sigma^k - 1} \cdot \frac{W_{it}}{\Theta_{x,iti}Z_{x,iti}M_{it}^\phi Y_{x,iti}} \cdot (\sigma^k - 1) \cdot \tau_{ni,t}P_{iti},$$

and the share of expenditure of country $n$ on country $i$’s varieties is

$$\lambda_{ni,t} = \frac{(\tau_{ni,t}P_{x,iti}/\omega_{ni})^{1-\eta^k}}{\sum_{j=1}^{N} (\tau_{nj,t}P_{x,iti}/\omega_{nj})^{1-\eta^k}}.$$  (21)

Substituting expression for $P_{ni,t}$ into (18), we get

$$P_{Y,nt} = \left[ \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{N} (\tau_{ni,t}P_{x,iti}/\omega_{ni})^{1-\eta^k}}{1-\eta^k} \right]^{1-\eta^k} \cdot \Theta_{r,nt}Z_{r,nt} \left( \frac{P_{Y,nt}Y_{nt}}{W_{nt}} \right)^\psi_{nt}. \)  (22)

Similarly to the price of intermediates in the generalized Eaton-Kortum model, $P_{x,iti}$ here can be interpreted as the price of the output of varieties in country $i$ in period $t$.

Let $\lambda_{nt}$ denote the value of total output of varieties in country $n$ in period $t$, and $D_{nt}$ denote the average profit of country $n$’s producers of varieties $\Omega_{nt}$. We have

$$\lambda_{nt} = \frac{\sigma^k}{\sigma^k - 1} W_{nt} L_{x,nt}, \quad \text{and} \quad D_{nt} = \frac{1}{\sigma^k} \cdot \frac{\lambda_{nt}}{M_{nt}}.$$  

### 3.2.2 Entry and Exit of Producers of Varieties

In order to enter the economy, producer of a variety in country $n$ in period $t$ needs to pay sunk cost equal to $W_{nt}^{\alpha_i} P_{Y,nt}^{1-\alpha_i} / \Theta_{l,nt} Z_{l,nt}$, where $0 \leq \alpha_i \leq 1$, and $\Theta_{l,nt} Z_{l,nt}$ is an exogenous cost shifter. Paying this sunk cost involves hiring $L_{l,nt} = \alpha_i V_{nt} W_{nt}$ units of labor and using $Y_{l,nt} = (1 - \alpha_i) V_{nt} P_{Y,nt}$ units of the final aggregate, where $V_{nt}$ is the value of a variety in country $n$
In every period \( t \), each country has an unbounded mass of prospective entrants (firms) into the production of varieties. Entry into the economy is free, and, therefore, the value of a variety is equal to the sunk cost of entry:

\[
V_{nt} = \frac{W_{nt}^{\alpha_I} P_{i,nt}^{1-\alpha_I}}{\Theta_{i,n} Z_{i,nt}}.
\]  

(23)

Timing is as follows. Firms entering in period \( t \) start producing in the next period. At the end of each period \( t \), an exogenous fraction \( \delta \) of the total mass of firms (i.e., a fraction \( \delta \) of \( M_{nt} \)) exits. The probability of exit is the same for all firms regardless of their age. Since exit occurs at the end of a period, any firm that entered into the economy produces for at least one period. Let \( M_{i,nt} \) denote the number of producers of varieties that enter into the country \( n \)'s economy in period \( t \). Given the described process of entry and exit of firms, the law of motion of varieties is

\[
M_{n,t+1} = (1 - \delta) M_{nt} + M_{i,nt}.
\]  

(24)

All producers of varieties are owned by households. We turn next to their problem.

### 3.2.3 Households

Similarly to the unified model, households in country \( n \) maximize expected sum of discounted utilities, \( E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t U(C_{nt}, L_{nt}) \), by choosing consumption \( C_{nt} \), supply of labor \( L_{nt} \), the number of new varieties \( M_{i,nt} \), and holdings of financial assets (if allowed). Constraints faced by the households are the budget constraint and the law of motion of varieties given by (24). The specification of the budget constraint depends on the financial markets structure, as in Section 2. In the case of financial autarky the budget constraint is given by

\[
P_{s,nt} C_{nt} + V_{nt} M_{i,nt} = W_{nt} L_{nt} + D_{nt} M_{nt}.
\]

The left-hand side of this expression contains household’s expenditure in period \( t \): the household spends its budget on consumption and entry of new firms. The right-hand side of this expression contains household’s income in period \( t \): it consists of labor income and profits of firms. In the case of the bond economy and complete markets the budget

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14In Appendix B.2 we derive the sunk cost by introducing an R&D sector and specifying an invention process for new varieties. Labor and final aggregate needed to pay the sunk cost of entry are interpreted as the production factors used in the R&D sector for the invention of varieties.
constraints can be written by adding the expenditure and income from financial assets in the same manner as it is done in the unified model in Section 2.

### 3.2.4 Markets Clearing Conditions

All market clearing conditions are standard. Labor is used for production and invention of varieties,

\[ L_{x, nt} + L_{i, nt} = L_{nt}, \]

demand for varieties is equal to supply,

\[ \sum_{n=1}^{N} \lambda_{ni,t}P_{y,nt}Y_{nt} = X_{it}, \]

and the final aggregate is used for consumption and invention of varieties,

\[ C_{nt} + Y_{i,nt} = Y_{nt}. \]

The complete set of equilibrium conditions for the generalized Krugman model is provided in Appendix B.2.

### 3.2.5 Discussion

A dynamic version of the standard Krugman model — which can be obtained by, for example, a straightforward extension of Bilbiie et al. (2012) to a multi-country environment — can be obtained from the generalized Krugman model by removing correction for the love of variety, shutting down external economies of scale, requiring that producers of varieties pay entry costs in terms of labor only, and removing the exogenous shock in production of the final aggregate. Formally, this is achieved by setting \( \phi_{y,M} = \frac{1}{\sigma^{e} - 1}, \)

\( \phi_{x,L} = \psi_{y} = 0, \alpha_{i} = 1, \) and \( Z_{i,nt} = 1. \)

### 3.3 Generalized Dynamic Version of the Melitz Model

Production side of the Melitz model is similar to the production side of the Krugman model in using only labor in production of intermediate goods, featuring monopolistic competition, and having sunk costs of entry into the economy. Additional features of the Melitz model are heterogeneous firms with Pareto distribution of efficiencies of production and the requirement that firms pay fixed costs of serving markets.
3.3.1 Production of Varieties, International Trade, and Final Aggregate

In every period $t$, country $i$ can produce any of the varieties from an endogenously determined set of varieties $\Omega_{it}$ with measure $M_{it}$. All varieties from the set $\Omega_{it}$ can be internationally traded, but not all of them are available in a particular country $n$. The subset of country-$i$’s varieties available in country $n$ is denoted by $\Omega_{ni,t}$ (with $\Omega_{ni,t} \subseteq \Omega_{it}$), and its measure is denoted by $M_{ni,t}$. Subsets of varieties $\Omega_{ni,t}$ are endogenously determined. Importantly, only a subset $\Omega_{ii,t}$ of the whole set of varieties $\Omega_{it}$ is available in the domestic market $i$, and, generally, some varieties from $\Omega_{it}$ are not available in any country (i.e., some varieties from $\Omega_{it}$ are not produced in period $t$). In general it can happen that some varieties from $\Omega_{it}$ are available in country $n \neq i$, but not in country $i$. In other words, generally it can be the case that $\Omega_{ni,t} \not\subseteq \Omega_{ii,t}$.

In order to sell in the country-$n$’s market, a country-$i$’s producer of a variety has to pay two types of costs: the usual per-unit iceberg trade costs $\tau_{ni,t}$ and fixed cost $\Phi_{ni,t} > 0$, which are paid in terms of country-$n$’s labor. The fixed cost $\Phi_{ni,t}$ is an endogenous object. Its formal definition is introduced later.

As in the Krugman model, countries combine varieties to produce non-traded final aggregates using the nested CES technology,

$$Y_{nt} = \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{N} \left[ \int_{\nu \in \Omega_{ni,t}} (\omega_{ni}x_{ni,t}(\nu))^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} d\nu \right]^{\frac{\sigma^M}{\sigma^M - 1}} \left[ \frac{\sigma^M - 1}{\sigma^M} \cdot \frac{\eta^M}{\eta^M - 1} \right] \right]^{\frac{1}{\eta^M - 1}}. \quad (25)$$

Differently from the Krugman model, we do not add correction for the love-of-variety effect in (25) — the reasons for this are discussed below in Section 4.1 (also, in Appendix B.3 we introduce the correction for the love-of-variety effect and formally explore implications of this correction). Also, (25), differently from (15), does not have an exogenous shock and external economies of scale. The reason for this is that the structure of the Melitz model endogenously generates both the exogenous shock and externalities in production of the final aggregate — both of these components of production function come from the fixed costs of serving markets, which are introduced below.

Perfect competition in production of the final aggregate implies the usual expressions for the CES demand that are almost the same as the corresponding expressions (16)-(18) in the Krugman model, except for there is no term correcting for the love of variety.

Production technology of variety $\nu \in \Omega_{it}$ is given by $x_{it}(\nu) = S_{X_{it}}^M z_i(\nu) L_{it}(\nu)$, where $L_{it}(\nu)$ is the amount of labor used in production of $\nu$, $z_i(\nu)$ is the efficiency of production of $\nu$, and $S_{X_{it}}^M \equiv \Theta_{X_{it}}^M Z_{zi} \left[ L_{X_{it}}^M \right]^{\Phi_{X_{it}}}$ is the aggregate productivity in production of varieties, with $L_{X_{it}}^M$ being the total amount of labor used in production of varieties in country $i$. As
in the Krugman model, \( S^M_{X,nt} \) features external economies of scale and is taken by firms as given. Monopolistic competition in production of varieties implies that the price of variety \( \nu \in \Omega_{ni,t} \) is given by

\[
p_{ni,t} (\nu) = \frac{\sigma^M}{\sigma^M - 1} \cdot \frac{\tau^M_{ni,t} W_{it}}{S^M_{X,nt} z_i (\nu)}.
\]

### 3.3.2 Entry and Exit of Producers of Varieties

This part of the Melitz model is almost the same as the corresponding part of the Krugman model with one important difference that, upon entry, producer of a new variety in country \( n \) gets an idiosyncratic draw of efficiency of production, \( z_n (\nu) \), from the Pareto distribution given by its cumulative distribution function with shape \( \Theta^m \) and minimal efficiency \( z_{\text{min},n} \).

\[
G_n (z) \equiv \text{Prob} [z_n (\nu) \leq z] = 1 - \left( \frac{z_{\text{min},n}}{z} \right)^\Theta^m.
\]

As in the Krugman model, the expected value of entry (before drawing the efficiency of production) is denoted by \( V_{nt} \). The sunk cost of entry is equal to \( \frac{W^m_{nt} P^1 - \alpha_i}{\Theta_{nt} Z_{nt}} \). Assuming that entry is free, the sunk cost of entry is equalized with the expected value of entry in equilibrium,

\[
V_{nt} = \frac{W^m_{nt} P^1 - \alpha_i}{\Theta_{nt} Z_{nt}}.
\]

The number of producers of varieties entering into the country \( n \)’s economy in period \( t \) is denoted by \( M_{i,nt} \). The law of motion of varieties is \( M_{i,t+1} = (1 - \delta) M_{nt} + M_{i,nt} \). Since the probability of exit is the same for all varieties \( \nu \in \Omega_{nt} \), the distribution of efficiencies of production of varieties \( \nu \in \Omega_{nt} \) in any period \( t \) is given by \( G_n (z) \).

Under the assumption that efficiencies of production of varieties are distributed Pareto, we can derive that the set of country-\( i \)'s varieties available in country \( n \) is given by

\[
\Omega_{ni,t} = \{ \nu \in \Omega_{nt} \mid z_i (\nu) \geq z^*_{ni,t} \},
\]

where \( z^*_{ni,t} \) is given by

\[
\left( \frac{\Theta^m}{z^*_{ni,t}} \right)^\Theta^m = \frac{\Theta^m + 1 - \sigma^M}{\Theta^m \sigma^M} \cdot \frac{\chi_{nt}}{W_{nt} \Phi_{ni,t} M_{it}},
\]

with \( \chi_{ni,t} \) being the total value of varieties that country \( n \) buys from \( i \) in period \( t \).
3.3.3 Fixed Costs of Serving Markets

At this point we need to introduce the formal definition of the fixed costs of serving market $n$ by firms from market $i$, $\Phi_{ni,t}$. Let $L_{i,t}$ be the total amount of country $n$’s labor that is used to pay the fixed costs of serving its market. We posit that

$$\Phi_{ni,t} \equiv \left[ M_{it}^{\frac{1}{\sigma^m}-\phi_{F,M} L_{i,t}^{\theta-\phi_{L}}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\theta}} F_{ni,t},$$

(27)

where $F_{ni,t}$ is an exogenous part of the fixed costs, $\left[ M_{it}^{\frac{1}{\sigma^m}-\phi_{F,M} L_{i,t}^{\theta-\phi_{L}}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\theta}}$ is an endogenous part of the fixed costs that is taken by firms as given, and

$$\theta \equiv \frac{1}{\sigma^m - 1} - \frac{1}{\theta^M}.$$

Under the assumption that $\theta^M > \sigma^m - 1$, we have that $\theta > 0$. The term $\left[ M_{it}^{\frac{1}{\sigma^m}-\phi_{F,M} L_{i,t}^{\theta-\phi_{L}}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\theta}}$ corrects for the externality that arises due to interaction of love-of-variety and scale effects. Parameter $\phi_{F,M}$ governs the strength of capital externality in production of intermediate goods in the corresponding unified model, while parameter $\phi_{L}$ governs the strength of externality in production of the final aggregate in the corresponding unified model. The intuition is the following. If the market is served by a small set of large firms, then it is cheaper to serve this market, because average costs for each of the firms are lower. This is the scale effect. The scale effect goes against the love-of-variety effect: consumers of the final good gain from access to a larger set of varieties. The trade-off between these two effects is captured by $\theta$. When $\theta = 0$, the two effects just offset each other. Given $\sigma^m$, larger $\theta^M$ implies larger $\theta$. High $\theta^m$ implies lower variance of Pareto efficiencies. When variance of efficiencies is low, all firms look similar. And so they either all enter the market, or none of them enters. Conversely, low $\theta^m$ implies higher variance of Pareto productivities, which allows for the scale effect to kick in.

Under the assumption (27) on the form on fixed costs of serving markets, we can derive that the bilateral price index is $P_{ni,t} = \tau_{ni,t}^m P_{X,it}$, where

$$P_{X,it} = \frac{\sigma^m}{\sigma^m - 1} \cdot \frac{W_{it}}{z_{\min,t} \Theta_{X,it}^{\frac{\phi_{F,M} L_{X,it}^{\theta-\phi_{L}}}} \left[ M_{it}^{\frac{1}{\sigma^m}-\phi_{F,M} L_{i,t}^{\theta-\phi_{L}}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\theta}}},$$

(28)

is interpreted as the price of the output of varieties in country $i$ in period $t$. The price of
the final aggregate is

\[ P_{Y,nt} = \left( \frac{\theta^M}{\theta^M + 1 - \sigma^M} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma^M-1} + \phi_{\theta,1}} \left( \frac{P_{Y,nt} Y_{nt}}{\sigma^M W_{nt}} \right)^{-\phi_{\theta,2}} \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{N} \left( F_{ni,t}^\theta M_{ni,t} P_{X,nt} / \omega_{ni} \right) \right]^{-\theta M \xi} \left( \frac{1}{\sigma^M-1} - \frac{1}{\sigma^M-1} \right) \theta^M + 1, \]  

(29)

where

\[ \xi \equiv \frac{1}{\left( \frac{1}{\sigma^M-1} - \frac{1}{\sigma^M-1} \right) \theta^M + 1}, \]  

(30)

and the share of expenditure of country \( n \) on country \( i \)'s varieties is

\[ \lambda_{ni,t} = \frac{\left( F_{ni,t}^\theta M_{ni,t} P_{X,nt} / \omega_{ni} \right)^{-\theta M \xi}}{\sum_{i=1}^{N} \left( F_{ni,t}^\theta M_{ni,t} P_{X,nt} / \omega_{ni} \right)^{-\theta M \xi}}. \]  

(31)

The value of total output of varieties in country \( n \) in period \( t \) is

\[ X_{nt} = \frac{\sigma^M}{\sigma^M - 1} W_{nt} L_{\chi,nt}, \]

and total average profits of country \( n \)'s producers of varieties are

\[ D_{nt} = \frac{\sigma^M}{\sigma^M \theta^M} \cdot \frac{X_{nt}}{M_{nt}}. \]

The total amount of country \( n \)'s labor used to serve its market is

\[ L_{\tau,nt} = \frac{\theta^M + 1 - \sigma^M}{\theta^M \sigma^M} \cdot \frac{P_{Y,nt} Y_{nt}}{W_{nt}}, \]

which can also be written as

\[ L_{\tau,nt} = \theta L_{\chi,nt} / X_{nt}. \]

If trade is balanced — for example, as is always the case under financial autarky — then \( P_{Y,nt} Y_{nt} = X_{nt} \) and so \( L_{\tau,nt} = \theta L_{\chi,nt} \).

**3.3.4 Household’s Problem and Markets Clearing Conditions**

The household’s problem is identical to the one in the Krugman model. Labor market clearing condition is different from the corresponding condition in the Krugman model — it involves labor used for serving markets, \( L_{\tau,nt} \),

\[ L_{\chi,nt} + L_{\tau,nt} + L_{\iota,nt} = L_{nt}. \]
The other conditions are the same as in the Krugman model:

\[ \sum_{n=1}^{N} \lambda_{nt} P_{y nt} Y_{nt} = X_{i t}, \]
\[ C_{nt} + Y_{i nt} = Y_{nt}. \]

The complete set of equilibrium conditions for the generalized Melitz model is provided in Appendix B.3.

### 3.3.5 Discussion

There are no direct analogs in the existing literature of the generalized Melitz model. There are two important differences of the generalized Melitz model with the dynamic versions of the Melitz model described in, for example, Ghironi and Melitz (2005), Alessandria and Choi (2007), and Fattal Jaef and Lopez (2014). First, fixed costs of serving markets in the generalized Melitz model are paid in terms of the destination-country labor, while in the existing dynamic Melitz models the fixed costs are paid in terms of the source-country labor. Second, there are non-zero fixed costs of serving domestic markets in the generalized Melitz model, while in the existing dynamic Melitz models there are no fixed costs of serving domestic markets. The presence of such costs in the generalized Melitz model creates the situation when in every period there are some firms that neither produce nor exit. These firms have too low efficiency of production to overcome fixed costs of serving markets, but had high enough efficiency of production to enter the economy at some point. In the existing dynamic Melitz models all firms that enter the economy produce for at least the domestic market. Quantitatively, the effects of the differences in these assumptions are small in the environment with two symmetric countries, which is traditionally the focus of the international business cycles literature (and which is studied in the quantitative part of the current paper). The benefit of the assumptions about fixed costs of serving markets made in the generalized Melitz model here is that these assumptions allow us to establish isomorphism with the unified model.\(^{15}\)

If we shut down external economies of scale in production of varieties and in the fixed costs of serving markets (by setting \( \phi_{X L} = 0, \phi_{F M} = \frac{1}{\theta^{M}}, \phi_{F L} = \theta \)), and if we require that the sunk costs of entry into the economy are paid in terms of labor only (by setting

---

\(^{15}\)The generalized Melitz model can be considered as an extension to a dynamic environment of the static version of the Melitz model described in Kucheryavyy \textit{et al.} (2017), who make the same assumptions about fixed costs of serving markets as in the current paper. These assumptions allow Kucheryavyy \textit{et al.} (2017) to establish isomorphism between a static multi-industry version of the Melitz model and a static multi-industry version of the Eaton-Kortum model with external economies of scale.
\[ a_i = 1 \], then the only essential differences between the generalized Melitz model and the version of the dynamic Melitz model presented in Ghironi and Melitz (2005) will be the differences in the assumptions about fixed costs of serving markets described in the previous paragraph. In Fattal Jaef and Lopez (2014), production technology for intermediate varieties uses capital together with labor. And, so, Fattal Jaef and Lopez (2014) model capital accumulation in addition to entry and exit of producers of varieties. The environment in Alessandria and Choi (2007) features sunk costs of entry into exporting markets, which create exporters hysteresis — the feature absent in the setup of the generalized Melitz model of the current paper.

4 Results

In this section we first formulate our main theoretical result: isomorphisms between the unified model of Section 2 and the models of Section 3. After that we describe the relationship between these models and relevant models in the literature. And then we explore quantitatively the ability of the unified model to match business cycle moments observed in the data.

In the rest of this paper, for brevity, when there is no risk of confusion, we refer to the generalized dynamic international trade models of Section 3 simply as “the Eaton-Kortum model”, “the Krugman model”, and “the Melitz model”.

4.1 Theoretical Isomorphisms

The key results in establishing the link between the unified model of Section 2 and the models of Section 3 are the following three lemmas.

**Lemma 1.** By an appropriate relabeling of variables and parameters, the price of country n’s output of varieties in the Eaton-Kortum, Krugman, and Melitz models — given, correspondingly, by expressions (13), (20), and (28) — can be written as the price of country n’s intermediates in the unified model given by expression (2).

**Proof.** There is nothing to prove in the case of the Eaton-Kortum model: the price of output of varieties in the Eaton-Kortum model, given by (13), is identical to the price in expression (2).

In Appendices B.2 and B.3 we show that expressions (20) and (28) for prices in the
Krugman and Melitz models can be rewritten, correspondingly, as

$$P_{X,nt} = \frac{D_{nt}^{\frac{1}{\sigma_X}} W_{nt}^{1 - \frac{1}{\sigma_X}}}{\tilde{\Theta}_{X,nt} Z_{X,nt} M_{nt}^{\phi_{X,nt} - \frac{1}{\sigma_X} L_{X,nt}^{\frac{1}{\sigma_X} + \frac{1}{\sigma_X}}}} \quad \text{and} \quad P_{X,nt} = \frac{D_{nt}^{\frac{M_{nt} - 1}{\sigma_M}} W_{nt}^{1 - \frac{M_{nt} - 1}{\sigma_M}}}{\tilde{\Theta}_{X,nt} Z_{X,nt} M_{nt}^{\phi_{X,nt} - \frac{M_{nt} - 1}{\sigma_M} L_{X,nt}^{\frac{M_{nt} - 1}{\sigma_M} - 1}}},$$

(32)

where $\tilde{\Theta}_{X,nt}$ and $\tilde{\Theta}_{X,nt}$ are model-specific constants, and, in the case of the Melitz model,

$$L_{X,nt} \equiv \left( \frac{\sigma^M}{\sigma^M - 1} - \frac{1}{\theta^M} \right) L_{X,nt}^M.$$  

(33)

By examining expressions (32), we see that they become identical to expression (2) for price in the unified model, if we (i) relabel variables $D_{nt}$ as $R_{nt}$ and $M_{nt}$ as $K_{X,nt}$; (ii) map exponents of all variables in (32) to the corresponding exponents in (2); and (iii) multiply the amount of labor used in production of varieties in the Melitz model, $L_{X,nt}^M$, by $\left( \frac{\sigma^M}{\sigma^M - 1} - \frac{1}{\theta^M} \right)$ to map it to the amount of labor used in production of intermediates in the unified model, $L_{X,nt}$.

Informally, the average firms’ profit in country $n$ and the measure of country $n$’s varieties in the Krugman and Melitz models play the role of, correspondingly, return on capital in country $n$ and the stock of country $n$’s capital in the unified model. The adjustment to $L_{X,nt}^M$ in the Melitz model has to be done because in the Melitz model — differently from the other models — there is an extra use of the total labor available in the economy: to pay fixed costs of serving markets. The labor used to pay fixed costs of serving markets can be written as

$$L_{F,nt} = \left( \frac{1}{\sigma^M - 1} - \frac{1}{\theta^M} \right) L_{X,nt}^M = \frac{\theta^M + 1 - \sigma^M}{\theta^M \sigma^M} \cdot \frac{\text{TB}_{nt}}{W_{nt}}.$$  

The sum of $L_{X,nt}^M$ and the first term on the right-hand side of the above expression gives the right-hand side of (33). The second term on the right-hand side of the above expression is mapped into the additional term on the right-hand side of the labor market clearing condition (11) in the unified model with

$$\alpha = \frac{\theta^M + 1 - \sigma^M}{\theta^M \sigma^M}.$$  

Mappings between exponents in expressions (32) and (2) are summarized in Table 1 and discussed later in this section.

In order to formulate the next lemma, we need to introduce an additional assumption for the Melitz model:
**Assumption 1. (Melitz)** (i) \((F_{ni,t}/F_{nn,t})^\theta \tau_{ni,t}^M \geq 1\) for all \(n, i\) and all \(t\); and (ii) \((F_{nl,t}F_{li,t})^\theta \tau_{nl,t}^M \tau_{li,t}^M \geq (F_{ni,t}/F_{nn,t})^\theta \tau_{ni,t}^M\) for all \(n, l, i\) and all \(t\).

Observe that, since \(\theta = \frac{1}{\sigma^M - 1} - \frac{1}{\theta^M}\) and \(\theta^M > \sigma^M - 1\), we have that \(\theta > 0\). So the sufficient conditions to guarantee Assumption 1 are (i) \(F_{ni,t} \geq F_{nn,t}\) for all \(n, i\) and all \(t\); and (ii) \(F_{nl,t}F_{li,t} \geq F_{ni,t}F_{nn,t}\) for all \(n, l, i\) and all \(t\).

**Lemma 2.** By an appropriate relabeling of variables and parameters, the price of country \(n\)'s final aggregate in the Eaton-Kortum and Krugman models — given, correspondingly, by expressions (12) and (22) — can be written as the price of country \(n\)'s final aggregate in the unified model given by expression (4). Moreover, under Assumption 1, the price of country \(n\)'s final aggregate in the Melitz model — given by expression (29) — can also be written as the price of country \(n\)'s final aggregate in the unified model.

**Proof.** Comparing expressions (12) and (22) for the Eaton-Kortum and Krugman models with expression (4) for the unified model, we see that they are almost identical. The only difference is in the exponents of the aggregators of the CES price indices.

One way to achieve a mapping between expression (29) for the Melitz model and (4) is by making two redefinitions in the Melitz model. First, we can redefine iceberg trade cost as

\[
\tau_{ni,t} \equiv \left(\frac{F_{ni,t}}{F_{nn,t}}\right)^\theta \tau_{ni,t}^M.
\]

Assumption 1 guarantees that \(\tau_{ni,t}\) defined this way are, indeed, iceberg trade costs that satisfy the no-arbitrage condition. Second, we can write \(F_{nn,t}^{-\theta} = \Theta_{1,n}Z_{t,n}\) and define

\[
\Theta_{1,n} \equiv \left(\frac{\theta^M}{\theta^M + 1 - \sigma^M}\right)^{1/\theta^M} \Phi_{t,n} \left[\sigma^M\right]^{-\Phi_{t,n} \Theta_{1,n}}.
\]

Then we get expression for \(P_{t,n}\) in the Melitz model that is almost identical to (4). Again, the only difference is in the exponents of the aggregators of the CES price indices. Mappings between these exponents across models are summarized in Table 1 and discussed later in this section.

**Lemma 3.** By an appropriate relabeling of variables and parameters, price of country \(n\)'s investment good in the Eaton-Kortum model — given by expression (14) — and the value of a variety before entry in the economy in the Melitz and Krugman models — given, correspondingly, by expressions (23) and (26) — can be written as the price of country \(n\)'s investment good in the unified model given by expression (7).
Proof. There is nothing to prove in the case of the Eaton-Kortum model. In the cases of the Krugman and Melitz models, all we need to do is to relabel the value of a variety before entry in the economy, $V_{nt}$, as the price of the investment good in the unified model, $P_{i,nt}$. After this relabeling, expressions (23) and (26) become identical to (7).

Lemmas 1-3 lead to our main theoretical result formulated in the next proposition.

**Proposition 1.** By an appropriate relabeling of variables and parameters in the Eaton-Kortum, Krugman, and Melitz models, and by making an additional Assumption 1 for the Melitz model, we can write the equilibrium system of equations in each of these models in a form identical to the equilibrium system of equations in the unified model. Thus, these models are isomorphic to each other in their aggregate predictions.

**Proof.** Appendix B. □

This proposition says that, up to relabeling, the generalized versions of the Eaton-Kortum, Krugman, and Melitz models are essentially the same, despite having very different micro-foundations. In particular, under certain parameterizations, these models are identical to a standard international business cycles model extended to allow for external economies of scale in production and iceberg trade costs.

Parameter mappings between models are summarized in Table 1. Let us first consider the Krugman model. As one can see from Table 1, in the standard Krugman model, elasticity of substitution between varieties governs four out of five key parameters of the corresponding unified model: the share of capital in production of intermediates, $\alpha_{X,K}$; strengths of economies of scale in production of intermediates, given by $\psi_{X,K}$ for capital and $\psi_{X,L}$ for labor; and trade elasticity, given by the (minus of) exponent of $\tau_{ni,t}$ in expression (5) for trade shares. Thus, the standard Krugman model implies tight links between key parameters of the corresponding unified model. The modeling assumptions of the generalized Krugman model of Section 3.2 allow us to break these tight links. To understand these modeling assumptions, observe that we can obtain the standard Krugman model as a special case of the generalized Krugman model by making several parameter restrictions. First, we need to set the elasticity of substitution between varieties produced in different countries equal to the elasticity of substitution between varieties produced in one country (i.e., assume that $\eta^k = \sigma^k$). Second, we need to remove the correction for the love-of-variety effect in the production technology for the final aggregate by setting $\phi_{Y,M} = \frac{1}{\sigma^{k-1}}$. Third, we need to shut down external economies of scale in production of varieties by setting $\phi_{X,L} = 0$. And, fourth, we need to shut down external economies of scale and exogenous shocks in production of the final aggregate by setting $S_{Y,nt} = 1$. In
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>$\alpha_{X,K}$</th>
<th>$\psi_{X,K}$</th>
<th>$\psi_{X,L}$</th>
<th>$\psi_Y$</th>
<th>$\alpha_I$</th>
<th>Trade elasticity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Standard Eaton-Kortum</td>
<td>$\alpha_{X,K}$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$\theta_{EK}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Krugman</td>
<td>$1/\sigma^k$</td>
<td>$1/\sigma^k - 1/\sigma^k$</td>
<td>$1/\sigma^k$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$\sigma^k - 1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Melitz</td>
<td>$\sigma^M - 1/\sigma^M$</td>
<td>$\sigma^M - 1/\sigma^M$</td>
<td>$1/\sigma^M - 1/\sigma^M$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$\theta^M$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalized Krugman</td>
<td>$\phi_{Y,M} - 1/\sigma^k$</td>
<td>$\phi_{X,L} + 1/\sigma^k$</td>
<td>$\psi_Y$</td>
<td>$\alpha_I$</td>
<td>$\eta^k - 1$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalized Melitz</td>
<td>$\sigma^M - 1/\sigma^M$</td>
<td>$\phi_{F,M} - 1/\sigma^M$</td>
<td>$\phi_{X,L} + 1/\sigma^M$</td>
<td>$\phi_{F,L}$</td>
<td>$\alpha_I$</td>
<td>$\theta^M \xi$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: $\alpha_{X,K}$ is the capital share in production of intermediates in the unified model as well as the capital share in production of varieties in the standard Eaton-Kortum model. $\psi_{X,K}$ and $\psi_{X,L}$ are the scale elasticities of capital and labor in production of intermediates in the unified model. $\psi_Y$ is the scale elasticity of real output of the final aggregate in production of the final aggregate in the unified model. $\sigma^k$ and $\sigma^M$ are the elasticities of substitution between varieties in the Melitz and Krugman models. $\theta_{EK}$ is the parameter of the Fréchet distribution in the Eaton-Kortum model. $\theta^M$ is the shape of Pareto distribution in the Melitz model. $\phi_{Y,M}$ is the correction for the love-of-variety effect in the generalized Krugman model. $\phi_{X,L}$ is the scale elasticity of labor in production of varieties in the generalized Krugman and Melitz models. $\phi_{F,M}$ and $\phi_{F,L}$ are the scale elasticities of total measure of varieties and total amount of labor in fixed costs of serving markets in the generalized Melitz model. $\alpha_I$ is the labor share in production of the investment good in the unified and Eaton-Kortum models as well as the labor share in the cost of entry into the economy in the Krugman and Melitz models. Trade elasticity in the unified model is given by the exponent of $\tau_{ni,t}$ in expression (21) for trade shares and is equal to $(\eta^k - 1)$. Thus, by assuming that $\eta^k \neq \sigma^k$, we break the link between parameter $\sigma^k$ and trade elasticity. By introducing correction for the love-of-variety effect in the generalized Krugman model — by assuming that $\phi_{Y,M} \neq 1/\sigma^k - 1$ — we break the tight link between parameter $\sigma$ and the strength of economies of scale for capital. We can get any desired value of parameter $\psi_{X,K}$ in the unified model by varying $\phi_{Y,M}$. However, the correction for the love-of-variety effect does not break the link between parameter $\sigma^k$ and the strength of economies of scale for labor. To break this last link, we directly introduce external economies of scale in the technology of production of varieties given by (21) — with the strength of these economies of scale given by parameter $\phi_{X,L}$. With this generalization we can get any desired level of the strength of economies of scale for labor in production of intermediates in the unified model.

Table 1: Parameter mappings between models
Let us now turn to the Melitz model. Two parameters of the standard Melitz model — elasticity of substitution between varieties, $\sigma^M$, and the shape of Pareto distribution, $\theta^M$, govern the five key parameters of the corresponding unified model: $\alpha_{X,K}$, $\Psi_{X,K}$, $\Psi_{X,L}$, $\psi_L$, and trade elasticity. Thus, as it is the case with the standard Krugman model, the standard Melitz model implies tight links between these key parameters of the corresponding unified model. Again, the modeling assumptions of the generalized Melitz model of Section 3.3 allow us to break these tight links. In order to understand these assumptions, let us describe parameter restrictions that we need to make to obtain the standard Melitz model from the generalized Melitz model. First, the same as in the generalized Krugman model, we need to set $\eta^M = \sigma^M$. Second, we need to remove correction for the externality that arises due to interaction of scale and love-of-variety effects in the presence of the fixed costs of serving markets. This involves setting $\phi_{F,M} = \frac{1}{\theta^M}$ and $\phi_{F,L} = \vartheta$. Third, we need to shut down external economies of scale in production of varieties by setting $\phi_{X,L} = 0$. Relaxing these parameter restrictions allows us to have isomorphism between the generalized Melitz model and the unified model.

In the generalized Melitz model, we do not have correction for the love-of-variety effect in production technology of the final aggregate given by (25). External economies of scale in production of intermediate goods arise in the Melitz model due to the selection effect: everything else equal, increase in the number of varieties produced in country $i$, $M_{it}$, leads to an increase in the cut-off threshold for the minimal efficiency available in any country $n$, $z^*_ni, t$. This increase in the cut-off threshold leads to dropping of varieties with efficiencies smaller than $z^*_ni, t$. The number of varieties dropped is such that the total amount of varieties left available at any destination $n$, $M_{ni, t}$, is unchanged. Since the remaining varieties have higher average efficiency relative to the previously available set of varieties, the price of production of intermediate goods available in any country $n$, given by $\tau^M_{ni, t} P_{X, it}$, falls (with elasticity $1/\theta^M$ in the standard Melitz model) as $M_{it}$ increases. We formally show in Appendix (B.3) that correction for the love-of-variety effect in (25) does not affect the elasticity $1/\theta^M$ with which price $P_{X, it}$ falls as $M_{it}$ increases. In order to change this elasticity, we correct the selection effect by introducing external economies of scale with respect to the number of varieties $M_{it}$ in the fixed costs of serving markets, $\Phi_{ni, t}$.
## 4.2 Quantitative Exercise

We now assess quantitatively the international business cycle implications of the dynamic trade models using our general, competitive model to provide perspectives on the transmission mechanisms that get altered compared to the standard international business cycle model. We also show in what direction the standard international business cycle model needs to be amended to provide a better fit with the data.

### 4.2.1 Calibration

| Common Parameters | \[ \begin{bmatrix} \log (Z_{x1,t}) \\ \log (Z_{x2,t}) \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \rho_{X11} & 0 \\ 0 & \rho_{X22} \end{bmatrix} \times \begin{bmatrix} \log (Z_{x1,t-1}) \\ \log (Z_{x2,t-1}) \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} \epsilon_{x1t} \\ \epsilon_{x2t} \end{bmatrix}, \]

| \[ \begin{bmatrix} \epsilon_{x1t} \\ \epsilon_{x2t} \end{bmatrix} \sim N \left( \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}, \begin{bmatrix} \sigma_{x1}^2 & 0 \\ 0 & \sigma_{x2}^2 \end{bmatrix} \right), \]

| with \( \rho_{X11} = \rho_{X22} = 0.97, \sigma_{x1} = \sigma_{x2} = 0.0073 \) |

| IRBC | \( \alpha_{x,k} = 0.36, \quad \psi_{x,k} = \psi_{x,l} = \psi_{y} = 0, \quad \alpha_{i} = 0, \quad a = 0, \quad Z_{i,nt} = Z_{y,nt} = 1 \) |

| Krugman | \( \alpha_{x,k} = \frac{1}{3.8} \approx 0.26, \quad \psi_{x,k} = \frac{1}{3.8 - 1} - \frac{1}{3.8} \approx 0.094, \quad \psi_{x,l} = \frac{1}{3.8} \approx 0.26, \)

| \( \psi_{y} = 0, \quad \alpha_{i} = 1, \quad a = 0, \quad Z_{i,nt} = Z_{x,nt}, \quad Z_{y,nt} = 1 \) |

| Melitz | \( \alpha_{x,k} = \frac{3.8 - 1}{3.8 \times 3} \approx 0.25, \quad \psi_{x,k} = \frac{1}{3.8 \times 3} \approx 0.088, \quad \psi_{x,l} = \frac{3.8 - 1}{3.8 \times 3} \approx 0.25, \)

| \( \psi_{y} = \frac{1}{3.8 - 1} - \frac{1}{3} \approx 0.024, \quad \alpha_{i} = 1, \quad a = \frac{3 + 1 - 3.8}{3.8 \times 3} \approx 0.018, \)

| \( Z_{i,nt} = Z_{x,nt}, \quad Z_{y,nt} = [Z_{x,nt}]^{\frac{1}{3.8 - 1} - \frac{1}{3}} \approx [Z_{x,nt}]^{0.024} \) |

| Table 2: Standard calibrations of models. |

In this quantitative section we focus on the world economy that consists of two sym-
metric countries. We consider the following preferences:

\[ U(C_{nt}, L_{nt}) = \frac{1}{1 - \gamma} \left[ C_{nt}^\mu (1 - L_{nt})^{1 - \mu} \right]^{1 - \gamma}. \]

We start with a calibration that we call “standard”. It is summarized in Table 2. For this calibration we choose three sets of parameter values of the unified model that correspond to standard IRBC, Krugman, and Melitz models. We choose parameter values of the unified model corresponding to the Krugman and Melitz models so that in the Krugman and Melitz models almost all generalizations are shut down. We only allow for the nested CES production technology of the final aggregate. Formally, the implied parameterization for the Krugman model is \( \phi_Y, M = \frac{1}{\sigma^k - 1} \) and \( \phi_X, L = 0 \), but allowing for \( \eta^k \neq \sigma^k \). Similarly, the implied parameterization for the Melitz model is \( \phi_Y, M = \frac{1}{\sigma^M} \), \( \phi_X, L = \vartheta \), and \( \phi_X, L = 0 \), but allowing for \( \eta^M \neq \sigma^M \).

We first choose a set of common parameter values for the three models. Most of these values are taken from the literature. Periods are interpreted as quarters. Values of parameters \( \beta, \gamma, \delta \), and \( \mu \) are the same as in, for example, Heathcote and Perri (2002) and Ghironi and Melitz (2005). We follow the macro literature (as opposed to the international trade literature) and set the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods in production of the final good to 2, i.e., we set \( \sigma = 2 \). This implies that the trade elasticity is equal to 1. We choose the level of iceberg trade costs \( \tau_{ni,t} = 5.67 \) for \( n \neq i \) to match the steady-state share of imports of intermediate goods of 0.15. Differently from Heathcote and Perri (2002), we do not have home bias in production of the final aggregate and set \( \omega_{ni} = 0.5 \) for all \( n \) and \( i \). Values of autocorrelations \( \rho_{X,11} \) and \( \rho_{X,22} \) of the productivity process in the intermediate goods sector, \( Z_{X,nt} \), as well as volatilities of shocks \( \sigma_{X,1} \) and \( \sigma_{X,2} \) to \( Z_{X,nt} \) are taken from Heathcote and Perri (2002). Differently from Heathcote and Perri (2002), we do not allow for spillovers in the process for \( Z_{X,nt} \), and we do not allow for correlation of shocks to \( Z_{X,nt} \). We set the normalization constants in the intermediate goods

\[ \lambda_{ni} = \frac{(\tau_{ni}/\omega_{ni})^{1 - \sigma}}{(\tau_{n1}/\omega_{n1})^{1 - \sigma} + (\tau_{n2}/\omega_{n2})^{1 - \sigma}}. \]

With the same values of taste parameters \( \omega_{ni} \) across countries, the steady state trade share depends only on iceberg trade costs and parameter \( \sigma \).
and investment sectors to 1, \( \Theta_{X,n} = \Theta_{I,n} = 1 \). In order to match the value of fixed costs of serving foreign markets in Ghironi and Melitz (2005) (which is discussed below), we set the normalization constant in the final aggregates sector to 2.677, \( \Theta_{Y,n} = 2.677 \). Finally, for the case of the bond economy, we choose a relatively low value of the bond holdings adjustment cost, \( b_{adj} = 0.0025 \).

The values of the remaining parameters are different between the IRBC, Krugman, and Melitz models. For the IRBC model, we set the same share of capital in production of intermediate goods as in Heathcote and Perri (2002), \( \alpha_{X,K} = 0.36 \), and require that investment is made in terms of the final good only (i.e., set \( \alpha_I = 1 \)). The IRBC model does not have any externalities (\( \psi_{X,K} = \psi_{X,L} = \psi_Y = 0 \)), it does not have productivity shocks in the investment and final aggregate sectors (\( Z_{I,nt} = Z_{Y,nt} = 1 \)), and it does not have the additional term \( aTB_{nt} \) in the labor market clearing condition (\( a = 0 \)).

For the parameterization corresponding to the Krugman model, we use the value of \( \sigma_K = 3.8 \) from Bilbiie et al. (2012). This choice immediately implies values for all key parameters specific to the Krugman model: \( \alpha_{X,K} = \frac{1}{\sigma_K} \approx 0.26 \), \( \psi_{X,K} = \frac{1}{\sigma_K - 1} - \frac{1}{\sigma_K} \approx 0.094 \), and \( \psi_{X,L} = \frac{1}{\sigma_K} \approx 0.26 \) (see Table 1 for parameter mappings between the models). The standard Krugman model has neither externalities nor productivity shocks in production of the final aggregate (\( \psi_Y = 0 \) and \( Z_{Y,nt} = 1 \)), and it does not have the additional term \( aTB_{nt} \) in the labor market clearing condition (\( a = 0 \)). Investment is made in terms of labor only (\( \alpha_I = 0 \)). We follow Bilbiie et al. (2012) in setting the productivity shock in production of investment goods identical to the productivity shock in production of intermediate goods (\( Z_{I,nt} = Z_{X,nt} \)). The choice of the investment-sector normalization constant \( \Theta_{I,n} = 1 \) implies that the sunk entry cost into the economy in the Krugman model — given by \( \tilde{\Theta}_{I,n}^{-1} \) — is also equal to 1.\(^1\) Finally, trade elasticity equal to 1 in the unified model implies that the elasticity of substitution between varieties from different countries in the Krugman model is equal to \( \eta^e = 2 \).

Turning to the parameterization corresponding to the Melitz model, let us first consider fixed and variable costs of serving markets in the Melitz model. We assume that in the Melitz model \( F_{12,t} = F_{11,t} \) and \( F_{21,t} = F_{22,t} \) for all \( t \). This implies that \( \tau_{n,t}^M = \tau_{n,t} = 5.67 \). Following Ghironi and Melitz (2005), we further assume that the fixed costs of serving markets in the Melitz model are subject to the same shock as the production technology of varieties. Formally, we assume that \( F_{mn,t} = f_{nn} / Z_{n,n,t} \), where \( f_{nn} \) is a time-independent constant (defined below). We proved the part of Lemma 2 concerning the Melitz model by

\(^1\)Bilbiie et al. (2012) also have the value of the sunk costs of entry into the economy equal to 1. As Bilbiie et al. (2012) note, this value does not affect any impulse-responses under CES preferences.
defining \( F_{\theta}^{-\frac{\theta}{\sigma}} = \Theta_{\gamma}^{\frac{1}{\sigma-\theta}} Z_{t,n} \). This definition implies that \( Z_{t,n} = [Z_{\theta}^{\frac{1}{\sigma-\theta}}] \) and \( f_{nn} = [\Theta_{\gamma}^{\frac{1}{\sigma-\theta}}]^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} \). Using mapping (34), we find that the fixed costs of serving markets are given by

\[
f_{nn} = \left( \frac{\theta^\sigma}{\theta^\sigma + 1 - \sigma^\sigma} \right)^{\frac{\sigma^\sigma-1}{\sigma^\sigma+1-\sigma^\sigma}} \frac{1}{\sigma^\sigma} [\Theta_{\gamma}^{\frac{1}{\sigma-\theta}}]^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}.
\]  

(35)

Let us now discuss the choice of parameter values for the Melitz model. We use the same value of \( \sigma^\sigma = 3.8 \) as Ghironi and Melitz (2005) (which is also the same as \( \sigma^\sigma \)). We somewhat arbitrary choose \( \theta^\sigma = 3 \) (which is close to the value of 3.4 used by Ghironi and Melitz (2005)). The choices of \( \sigma^\sigma \) and \( \theta^\sigma \) imply that \( a_{X,K} = \frac{\sigma^\sigma - 1}{\sigma^\sigma \theta^\sigma} \approx 0.25 \), \( \psi_{X,K} = \frac{1}{\sigma^\sigma \theta^\sigma} \approx 0.088 \), \( \psi_{X,L} = \frac{1}{\sigma^\sigma \theta^\sigma} - \frac{1}{\theta^\sigma} \approx 0.024 \), and \( Z_{X,n} \approx [Z_{X,n}]^{0.024} \). Using expression (35) we get that the implied value of the fixed costs of serving markets in the Melitz model is \( f_{nn} \approx 0.0084 \), which is the same as the fixed cost of serving foreign markets in Ghironi and Melitz (2005). The labor market clearing condition now features the additional term \( a_{TB} \) with \( a = \frac{\theta^\sigma + 1 - \sigma^\sigma}{\sigma^\sigma \theta^\sigma} \approx 0.018 \). As in the calibration corresponding to the Krugman model, \( Z_{t,n} = Z_{X,n} \) and \( a_{t} = 1 \). The implied sunk entry cost into the economy is equal to 1. Finally, the choice of \( \sigma = 2 \) in the unified model implies that in the Melitz model the elasticity of substitution between varieties from different countries is equal to

\[
\eta^\sigma = 1 + \left( \frac{1}{\sigma^\sigma - 1} + \theta^\sigma \right)^{-1} \approx 1.98.
\]

4.2.2 Comparison Across Models

Moments across models for standard calibrations are presented in Table 3.\(^{19}\) Column 1 provides data moments from Heathcote and Perri (2002). Columns 2, 5, 8 present results for the standard IRBC model for three different financial market arrangements. Columns 3, 6, 9 and 4, 7, 10 present results for “standard” versions of the Krugman and Melitz models respectively. Comparing outcomes of the three models with moments in the data, we see that the Krugman and Melitz models perform no better than the standard IRBC model: the Krugman and Melitz models perform well (or even worse in output and hours cross country correlations and the cyclicality of trade balance) and fail in the same moments where the standard IRBC model performs well or fails.\(^{20}\) This outcome was re-

\(^{19}\)In Table 11 in Appendix C.1 we provide moments for standard formulations of the IRBC, Krugman, and Melitz models, where we calibrate processes for \( Z_{X,t} \) for the Krugman and Melitz models so that the implied processes for \( S_{X,t} \) in these models are the same as the process for \( S_{X,t} \) in the IRBC model.

\(^{20}\)Note, as emphasized by Heathcote and Perri (2002), the IRBC model under financial autarky leads to international correlations closer to the data than under complete markets or the bond economy.
ported, among others, by Alessandria and Choi (2007) and Fattal Jaef and Lopez (2014) for different versions of the Melitz model.

First, note that there is not much difference between the moments for the Krugman and Melitz models despite the fact that the Melitz model has a much richer firm-level dynamics than the Krugman model. From the point of view of the unified model, the Melitz model has three different features relative to the Krugman model: external economies of scale and shocks in production of the final aggregate as well as the additional term $aTB_{nt}$ in the labor market clearing condition. However, the standard calibration used for the Melitz model implies that these features have a quantitatively small impact. This follows from the fact that parameters responsible for these features are relatively small: $\psi_Y \approx 0.024$, $Z_{v,nt} \approx [Z_{X,nt}]^{0.024}$, and $a \approx 0.018$. In the calibration for the Melitz model model we have values of three other parameters --- $\alpha_{X,K}$, $\psi_{X,K}$, and $\psi_{X,L}$ --- different from the calibration for the Krugman model. But again, this difference is small. The small values of $\psi_Y$, $Z_{v,nt}$, and $a$ as well as small differences between calibrations for the Krugman and Melitz models are implied by a small difference between the chosen values of $\sigma^M = 2.8$ and $\theta^M = 3$ as well as our choice $\sigma^M = \sigma^K$. The chosen values of $\sigma^M$ and $\theta^M$ are fairly standard, and the unified-model perspective allows us to see clearly the consequences of this choice. Table 2 shows how this standard calibration implies small differences between the Krugman and Melitz models.

Next, from the point of view of the standard IRBC model, the Krugman and Melitz models have several key modifications that could potentially have opposite or hard to understand effects on the performance of these models. Out of all new features of the Krugman and Melitz models (relative to the standard IRBC model), external economies of scale in production of intermediate goods and final aggregates are the most interesting. Before we focus on the role played by external economies of scale however, we consider a few more exercises to show that our comparisons across models are robust to various specifications. In exercises that we report below, for concreteness we focus on the complete markets benchmark and report financial autarky and bond economy cases in Appendix C.2.

First, one striking difference between the IRBC model and the Krugman and Melitz models in Table 3 is in terms of the cyclicality of the trade balance. The correlation of trade
### Table 3: Moments from standard calibrations and formulations of models. Shock to the intermediate goods sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moment</th>
<th>Complete Markets</th>
<th>Bond Economy</th>
<th>Financial Autarky</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Data (1)</td>
<td>IRBC (2)</td>
<td>Krug (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Corr} \left( \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{\text{P}</em>{x,1}}, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>2}{\text{P}</em>{x,2}} \right)$</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Corr} \left( \frac{\text{C}<em>1}{\text{P}</em>{x,1}}, \frac{\text{C}<em>2}{\text{P}</em>{x,2}} \right)$</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Corr} \left( \frac{\text{P}<em>{x,1}}{\text{P}</em>{x,1}}, \frac{\text{P}<em>{x,2}}{\text{P}</em>{x,2}} \right)$</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>-0.39</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Corr} \left( \frac{\text{L}<em>1}{\text{P}</em>{x,1}}, \frac{\text{L}<em>2}{\text{P}</em>{x,2}} \right)$</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>-0.30</td>
<td>-0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Corr} \left( \frac{\text{S}<em>X}{\text{P}</em>{x,1}}, \frac{\text{S}<em>Y}{\text{P}</em>{x,2}} \right)$</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Corr} \left( \frac{\text{TB}_1}{\text{GDP}_1}, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{\text{P}</em>{x,1}} \right)$</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Std} \left( \frac{\text{TB}_1}{\text{GDP}_1} \right)$</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Corr} \left( \frac{\text{X}<em>{21}}{\text{P}</em>{x,1}}, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{\text{P}</em>{x,1}} \right)$</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Corr} \left( \frac{\text{X}<em>{12}}{\text{P}</em>{x,1}}, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{\text{P}</em>{x,1}} \right)$</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Corr} \left( \frac{\text{ReR}}{\text{GDP}_1}, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{\text{P}</em>{x,1}} \right)$</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Data moments are from Heathcote and Perri (2002), Table 2. All series have been Hodrick-Prescott filtered with a smoothing parameter of 1600. Time index is dropped from notation for brevity.

$$\text{GDP}_n = W_n + R_n K_n, \text{X}_{ni} = P_{x,ni} X_{ni}, \text{TB}_1 = P_{x,1} X_1 - P_{y,1} Y_1, \text{ReR} = P_{x,2}/P_{y,1}.$$
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moment</th>
<th>Complete Markets</th>
<th></th>
<th>Bond Economy</th>
<th></th>
<th>Financial Autarky</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Data</td>
<td>IRBC</td>
<td>Krug</td>
<td>Mel</td>
<td>IRBC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \text{Corr} \left( \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{1,t}}, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>2}{P</em>{2,t}} \right) )</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \text{Corr} (C_1, C_2) )</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \text{Corr} \left( \frac{P_{1,t} X_1}{P_{1,t}}, \frac{P_{2,t} X_2}{P_{2,t}} \right) )</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>-0.62</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>-0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \text{Corr} (L_1, L_2) )</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>-0.69</td>
<td>-0.69</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \text{Corr} (S_{1_t}, S_{2_t}) )</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
<td>-0.46</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \text{Corr} \left( \frac{\text{TB}_1}{\text{GDP}_1}, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{1,t}} \right) )</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
<td>-0.69</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>-0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \text{Std} \left( \frac{\text{TB}_1}{\text{GDP}_1}, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{1,t}} \right) )</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \text{Corr} \left( \frac{X_{1_t}^1}{P_{1,t}}, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{1,t}} \right) )</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \text{Corr} \left( \frac{X_{1_t}^1}{P_{1,t}}, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{1,t}} \right) )</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \text{Corr} \left( \text{ReR}, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{1,t}} \right) )</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Data moments are from Heathcote and Perri (2002), Table 2. All series have been Hodrick-Prescott filtered with a smoothing parameter of 1600. Time index is dropped from notation for brevity.

GDP\(_n\) = \(W_n L_n + R_n K_n\), \(X_{1t} = P_{x,1} X_{1t} \), \(\text{TB}_1 = P_{x,1} X_1 - P_{y,1} Y_1\), \(\text{ReR} = P_{X_2}/P_{X_1}\).

Table 4: Moments from standard calibrations and formulations of models. Shock to the final goods sector

how the investment good is produced, we now change the Krugman and Melitz models in reverse. In columns 5 and 6 we now change these models such that the investment good is produced using the final aggregate good only (by setting \(\alpha_i = 0\)). It is clear that in this case, the trade balance is countercyclical. Finally, note that the Melitz model, other than a new externality, also introduces a shock to the final aggregate sector from the perspective of the general competitive model. In column 7 we shut down this shock (by setting \(\alpha_{nt} = 1\)) and find that it does not affect the moments.

It ensures a counter cyclical trade balance by countervailing the consumption smoothing intuition in models without investment. It is critically important how the investment good is produced. If it is with labor input only, then even with investment in the model, while investment certainly increases with a positive productivity shock, it does not render net exports counter cyclical. The reason is that in such a case, the rise in imports, is much more muted. This is because now imports follow consumption closely (as investment good production does not use the foreign intermediate good), which is smoothed over time due to standard consumption smoothing incentives. This then plays a key role in making net exports procyclical, and the usual consumption smoothing intuition that applies in a model without investment continues to apply.
Having resolved the issue related to cyclicality of trade balance, we undertake one potentially important additional robustness exercise. In columns 8, 9, and 10 of Table 5 we show that the IRBC and the Krugman and Melitz models lead to very similar moments for key international business cycle variables even when we calibrate the model to a high trade elasticity. In particular, we follow the international trade literature here and set the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods in production of the final good to 6, i.e., we set $\sigma = 6$. With this calibration, as is well-known, the fit of the IRBC model itself worsens significantly as international correlations become much weaker, with output correlations even turning negative.\(^{22}\) But the differences across the three models for the key moments are still minor (and the fit still worse for the Krugman and Melitz models for output and hours correlation).\(^{23}\)

Overall then, what is the main reason for the similar performance of the IRBC model on the one hand and the Krugman and Melitz models on the other hand, as shown in Tables 3 and 5? Our result on isomorphism is useful in answering this question. Note from above that in these restricted/standard versions of the Krugman and the Melitz models, the difference from the standard IRBC models is externalities that are highly restricted both in scale and in the split between capital and labor. Given the calibration in particular, where we follow the parameterization from the literature, not only are the extent and type of externalities highly restricted, they are also somewhat small overall. For instance, in the Krugman model, as $\psi_{X,K} = 0.094$ the positive externality on capital input in the intermediate good production is small. Moreover, since $\psi_{X,L} = 0.26$, the positive externality on labor input is higher, it is still not large enough to affect quantitatively as we show in detail later. Similar reasoning holds for the Melitz model, where the two externalities on the intermediate good production are relatively small, with $\psi_{X,K} = 0.088$, $\psi_{X,L} = 0.25$, and the externality on the final good production/aggregation technology similarly small as well, $\psi_Y = 0.024$. Table 2 shows how standard calibrations imply small differences between the Krugman and Melitz models for these externalities, as well as small overall differences from the standard IRBC model. Moreover, as we show later, positive externality, especially on the capital input, leads to a negative endogenous correlation in productivity across countries. This then further dampens down any co-movement in quantity variables across countries. In particular, it decreases the co-movement in output while

\(^{22}\)That is generally, with the elasticity of substitution increasing, in the IRBC model, the cross-country correlation of output, investment, and labor decreases while that of consumption increases. If the productivity shock were to be much more persistent, essentially a random walk, then in the particular case of the bond economy only, this worsening of fit can be less severe.

\(^{23}\)Of course, here again the trade balance is pro-cyclical for the Krugman and Melitz models as we report results from a standard specification of these models where investment good sector uses home labor to produce the investment good.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moment</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Bench</th>
<th>Krug</th>
<th>Mel</th>
<th>Mel</th>
<th>Inv. final aggregate</th>
<th>$\sigma = 0.9$</th>
<th>$\sigma = 6$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr $\left( \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{y,1}}, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>2}{P</em>{y,1}} \right)$</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr $\left( C_1, C_2 \right)$</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr $\left( \frac{P_{x,1}}{P_{x,1}}, \frac{P_{x,2}}{P_{x,1}} \right)$</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>-0.39</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
<td>-0.42</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr $\left( L_{1,2} \right)$</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>-0.30</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr $\left( S_{x,1}, S_{x,2} \right)$</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>Corr $\left( S_{y,1}, S_{y,2} \right)$</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr $\left( \frac{\text{TB}_1}{\text{GDP}_1}, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{y,1}} \right)$</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>-0.60</td>
<td>-0.62</td>
<td>-0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std $\left( \frac{\text{TB}_1}{\text{GDP}_1} \right)$</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.19</td>
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<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr $\left( \frac{X_{1,1}}{P_{y,1}}, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{y,1}} \right)$</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr $\left( \frac{X_{2,1}}{P_{y,1}}, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{y,1}} \right)$</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr $\left( \frac{\text{ReR}}{\text{GDP}_1}, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{y,1}} \right)$</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Data moments are from Heathcote and Perri (2002), Table 2. All series have been Hodrick-Prescott filtered with a smoothing parameter of 1600. Time index is dropped from notation for brevity. $\text{GDP}_n = W_nL_n + R_nK_n$, $X_{n,i} = P_{x,n}X_{n,i}$, $\text{TB}_1 = P_{y,1}X_1 - P_{y,1}Y_1$, ReR = $P_{y,2}/P_{y,1}$. Column 2 corresponds to the standard calibration of the IRBC model and is identical to column 2 in Table 3. Columns 3-5 are for the case of investment in terms of final aggregate in otherwise standard calibrations of Krugman and Melitz models. For column 5, there is no shock in the final aggregate sector. Columns 7-9 are for the case of $\sigma = 0.5$ in otherwise standard calibrations of IRBC, Krugman, and Melitz models. Columns 10-12 are for the case of $\sigma = 6$ in otherwise standard calibrations of IRBC, Krugman, and Melitz models.

Table 5: Robustness checks on comparisons across models. Complete markets. making even more negative the correlation in investment and hours.

### 4.2.3 Potential Role of Negative Capital Externality

Given the results described above, we next use our general competitive model, which because of the isomorphism can then be re-interpreted as a version of the generalized dynamic trade models, to explore if it is possible to achieve a better fit with the data. The general model is particularly useful as we can independently vary both the overall scale and the split of externalities across capital and labor. We do comparative statics for all the three externalities: capital and labor input in the intermediate goods production...
technology and the externality on the final good production technology. But here we first focus on the role of capital externality as that turns out to be most crucial. This leads to one of our main insights: we show that an essential feature is negative capital externalities in intermediate goods production. This can be seen from the results in Table 6, where for comparison, we provide the moments from a model without any externality, as well as those with positive and negative externality. For concreteness again, below when we present results we focus on the complete financial markets case and present all the results for the other two risk-sharing arrangements in Appendix C.4. As the standard dynamic trade models imply positive capital externalities in intermediate good production, they do not provide a closer fit, and in fact often a worse fit, to the data. What is the intuition for negative capital externalities helping with resolving several international business cycle puzzles, especially those that pertain to co-movement across countries?

Before going into the results, first, note that the main empirical puzzles are associated with co-movement across countries in output, consumption, hours, and investment, as is clear from Table 6. In the standard model, the co-movement of consumption is counterfactually higher than GDP. Moreover, while in the data, labor hours and investment co-move positively, in the standard models, they co-move negatively. Second, it is critical to note that when there are negative capital externalities in production of intermediate goods, from the perspective of individual firms, it is as if the aggregate country-specific productivity shock is less persistent with the same initial impact. This is because, in future, due to positive capital accumulation, the productivity shock faced by the firms is lower than the exogenous productivity shock. Third, note that since this feature is irrespective of the risk-sharing arrangements across countries, our finding applies independently of whether we assume complete financial markets or incomplete markets or financial autarky. For concreteness again, below when we present results we focus on the complete financial markets case and present all the results for the other two risk-sharing arrangements in Appendix D.

We now provide an interpretation for the moments by analyzing in depth the transmission mechanism. For this we turn to an analysis of impulse response functions, where a 1% exogenous technology shock in the intermediate goods sector hits the home country. In order to focus on the main mechanism behind the results, we do not consider exoge-

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24 Here, to keep the transmission mechanism and interpretation clear, we do not consider exogenously correlated shocks across countries. This is the reason why our benchmark moments are slightly different from the IRBC moments in Table 3. Moreover, throughout next, investment is in terms of the final good. We show results for the correlated shocks case also later below.

25 Note that high co-movement of consumption is not due to only perfect risk-sharing. This is also true even under financial autarky, as long as different countries produce different goods.
Table 6: Moments from calibration with increasing and decreasing returns, uncorrelated shocks across countries, and no spillovers in the productivity process. Shock to the intermediate goods sector. Complete markets.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moment</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Bench</th>
<th>$\psi_{X,K}$</th>
<th>$\psi_{X,L}$</th>
<th>$\psi_{Y}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Corr} \left( \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{X,1}} \frac{\text{GDP}<em>2}{P</em>{X,2}} \right)$</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Corr} \left( C_{1,2} \right)$</td>
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<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
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<td>$\text{Corr} \left( \frac{P_{X,1}}{P_{X,2}} \frac{P_{X,2}}{P_{X,3}} \right)$</td>
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<td>-0.39</td>
<td>-0.47</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
<td>-0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Corr} \left( L_{1,2} \right)$</td>
<td>0.42</td>
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<td>-0.52</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Corr} \left( S_{X,1}, S_{X,2} \right)$</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Corr} \left( S_{Y,1}, S_{Y,2} \right)$</td>
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<td>0.27</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Corr} \left( \frac{\text{TB}_1}{\text{GDP}_1} \frac{\text{GDP}<em>2}{P</em>{X,3}} \right)$</td>
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<td>-0.49</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
<td>-0.57</td>
<td>-0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Std} \left( \frac{\text{TB}_1}{\text{GDP}_1} \right)$</td>
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<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Corr} \left( \frac{X_{Y,1}}{P_{X,1}} \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{X,1}} \right)$</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Corr} \left( \frac{X_{Y,2}}{P_{X,1}} \frac{\text{GDP}<em>2}{P</em>{X,1}} \right)$</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Corr} \left( \text{ReR} \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{X,1}} \right)$</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.64</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Data moments are from Heathcote and Perri (2002), Table 2. All series have been Hodrick-Prescott filtered with a smoothing parameter of 1600. Time index is dropped from notation for brevity. GDP$_{n} = W_{n}L_{n} + R_{n}K_{n}, \bar{X}_{ni} = P_{X,ni}X_{ni}, \text{TB}_1 = P_{X,1}X_{1} \left( P_{X,1}Y_{1} \right), \text{ReR} = P_{X,2}/P_{X,1}.$

Table 6: Moments from calibration with increasing and decreasing returns, uncorrelated shocks across countries, and no spillovers in the productivity process. Shock to the intermediate goods sector. Complete markets.

Naturally correlated shocks across the two countries. Figure 1 shows the first set of results where we vary only the externalities in capital input, $\psi_{X,K}$, for a model with complete markets. As we mentioned above, when there are negative (positive) capital externalities in production of intermediate goods, from the perspective of individual firms, it is as if the aggregate country-specific productivity shock is less (more) persistent with the same initial impact. This is because, in future, due to positive capital accumulation, the productivity shock faced by the firms is lower than the exogenous productivity shock under negative capital externalities. Given this, how do agents, say at home, respond to a productivity shock that has the same initial size but is more transient compared to the no externality case? As is standard in competitive business cycle models, it is most useful to think through the labor supply response. As the shock is now more transient, compared
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moment</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Bench</th>
<th>$\psi_{X,K}$</th>
<th>$\psi_{X,L}$</th>
<th>$\psi_{Y}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ($\frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{11}}, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>2}{P</em>{21}}$)</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ($C_1, C_2$)</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ($\frac{P_{11}X_1}{P_{11}}, \frac{P_{21}X_2}{P_{21}}$)</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>-0.62</td>
<td>-0.68</td>
<td>-0.53</td>
<td>-0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ($L_1, L_2$)</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>-0.42</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ($S_{X,1}, S_{X,2}$)</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ($\frac{\text{TB}_1}{\text{GDP}_1}, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{11}}$)</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
<td>-0.69</td>
<td>-0.66</td>
<td>-0.73</td>
<td>-0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std ($\frac{\text{TB}_1}{\text{GDP}_1}$)</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ($\frac{X_{21}}{P_{11}}, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{11}}$)</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ($\frac{X_{21}}{P_{11}}, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{11}}$)</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ($\frac{\text{ReR}}{\text{GDP}_1}, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{11}}$)</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Data moments are from Heathcote and Perri (2002), Table 2. All series have been Hodrick-Prescott filtered with a smoothing parameter of 1600. Time index is dropped from notation for brevity. GDP$_n = W_nL_n + R_nK_n, \ x_{ni} = P_{x,ni}x_{ni}, \ TB_1 = P_{x,1}X_1 - P_{y,1}Y_1, \ ReR = P_{x,2}/P_{y,1}$.

Table 7: Moments from calibration with increasing and decreasing returns, uncorrelated shocks across countries, and no spillovers in the productivity process. Shock to the final goods sector. Complete markets.

to the no externality case, the substitution effect of wage increases is stronger than the income effect. This means than that households supply more labor today. This, with the capital stock as given, then leads to a larger initial response of output. This helps with increasing output co-movement across countries.

What should households do with this increased income? While the initial effect on income is higher, in future, as the productivity process is more transient, income will be lower than in the model without externalities. Then through the usual intuition from the permanent income hypothesis, while consumption rises today, due to the desire to smooth consumption over time, consumption rises by less. This smaller rise of consumption at home then helps with not counterfactually increasing consumption co-movement across countries and in fact helps reduce the correlation in consumption across countries.
We see these effects on output and consumption co-movement in Table 6.

Finally, why do cross-country investment and labor hours co-movement turn more positive, with investment and hours correlation in fact moving from negative to positive? First, given that consumption rises by less at home, investment increases by more. But this does not worsen international correlation in investment. An important feature now is that while the country-specific productivity shocks are uncorrelated in our experiments, negative capital externality leads to an endogenous positive correlation in the productivity faced by the two countries. In particular, from the foreign country’s perspective, starting from the next period, there is a positive effect on productivity, as typically, there would be negative investment in the foreign country following a positive productivity shock in the home country. This positive effect on productivity faced by the foreign country then leads to increased labor hours and increased investment for very standard reasons. Moreover, note that this endogenous increase in productivity in the foreign country leads also to an increase in output, which helps further with increasing output co-movement across countries. Finally, consumption in the foreign country increases, but by less than it would with no externality.

In addition to assessing international correlations, we also explore the fit with the data in terms of domestic correlations of key open economy variables with output. We focus on cyclicality of exports, imports, real exchange rate, and the trade balance. As Table 6 shows, negative capital externalities in production help also with moving the model closer to the data in terms of generating less procyclical exports and the real exchange rate and a more countercyclical trade balance. That is, to meet the larger increase in investment demand that we discussed above, the home country imports more, as the investment good is produced using the final aggregate good that combines the domestic and foreign intermediate goods. Moreover, given the lower effect on relative consumption across countries we described above, the real exchange rate is now less procyclical. Figure 1 shows how the larger initial response of investment under negative capital externalities translate to a more countercyclical trade balance driven by a sharper negative effect initially.26 One exception here is that negative capital externalities in production lead to a more procyclical imports, which makes the fit worse with the data as the standard business cycle model already leads to imports that are more procyclical than the data. The reason imports become more procyclical is that the behavior of imports closely follow that of investment as can be clearly seen in Figure 1. This is because with consumption smoothed over time, as is typical in business cycle models, investment response is

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26 Over time, as is standard, trade balance switches to positive with investment increasing in the foreign country as it rebuilds its capital stock.
comparatively larger to a productivity shock. As the investment good is produced with
the final aggregate good, which uses the foreign intermediate good, it implies that the
behavior of imports closely mirrors that of investment, with only the magnitude being
smaller as determined by the import share. Then, given that we explained above how in-
vestment and output increases more sharply initially with negative capital externalities,
imports follow a similar pattern, thereby increasing the pro-cyclicality.\textsuperscript{27}

Table 7 shows that similar results hold for negative capital externalities when we con-
sider a productivity shock in the final good sector, instead of the intermediate good sector.

\textbf{4.2.4 Varying Labor and Final Aggregator Externalities}

We now conduct a similar exercise with labor and final aggregator externalities. While
negative capital externalities in production help with moving the model closer to the data
in terms of co-movement across countries of business cycle quantities, negative labor ex-
ternalities do not uniformly do so. We see this in Table 6, especially for co-movement of
consumption. The main difference overall with negative capital externality is that con-
sumption correlation actually increases, instead of decreasing.\textsuperscript{28} This is mostly because
consumption in the foreign country does not change its dynamic response and change in
a non-monotonic way across various levels of externality, as there is relatively less dif-
ference in its investment and output paths. Finally, net exports also now become less
countercyclical, which worsens fit with the data.

We show the transmission mechanisms underlying these results in Figure 2, where
we vary only the externalities in labor input, $\psi_{X,L}$. The main reason is that with negative
labor externalities, while the productivity process faced by the home country is also less
transient in future as typically there would be an increase in labor hours in future, the ini-
tial impact also shifts down. This is because unlike capital stock which is pre-determined
today, labor hours respond positively today as well. This then looks basically like a pro-
ductivity process for the home country that has shifted downwards at every point in time.
Then, home households do not increase their hours initially, which in turn means that the

\textsuperscript{27}Finally, while we focus in this paper on assessing implications for cross-country quantity correlations
and within country cyclicity of open economy variables, we acknowledge that for one important moment
that constitutes a long-standing puzzle in international business cycles, the volatility of the real exchange
rate, negative capital externalities make the discrepancy worse between the model and the data. We see this
in Table ?? and also in Figure 1. For this moment, the margins that get introduced from international trade
features thus do help with enabling a closer fit with the data, as also seen in Table 3 (but as we mentioned
above, this goes together with making the real exchange rate more procyclical, unlike the case in the data).

\textsuperscript{28}Also note that the investment correlation is still negative. A further increase in the extent of negative
labor externality can push this to positive. But regardless of the calibration, the consumption correlation
increasing is a robust feature. Another issue is that the results are less robust than that of negative capital
externality when we consider different risk-sharing arrangement across countries.
initial increase in investment and output also does not happen. The effect is thus not as strong before with negative capital externalities in moving the co-movement of hours and investment towards positive. Given lower GDP currently and in future, with consumption smoothing, consumption drops uniformly at home compared to the case of no externality. This lower response of investment and consumption means that unlike the case of negative capital externality, net exports does not become more countercyclical. In terms of the foreign country, there is again an endogenous correlation of productivity, as typically there would be a negative response of foreign labor hours, and so it does help qualitatively with generating a less negative response of foreign investment and hours, but the dynamic positive correlation of productivity that occurs with negative capital externality does not happen in this case as is clear in Figure 2. For consumption response in the foreign country, the effects are less clear overall, because of the combination of perfect risk-sharing and the different response of hours at home when labor externalities are negative compared to capital externalities. This contributes to consumption co-movement increasing.

Finally, we consider varying the externality in the production/aggregation technology of the final aggregate good. Note again that in terms of interpretation from trade models, this externality is a new feature of the dynamic Melitz model compared to the dynamic Krugman model. Negative externality here also does not uniformly help move the model closer to the data, as seen in Table 6. It for instance, increases co-movement in consumption.\(^\text{29}\) Moreover, making this externality negative leads to counterfactual effects on the trade balance, not only decreasing the counter cyclical as with the labor externality, but actually turning it from counter to procyclical in our example.

We show detailed transmission mechanisms in Figure 3, where we vary only the externality in the final good aggregator technology, \(\psi_Y\). For the home country, the effects are similar to that of negative labor externalities in the intermediate good production technology. Our modeling of this externality in terms of \((p_{Y,nt}y_{nt}) / W_{nt}\), the number of country-\(n\)’s workers that produce the same value as the value of the final aggregate, suggests why this is the case. To understand the transmission mechanism in more detail, note that this externality does not affect at all the path of productivity in the intermediate goods sector. Instead, when the externality is negative, since typically labor supply would increase with a productivity increase in the intermediate good sector, it means that productivity in the final aggregate sector endogenously decreases. In other words, the final aggregate good becomes more expensive. This then drives both consumption and investment at home down, as they use the final aggregate good, compared to the case of

\(^{29}\text{Moreover, with this level of negative externality, the hours correlation is still negative.}\)
no externality. This lower demand for the aggregate final good translates to lower production of the home intermediate good and lower home labor supply, given the low import share. Like with negative labor externality, this lower effect in particular on investment plays an important role in making net exports less countercyclical. In terms of the foreign country, unlike labor externality, there is not effect on the foreign country’s productivity in the intermediate good sector. The effect again is the the negative labor externality makes the final aggregator productivity higher as typically there would be lower labor supply in the foreign country. This then increases the demand of the foreign final good, which leads to an increase in foreign consumption and investment. This play a key role in generating a less negative effect on foreign labor and a positive effect on foreign output. The increased co-movement of output, investment, and hours follow as a result.

4.2.5 Correlated Shocks Across Countries

We next show that our results and explanations for the potential role of negative capital externality to provide a better fit with the data continue to hold even if we allow the productivity shocks across countries to be correlated, as we did for comparison across models in Table 3. The results are in Table 9 and now our benchmark moments coincide with those in Table 3. For concreteness again, below when we present results we focus on the complete financial markets case and present all the results for the other two risk-sharing arrangements in Appendix C.6.

5 Conclusion

We present a general, competitive open economy business cycles model with capital accumulation, production externalities, trade in intermediate goods, and iceberg trade costs. Our main theoretical result shows that models developed in the modern international trade literature that feature comparative advantage, monopolistic competition and cost of entry, and firm heterogeneity and cost of exporting are isomorphic, in terms of aggregate equilibrium, to versions of this competitive dynamic model under appropriate restrictions on the externalities. In particular, the restrictions apply on the overall scale of externalities, the split of externalities between the different factors of production, and the identity of the sectors with externalities.

Our theoretical result shows that such isomorphism in terms of aggregate dynamics holds even though the dynamic new trade models have very different micro foundations. Our quantitative exercise then assesses whether various restricted versions of the general
<table>
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<th>Moment</th>
<th>Data</th>
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<th>$\psi_{X,K}$</th>
<th>$\psi_{X,L}$</th>
<th>$\psi_{Y}$</th>
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<td>(2)</td>
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<td>Corr $\left(\frac{GDP_1}{P_{3,1}}, \frac{GDP_2}{P_{3,2}}\right)$</td>
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<tr>
<td>Corr $(C_1, C_2)$</td>
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Notes: Data moments are from Heathcote and Perri (2002), Table 2. All series have been Hodrick-Prescott filtered with a smoothing parameter of 1600. Time index is dropped from notation for brevity. GDP$_n = W_n L_n + R_n K_n$, $X_{ni} = P_{x,ni} X_{ni}$, TB$_1 = P_{x,1} X_1 - P_{y,1} Y_1$, ReR = $P_{x,2} / P_{y,1}$.

Table 8: Moments from calibration with increasing and decreasing returns, correlated shocks across countries, and no spillovers in the productivity process. Complete markets.

model, in forms they are often considered in the literature, are able to resolve the well-known aggregate empirical puzzles in international business cycles models. We provide insights on why they fail to do so in many instances and in what directions they need to be amended to generate the required co-movement across countries. A critical feature that is required is negative capital externalities in intermediate goods production.

In future work, we plan to extend the analysis in some key directions. It would be of interest to study, in our general framework, optimal trade policy to provide a unified treatment of normative issues that have been explored in various modern international trade models. It would also be worthwhile to use this model to delve further into the disconnect that has often been identified in the literature between the international business cycles and international trade fields, such as in estimation/calibration of trade elasticity.
<table>
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<th>Moment</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Bench</th>
<th>$\psi_{X,K}$</th>
<th>$\psi_{X,L}$</th>
<th>$\psi_{Y}$</th>
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<td>-0.48</td>
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<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.28</td>
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<td>Corr ($\frac{X_{12}}{P_{i,1}}$, $\frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{i,1}}$)</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.95</td>
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<td>Corr ($\text{ReR}$, $\frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{i,1}}$)</td>
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<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.59</td>
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<tr>
<td>Std ($\text{ReR}$)</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>0.26</td>
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<td>0.30</td>
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Notes: Data moments are from Heathcote and Perri (2002), Table 2. All series have been Hodrick-Prescott filtered with a smoothing parameter of 1600. Time index is dropped from notation for brevity. $\text{GDP}_n = W_n L_n + R_n K_n$, $X_{ni} = P_{x,ni} X_{ni}$, $\text{TB}_1 = P_{x,1} X_1 - P_{x,1} Y_1$, $\text{ReR} = P_{x,2} / P_{x,1}$.

Table 9: Moments from calibration with increasing and decreasing returns, correlated shocks across countries, and spillovers in the productivity process. Complete markets.
Notes: The plots show responses for 1% shock to the exogenous component of productivity in the intermediates sector in country 1, \( Z_{X,1} \). All vertical axes — except for the figures for the current account and trade balance — measure percent deviation from steady state. The figures for the current account and trade balance measure the number of percentage points. The case with \( \psi_{X,K} = 0 \) corresponds to the benchmark calibration of the unified model with no externalities, uncorrelated shocks (i.e., \( \sigma_{X,12} = \sigma_{X,21} \)), and no spillovers in the productivity process (i.e., \( \rho_{X,12} = \rho_{X,21} = 0 \)). Calibrations for the cases with \( \psi_{X,K} = 0.3 \) and \( \psi_{X,K} = -1 \) differ from the case with \( \psi_{X,K} = 0 \) only in having capital externality in the production of intermediates (with the corresponding value for \( \psi_{X,K} \)). All cases are for the complete markets economy. The red solid lines on the plots for \( S_{X,1} \) and \( S_{X,2} \) — in addition to responses of \( S_{Y,1} \) and \( S_{Y,2} \) for the case of \( \psi_{X,K} = 0 \) — also correspond to responses of \( Z_{X,1} \) and \( Z_{X,2} \) for all values of \( \psi_{X,K} \).

Figure 1: Impulse-response functions for \( Z_{X,1} \). Capital externalities in the intermediate goods sector. Complete markets.
Notes: The plots show responses for 1% shock to the exogenous component of productivity in the intermediates sector in country 1, $Z_{x,1}$. All horizontal axes measure number of quarters after the shock. All vertical axes — except for the figures for the current account and trade balance — measure percent deviation from steady state. The figures for the current account and trade balance measure the number of percentage points. The case with $\psi_{x,L} = 0$ corresponds to the benchmark calibration of the unified model with no externalities, uncorrelated shocks (i.e., $\sigma_{x12} = \sigma_{x21}$), and no spillovers in the productivity process (i.e., $\rho_{x12} = \rho_{x21} = 0$). Calibrations for the cases with $\psi_{x,L} = 0.7$ and $\psi_{x,L} = -1$ differ from the case with $\psi_{x,L} = 0$ only in having labor externality in the production of intermediates (with the corresponding value for $\psi_{x,L}$). All cases are for the complete markets economy. The red solid lines on the plots for $S_{x,1}$ and $S_{x,2}$ — in addition to responses of $S_{x,1}$ and $S_{x,2}$ for the case of $\psi_{x,L} = 0$ — also correspond to responses of $Z_{x,1}$ and $Z_{x,2}$ for all values of $\psi_{x,L}$.

Figure 2: Impulse-response functions for $Z_{x,1}$. Labor externalities in the intermediate goods sector. Complete markets.
Notes: The plots show responses for 1% shock to the exogenous component of productivity in the intermediates sector in country 1, Z_{X,1}. All horizontal axes measure number of quarters after the shock. All vertical axes — except for the figures for the current account and trade balance — measure percent deviation from steady state. The figures for the current account and trade balance measure the number of percentage points. The case with \( \psi_Y = 0 \) corresponds to the benchmark calibration of the unified model with no externalities, uncorrelated shocks (i.e., \( \sigma_{x_{12}} = \sigma_{x_{21}} \)), and no spillovers in the productivity process (i.e., \( \rho_{x_{12}} = \rho_{x_{21}} = 0 \)). Calibrations for the cases with \( \psi_Y = 0.2 \) and \( \psi_Y = -1 \) differ from the case with \( \psi_Y = 0 \) only in having externality in production of the final aggregates (with the corresponding value for \( \psi_Y \)). All cases are for the complete markets economy.

Figure 3: Impulse-response functions for \( Z_{X,1} \). Externality in the final aggregates sector. Complete markets.
References


A Unified Model

A.1 Equilibrium Conditions

Equilibrium conditions of the unified model are given by:

\[ P_{nt} = \beta \mathcal{E} \left\{ \frac{P_{nt}}{P_{nt+1}} \cdot \frac{U_1(C_{nt+1}, L_{nt+1})}{U_1(C_{nt}, L_{nt})} \left[ R_{nt+1} + (1 - \delta) P_{nt+1} \right] \right\}, \]

\[ - \frac{U_2(C_{nt}, L_{nt})}{U_1(C_{nt}, L_{nt})} = W_{nt} \]

\[ K_{n,t+1} = (1 - \delta) K_{nt} + I_{nt}, \]

\[ X_{nt} = \left( \Theta_{x,n} Z_{x,nt} K_{nt}^{\psi_{x,n}} L_{x,nt}^{\gamma_{x,n}} \right) K_{nt}^{\alpha_{x,n}} L_{x,nt}^{\beta_{x,n}}, \]

\[ Y_{nt} = \Theta_{y,n} Z_{y,nt} \left( \frac{P_{y,nt} Y_{nt}}{W_{nt}} \right) \psi_y \left[ \sum_{i=1}^N \left( \omega_{ni} \frac{\lambda_{ni,t} P_{y,nt} Y_{nt}}{\tau_{ni,t} P_{x,nt}} \right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}, \]

\[ I_{nt} = \Theta_{i,n} Z_{i,nt} L_{i,nt}^{1-\alpha_i} Y_{i,nt}^{1-\alpha_i}, \]

\[ W_{nt} L_{x,nt} + W_{nt} L_{i,nt} = W_{nt} L_{nt} + a T B_{nt}, \]

\[ C_{nt} + Y_{nt} = Y_{nt}, \]

\[ \sum_{n=1}^N \lambda_{ni,t} P_{y,nt} Y_{nt} = P_{x,nt} X_{nt}, \]

\[ \lambda_{ni,t} = \frac{(\tau_{ni,t} P_{x,nt} / \omega_{ni})^{1-\sigma}}{\sum_{j=1}^N (\tau_{nj,t} P_{x,nt} / \omega_{nj})^{1-\sigma}}, \]

\[ K_{nt} = \alpha_{x,n} P_{x,nt} X_{nt} / R_{nt}, \]

\[ L_{x,nt} = \alpha_{x,n} P_{x,nt} X_{nt} / W_{nt}, \]

\[ L_{i,nt} = \alpha_i P_{i,nt} I_{nt} / W_{nt}, \]

\[ Y_{i,nt} = (1 - \alpha_i) \frac{P_{i,nt} I_{nt}}{P_{i,nt}}, \]

The household’s budget constraint in the case of financial autarky is given by

\[ P_{y,nt} C_{nt} + P_{l,nt} I_{nt} = W_{nt} L_{nt} + R_{nt} K_{nt}, \]

in the case of the bond economy it is given by

\[ P_{y,nt} C_{nt} + P_{l,nt} I_{nt} + \sum_{i=1}^N P_{y,nt} B_{ni,t} = W_{nt} L_{nt} + R_{nt} K_{nt} + \sum_{i=1}^N P_{y,nt} (1 + r_{i,t-1}) B_{ni,t-1}, \]
and in the case of complete markets it is given by

\[ P_{y,nt}C_{nt} + P_{l,nt}I_{nt} + A_{nt} = W_{nt}L_{nt} + R_{nt}K_{nt} + B_{nt}, \]

with

\[ A_{nt} = \beta E_t \left\{ \frac{P_{y,nt}}{P_{n,t+1}} \cdot \frac{U_1(C_{n,t+1}, L_{n,t+1})}{U_1(C_{nt}, L_{nt})} B_{n,t+1} \right\}. \]

Additional conditions in the case of the bond economy are

\[ P_{y,it} (1 + b_{adj} B_{ni,t}) = \beta E_t \left\{ \frac{P_{y,it}}{P_{n,t+1}} \cdot \frac{U_1(C_{n,t+1}, L_{n,t+1})}{U_1(C_{nt}, L_{nt})} P_{y,i,t+1} (1 + r_{it}) \right\}, \]

for \( i = 1, \ldots, N, \)

\[ \sum_{n=1}^{N} B_{ni,t} = 0, \]

while in the case of complete markets they are

\[ \frac{P_{y,it}}{P_{y,jt}} = \kappa_{ij} \frac{U_1(C_{it}, L_{it})}{U_1(C_{jt}, L_{jt})}, \quad \text{for each } i \text{ and } j, \]

\[ \sum_{i=1}^{N} A_{it} = 0, \]

where

\[ \kappa_{ij} \equiv \left( \frac{U_1(C_{i0}, L_{i0}) / P_{y,i0}}{U_1(C_{j0}, L_{j0}) / P_{y,j0}} \right)^{-1}. \]

is found in the steady state.

### A.2 Steady State

Given \( L_n, Y_n, R_n, W_n, P_{x,nt}, P_{l,nt}, P_{y,nt}, \) we can find the rest of the variables using the following conditions:
\[
\lambda_{ni} = \frac{(\tau_{ni} P_{X,i} / \omega_{ni})^{1-\sigma}}{\sum_{j=1}^{N} (\tau_{nj} P_{X,j} / \omega_{nj})^{1-\sigma}},
\]

\[
X_i = \frac{1}{P_{X,i}} \sum_{n=1}^{N} \lambda_{ni} P_{y,n} Y_n,
\]

\[
K_n = \alpha_{x,k} \frac{P_{x,n} X_n}{R_n},
\]

\[
L_{x,n} = \alpha_{x,l} \frac{P_{x,n} X_n}{W_n},
\]

\[
I_n = \delta K_n,
\]

\[
C_n = \left( W_n L_n + R_n K_n - P_{l,n} I_n \right) / P_{y,n},
\]

\[
L_{i,n} = \alpha_i \frac{P_{l,n} I_n}{W_n},
\]

\[
Y_{i,n} = (1 - \alpha_i) \frac{P_{l,n} I_n}{P_{y,n}}.
\]

Conditions that determine \(L_n, Y_n, R_n, W_n, P_{x,n}, P_{l,n}, P_{y,n}\), are:

\[
L_n - L_{x,n} - L_{i,n} = 0,
\]

\[
Y_n - C_n - Y_{i,n} = 0,
\]

\[
R_n - \left( \frac{1}{\beta} - 1 + \delta \right) P_{l,n} = 0,
\]

\[
- \frac{U_2 (C_n, L_n)}{U_1 (C_n, L_n)} - \frac{W_n}{P_{y,n}} = 0,
\]

\[
X_n - \Theta_{x,n} Z_{x,n} K_n^{\alpha_{x,k} + \psi_{x,k}} L_{x,n}^{\alpha_{x,l} + \psi_{x,l}} = 0,
\]

\[
I_n - \Theta_{i,n} Z_{i,n} L_{i,n}^{1-\alpha_i} Y_{i,n}^{1-\alpha_i} = 0,
\]

\[
Y_n - \Theta_{t,n} \left( \frac{P_{t,n} Y_n}{W_n} \right)^{\psi_t} \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{N} \left( \omega_{ni} \lambda_{ni} P_{y,n} Y_n \right)^{\frac{\alpha_i - 1}{\sigma}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} = 0.
\]

**B Generalized Dynamic Versions of the Standard Trade Models**

**B.1 Generalized Dynamic Version of the Eaton-Kortum Model**

Since the household’s problem is identical to the one in the unified model of Section 2, it yields the same set of equilibrium conditions. Profit maximization problem of producer
of variety $\nu$ implies

$$R_{nt} K_{x,nt} (\nu) = \alpha_{x,k} p_{nt} (\nu) x_{nt} (\nu), \quad (36)$$

$$W_{nt} L_{x,nt} (\nu) = \alpha_{x,l} p_{nt} (\nu) x_{nt} (\nu). \quad (37)$$

And the cost of production is

$$p_{nt} (\nu) = \frac{-\alpha_{x,k} \alpha_{x,l} - \alpha_{x,k}}{R_{nt}^B K_{x,nt}^B W_{nt}^B S_{X,nt}^B}.$$  

In equilibrium,

$$K_{x,nt} = \int_0^1 k_{x,nt} (\nu) d\nu \quad \text{and} \quad L_{x,nt} = \int_0^1 l_{x,nt} (\nu) d\nu.$$

Denote the value of total output of varieties by $X_{nt}$:

$$X_{nt} \equiv \int_0^1 p_{nt} (\nu) x_{nt} (\nu) d\nu.$$

Integrating conditions (36)-(37) over $\nu$, we get

$$R_{nt} = \alpha_{x,k} \frac{X_{nt}}{K_{x,nt}} \quad \text{and} \quad W_{nt} = \alpha_{x,l} \frac{X_{nt}}{L_{x,nt}}.$$

Let $\Omega_{ni,t} \subseteq [0, 1]$ be the (endogenously determined) set of varieties that country $n$ buys from $i$. We can write

$$Y_{nt} = S_{v,nt}^{ek} \left[ \sum_{i=1}^N \int_{\nu \in \Omega_{ni,t}} (\omega_{ni} x_{ni,t} (\nu))^{\sigma_{ek}^{\nu} - 1} d\nu \right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma_{ek}^{\nu} - 1}}.$$

Demand for individual varieties $\nu \in \Omega_{ni,t}$ is given by

$$x_{ni,t} (\nu) = \left[ S_{v,nt}^{ek} \right]^{\sigma_{ek}^{\nu} - 1} \omega_{ni}^{\sigma_{ek}^{\nu} - 1} \left( \frac{p_{ni,t} (\nu)}{P_{v,nt}} \right)^{-\sigma_{ek}^{\nu}} Y_{nt},$$

with the price index

$$P_{v,nt} = \left[ S_{v,nt}^{ek} \right]^{-1} \left[ \sum_{i=1}^N \left( \frac{p_{ni,t}}{\omega_{ni}} \right)^{1-\sigma_{ek}^{\nu}} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma_{ek}^{\nu}}}.$$
where
\[ P_{ni,t} \equiv \left[ \int_{\Omega_{ni,t}} p_{ni,t}(\nu) \, (1 - \sigma^{ek}) \, d\nu \right]^{1/(1-\sigma^{ek})}. \]

Producers of the final aggregate in country \( n \) buy each variety \( \nu \) from the cheapest source. We can derive
\[
P_{1-\sigma^{ek},ni,t} = \Gamma \left( \frac{\theta^{ek} + 1 - \sigma^{ek}}{\theta^{ek}} \right) \sum_{j=1}^{N} \left( \frac{\tau_{nj,t} P_{x,j,t} / \omega_{ni}}{\theta^{ek}} \right)^{\frac{\theta^{ek}+1-\sigma^{ek}}{\theta^{ek}}},
\]

where
\[
P_{x,j,t} \equiv \frac{R_{it}^{a_{x,j,t}} W_{it}^{a_{x,j,t}}}{\Theta_{x,i} Z_{x,i} K_{x,i} L_{x,i}},
\]

with \( \tilde{\Theta}_{x,i} \equiv \tilde{a}_{x_{x,k}} \tilde{a}_{x_{x,l}} \Theta_{x,i} \). Therefore
\[
P_{1-\sigma^{ek},y,nt} = \Gamma \left( \frac{\theta^{ek} + 1 - \sigma^{ek}}{\theta^{ek}} \right) \sum_{i=1}^{\sigma^{ek}-1} \sum_{j=1}^{N} \left( \frac{\tau_{ni,t} P_{x,it} / \omega_{ni}}{\theta^{ek}} \right)^{\frac{\theta^{ek}+1-\sigma^{ek}}{\theta^{ek}}},
\]

which gives
\[
P_{y,nt} = \frac{\left[ \sum_{i=1}^{N} \left( \frac{\tau_{ni,t} P_{x,it} / \omega_{ni}}{\theta^{ek}} \right)^{-\frac{\theta^{ek}}{\theta^{ek}}} \right]^{-\frac{1}{\theta^{ek}}} \Theta_{y,n} Z_{y,nt} \left( \frac{P_{y,nt} Y_{nt}}{W_{nt}} \right)^{\psi_{y}}}{\Theta_{y,n} Z_{y,nt} \left( \frac{P_{y,nt} Y_{nt}}{W_{nt}} \right)^{\psi_{y}}},
\]

with \( \Theta_{y,n} \equiv \Gamma \left( \frac{\theta^{ek} + 1 - \sigma^{ek}}{\theta^{ek}} \right) \frac{1}{\theta^{ek}} \Theta_{y,nt}^{\psi_{y}}. \)

Denote \( X_{nt} \equiv \chi_{nt} / P_{x,nt}. \) After some manipulations, the set of equilibrium conditions
that are common across all financial market structures can be written as

\[
P_{i,nt} = \beta E_t \left\{ \frac{U_1 \left( C_{i,t+1}, L_{n,t+1} \right)}{U_1 \left( C_{nt}, L_{nt} \right)} \left[ R_{n,t+1} + (1 - \delta) P_{i,n,t+1} \right] \right\},
\]

\[
- \frac{U_2 \left( C_{nt}, L_{nt} \right)}{U_1 \left( C_{nt}, L_{nt} \right)} = \frac{W_{nt}}{P_{i,nt}},
\]

\[
K_{n,t+1} = (1 - \delta) K_{nt} + I_{nt},
\]

\[
X_{nt} = \left( \Theta_{x,n} Z_{x,nt} K_{nt}^{\Psi_{x,n}} L_{x,nt}^{\Psi_{x,n}} \right) K_{nt}^{\alpha_{x,n}} L_{x,nt}^{\alpha_{x,n}},
\]

\[
Y_{nt} = \Theta_{y,n} Z_{y,nt} \left( \frac{P_{i,nt} Y_{nt}}{W_{nt}} \right)^{\Psi_{y}} \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{N} \left( \omega_{ni} \frac{\lambda_{ni,t} P_{i,nt} Y_{nt}}{\tau_{ni,t} P_{x,nt}} \right)^{\frac{\alpha_{y}}{\alpha_{x}}} \right]^{\frac{\alpha_{y} - 1}{\alpha_{x}}},
\]

\[
I_{nt} = \Theta_{i,n} Z_{i,nt} L_{i,nt}^{\alpha_{i}} Y_{i,nt}^{1 - \alpha_{i}},
\]

\[
L_{x,nt} + L_{i,nt} = L_{nt},
\]

\[
C_{nt} + Y_{nt} = Y_{nt},
\]

\[
\sum_{n=1}^{N} \lambda_{ni,t} P_{i,nt} Y_{nt} = P_{x,nt} X_{nt},
\]

\[
\lambda_{ni,t} = \frac{\left( \tau_{ni,t} P_{x,nt} / \omega_{ni} \right)^{0^{\alpha_{x}}} \sum_{j=1}^{N} \left( \tau_{nj,t} P_{x,nt} / \omega_{nj} \right)^{0^{\alpha_{x}}} \alpha_{x,n} P_{x,nt} X_{nt}^\alpha}{R_{nt}},
\]

\[
K_{nt} = \alpha_{x,n} X_{nt}^\alpha R_{nt},
\]

\[
L_{x,nt} = \alpha_{x,n} X_{nt}^\alpha W_{nt},
\]

\[
L_{i,nt} = \alpha_{i} \frac{P_{i,nt} I_{nt}}{W_{nt}},
\]

\[
Y_{i,nt} = (1 - \alpha_{i}) \frac{P_{i,nt} I_{nt}}{P_{i,nt}},
\]

\[
C_{nt} + I_{nt} = Y_{nt}.
\]

Conditions, that are specific to different financial market structures, are identical to the ones in the unified model.

### B.2 Generalized Dynamic Version of the Krugman Model

**Production of Varieties, International Trade, and Final Aggregate.** The profit maximization problem of producer of variety \( v \in \Omega_{it} \) is given by
\[
\max_{p_{ii,t}(v), x_{ni,t}(v), l_{it}(v)} \sum_{n=1}^{N} p_{ii,t}(v) \tau_{ni,t} x_{ni,t}(v) - W_{it} l_{it}(v)
\]

s.t.
\[
x_{ni,t}(v) = S_{\nu,nt}^{\sigma_{K}-1} M_{it}^{\left(\phi_{\nu,M} - \frac{1}{\sigma_{K}-1}\right)} \omega_{ni}^{1-\sigma_{K}} \tau_{ni,t}^{\sigma_{K}} p_{ni,t}(v) - \sigma_{K} \tau_{ni,t}^{\sigma_{K}} P_{ni,t}^{\sigma_{K}-\eta_{K}} P_{\nu,nt}^{\eta_{K}} Y_{nt},
\]
\[
\sum_{n=1}^{N} \tau_{ni,t} x_{ni,t}(v) = S_{\nu,lt}^{\sigma_{K}} l_{it}(v),
\]

(38)

This gives the monopolist’s price
\[
p_{ii,t}(v) = \frac{\sigma_{K}}{\sigma_{K} - 1} \cdot \frac{W_{it}}{S_{\nu,lt}},
\]

and the bilateral price index
\[
P_{ni,t} = M_{it}^{-\left(\phi_{\nu,M} - \frac{1}{\sigma_{K}-1}\right)} \left[ \int_{v \in \Omega_{lt}} \left( \frac{p_{ni,t}(v)}{\omega_{ni}} \right)^{1-\sigma_{K}} dv \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma_{K}}}
\]
\[
= M_{it}^{-\left(\phi_{\nu,M} - \frac{1}{\sigma_{K}-1}\right)} \left[ M_{it} \left[ \frac{\sigma_{K}}{\sigma_{K} - 1} \cdot \frac{\tau_{ni,t} W_{it}}{\omega_{ni} S_{\nu,lt}} \right] \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma_{K}}}
\]
\[
= \frac{\tau_{ni,t} P_{\nu,lt}}{\omega_{ni}},
\]

where
\[
P_{\nu,lt} = \frac{\sigma_{K}}{\sigma_{K} - 1} \cdot \frac{W_{it}}{\Theta_{\nu,lt} Z_{\nu,lt} M_{it}^{\phi_{\nu,M}} L_{\nu,lt}^{\phi_{\nu,M}}}
\]

From here we can find total demand of country \( n \) for country \( i \)’s varieties:
\[
\lambda_{ni,t} = \int_{v \in \Omega_{lt}} \tau_{ni,t} p_{ii,t}(v) x_{ni,t}(v) dv
\]
\[
= S_{\nu,nt}^{\sigma_{K}-1} \left( \frac{\tau_{ni,t} P_{\nu,lt}}{\omega_{ni}} \right)^{1-\sigma_{K}} P_{ni,t}^{\sigma_{K}-\eta_{K}} P_{\nu,nt}^{\eta_{K}} Y_{nt}
\]
\[
= \lambda_{ni,t} P_{\nu,nt} Y_{nt},
\]

where
\[
\lambda_{ni,t} = \frac{\left( \frac{\tau_{ni,t} P_{\nu,lt}}{\omega_{ni}} \right)^{1-\eta_{K}}}{\sum_{j=1}^{N} \left( \frac{\tau_{nj,t} P_{\nu,jt}}{\omega_{nj}} \right)^{1-\eta_{K}}}
\]

is the expenditure share.
Next, multiplying both sides of (38) on price $p_{i,t}(v)$ gives

$$
\sum_{n=1}^{N} p_{ni,t}(v) x_{ni,t}(v) = \frac{\sigma^x}{\sigma^x - 1} \cdot W_{it} \chi_{it}(v).
$$

Integrating both sides of this expression over $v \in \Omega_{it}$, we get

$$
\chi_{it} = \frac{\sigma^x}{\sigma^x - 1} W_{it} L_{x_{it}},
$$

where $\chi_{it}$ is the total value of output of all varieties in country $i$.

Profit of producer of variety $v \in \Omega_{it}$ is given by

$$
D_{it}(v) = \sum_{n=1}^{N} p_{ni,t}(v) x_{ni,t}(v) - W_{it} \chi_{it}(v).
$$

Let $D_{it} \equiv \frac{1}{M_{it}} \int_{v \in \Omega_{it}} D_{it}(v) \, dv$ be the average profit of country $i$’s producers of varieties $\Omega_{it}$. Integrating both sides of the above expression over $v \in \Omega_{it}$, we get

$$
D_{it} = \frac{\chi_{it} - W_{it} L_{x_{it}}}{M_{it}} = \frac{1}{\sigma^x} \frac{\chi_{it}}{M_{it}}.
$$

**Invention of Varieties, Entry and Exit of Producers of Varieties.** Varieties are invented in the R&D sector. The invention process uses labor and final aggregate. Specifically, a combination of $l_I$ units of labor and $y_I$ units of the final aggregate results in $\Theta_{i,n} Z_{i,nt} l_I^{\alpha_I} y_I^{1-\alpha_I}$ new varieties, where $0 \leq \alpha_I \leq 1$, and $\Theta_{i,n} Z_{i,nt}$ is an exogenous productivity in the R&D sector. Assuming perfect competition in the R&D sector and letting $V_{nt}$ be the value of an invented variety, we get that invention of one variety requires $\alpha_I \frac{V_{nt}}{W_{nt}}$ units of labor and $(1 - \alpha_I) \frac{V_{nt}}{P_{i,nt}}$ units of the final aggregate. Perfect competition also implies that $V_{nt} = \frac{W_{nt}^{\alpha_I} P_{i,nt}^{1-\alpha_I}}{\Theta_{i,n} Z_{i,nt}}$, where $\Theta_{i,n} \equiv \alpha_I (1 - \alpha_I)^{1-\alpha_I} \Theta_{i,n}$.

In every period $t$ each country has an unbounded mass of prospective entrants (firms) into the production of varieties. All varieties invented in a particular country in period $t$ are sold to these prospective entrants in the same period. A producer of a variety enters into the economy by buying this variety from the R&D sector. Entry into the economy is free, and so any entrant pays for the variety its value $V_{nt}$.

Let $M_{i,nt}$ denote the number of varieties that are invented in country $n$ in period $t$ (which is also the number of firms that enter into the economy). The total amount of
labor and final aggregate used in the R&D sector are, respectively,

\[ L_{i,nt} = \alpha_i \frac{V_{nt} M_{i,nt}}{W_{nt}}, \quad \text{and} \quad Y_{i,nt} = \left(1 - \alpha_i \right) \frac{V_{nt} M_{i,nt}}{P_{i,nt}}. \]

From here we also get that

\[ M_{i,nt} = \Theta_{i,n} Z_{i,nt} L_{i,nt} Y_{i,nt}^{1 - \alpha_i}. \]

**Households.** Here we describe only financial autarky. Derivations for bond economy and complete markets can be done in a similar way. The problem of country \( n' \)'s households is

\[
\max_{C_{nt}, L_{nt}, M_{i,nt}, M_{n,t+1}} E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t U(C_{nt}, L_{nt})
\]

s.t.

\[
P_{i,nt} C_{nt} + V_{nt} M_{i,nt} = W_{nt} L_{nt} + D_{nt} M_{nt},
\]

\[
M_{n,t+1} = (1 - \delta) M_{nt} + M_{i,nt}.
\]

First-order conditions for this problem imply:

\[
V_{nt} = \beta E_t \left\{ \frac{P_{y,nt}}{P_{y,n,t+1}} \cdot \frac{U_1(C_{n,t+1}, L_{n,t+1})}{U_1(C_{nt}, L_{nt})} \left[ D_{n,t+1} + (1 - \delta) V_{n,t+1} \right] \right\},
\]

\[
- \frac{U_2(C_{nt}, L_{nt})}{U_1(C_{nt}, L_{nt})} = \frac{W_{nt}}{P_{y,nt}}.
\]

**Equilibrium System of Equations** Let us manipulate the expression for \( P_{x,nt} \) to bring it to a form isomorphic to the price of the intermediate good in the unified model. We have

\[
P_{x,nt} = \frac{\sigma^k}{\sigma^k - 1} \cdot \frac{W_{nt}}{\Theta_{x,nt} Z_{x,nt} M_{x,nt}^{\phi_{x,nt}} L_{x,nt}^{\phi_{x,nt}}} = \left(1 - \frac{1}{\sigma^k}\right)^{-1} \frac{D_{nt}^{1/\sigma^k} W_{nt}^{1 - 1/\sigma^k}}{Z_{x,nt} M_{x,nt}^{\phi_{x,nt}} L_{x,nt}^{\phi_{x,nt}} D_{nt}^{1/\sigma^k} W_{nt}^{1 - 1/\sigma^k}}.
\]

Using the facts that \( D_{nt} = \frac{1}{\sigma^k} \cdot \frac{X_{nt}}{M_{nt}} \) and \( W_{nt} = \left(1 - \frac{1}{\sigma^k}\right) \frac{X_{nt}}{L_{x,nt}} \), we get

\[
P_{x,nt} = \frac{D_{nt}^{1/\sigma^k} W_{nt}^{1 - 1/\sigma^k}}{\Theta_{x,nt} Z_{x,nt} M_{x,nt}^{\phi_{x,nt} - 1/\sigma^k} L_{x,nt}^{\phi_{x,nt} + 1/\sigma^k}}.
\]
where $\tilde{\Theta}_{X,n} \equiv \left( \frac{1}{\sigma^k} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma^k}} (1 - \frac{1}{\sigma^k})^{1-\frac{1}{\sigma^k}} \Theta_{X,n}$. Let $X_{nt} \equiv X_{nt} / P_{x,nt}$ be the real output of varieties. By substituting the expressions for $D_{nt}$ and $W_{nt}$ into the above expression for $P_{x,nt}$, we get

$$X_{nt} = \left( \Theta_{X,n} Z_{X,nt} M_{yt,n}^{\phi_{X,Y} - \frac{1}{\sigma^k} \Phi_{X,Y} + \frac{1}{\sigma^k}} L_{X,nt}^\sigma \right) M_{nt}^{\frac{1}{\sigma^k} L_{X,nt}^\sigma}.$$

Next, we have

$$\lambda_{ni,t} P_{Y,nt} Y_{nt} = S_{Y,nt}^{\eta_Y-1} \left( \frac{\lambda_{ni,t} P_{Y,nt} Y_{nt}}{\tau_{ni,t} P_{X,nt} / \omega_{ni}} \right)^{-\eta_Y} P_{Y,nt}^{\eta_Y} Y_{nt},$$

which gives

$$\left( \frac{\lambda_{ni,t} P_{Y,nt} Y_{nt}}{\tau_{ni,t} P_{X,nt} / \omega_{ni}} \right)^{\eta_Y} = S_{Y,nt}^{\eta_Y-1} \left( \frac{\lambda_{ni,t} P_{Y,nt} Y_{nt}}{\tau_{ni,t} P_{X,nt} / \omega_{ni}} \right)^{-1} P_{Y,nt}^{\eta_Y} Y_{nt}.$$

Taking both sides to the power of $\frac{1-\eta_Y}{\eta_Y}$, we get

$$\left( \frac{\lambda_{ni,t} P_{Y,nt} Y_{nt}}{\tau_{ni,t} P_{X,nt} / \omega_{ni}} \right)^{-\eta_Y} = S_{Y,nt}^{\frac{\eta_Y-1}{\eta_Y}} \left( \frac{\lambda_{ni,t} P_{Y,nt} Y_{nt}}{\tau_{ni,t} P_{X,nt} / \omega_{ni}} \right)^{\frac{\eta_Y-1}{\eta_Y}} P_{Y,nt}^{\eta_Y - 1} Y_{nt}.$$

Summing over $i$ and using the fact that

$$P_{Y,nt}^{1-\eta_Y} = S_{Y,nt}^{-(1-\eta_Y)} \sum_{i=1}^{N} P_{ni,t}^{1-\eta_Y} = S_{Y,nt}^{-(1-\eta_Y)} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \left( \tau_{ni,t} P_{X,nt} / \omega_{ni} \right)^{1-\eta_Y},$$

we get

$$Y_{nt} = S_{Y,nt} \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{N} \left( \frac{\lambda_{ni,t} P_{Y,nt} Y_{nt}}{\tau_{ni,t} P_{X,nt} / \omega_{ni}} \right)^{\frac{\eta_Y-1}{\eta_Y}} \right]^{\frac{\eta_Y}{\eta_Y-1}}.$$

Combining all expressions and definitions, we get the equilibrium system in isomorphic form:
Assume that the final aggregate technology is given by

\[ V_{nt} = \beta E_t \left\{ \frac{P_{Y,nt}}{P_{Y,nt+1}} \cdot \frac{U_1(C_{nt+1},L_{nt+1})}{U_1(C_{nt},L_{nt})} \left[ D_{nt+1} + (1 - \delta) V_{nt+1} \right] \right\}, \]

\[ - \frac{U_2(C_{nt},L_{nt})}{U_1(C_{nt},L_{nt})} = \frac{W_{nt}}{P_{nt}}, \]

\[ M_{nt+1} = (1 - \delta) M_{nt} + M_{i,nt}, \]

\[ X_{nt} = \left( \Theta_{Y,n} Z_{n,nt} M_{nt}^{\lambda \phi - \frac{1}{\sigma^x}} L_{n,nt}^{\phi \lambda + \frac{1}{\sigma^x}} \right) M_{nt}^{\frac{1}{\sigma^x}} L_{n,nt}^{1 - \frac{1}{\sigma^x}}, \]

\[ Y_{nt} = \Theta_{Y,n} Z_{n,nt} \left( \frac{P_{Y,nt} Y_{nt}}{W_{nt}} \right) \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{N} \left( \frac{\lambda_{ni,t} P_{i,nt} Y_{nt}}{\tau_{ni,t} P_{X,it}} \right) \right]^{\frac{\eta^x}{1 - \eta}}, \]

\[ M_{i,nt} = \Theta_{i,n} Z_{n,nt} L_{i,nt}^{\alpha_i} Y_{i,nt}^{1 - \alpha_i}, \]

\[ L_{n,nt} = L_{i,nt} = L_{nt}, \]

\[ C_{nt} + Y_{i,nt} = Y_{nt}, \]

\[ \sum_{n=1}^{N} \lambda_{ni,t} P_{i,nt} Y_{nt} = P_{x,it} X_{it}, \]

\[ \lambda_{ni,t} = \frac{\left( \tau_{ni,t} P_{x,it} \right)^{1 - \eta}}{\sum_{i=1}^{N} \left( \tau_{ni,t} P_{x,it} \right)^{1 - \eta}}, \]

\[ M_{nt} = \frac{1}{\sigma^x} \cdot \frac{P_{x,nt} X_{nt}}{D_{nt}}, \]

\[ L_{n,nt} = \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\sigma^x} \right) \cdot \frac{P_{x,nt} X_{nt}}{W_{nt}}, \]

\[ L_{i,nt} = \alpha_i V_{nt} M_{i,nt} \]

\[ Y_{i,nt} = (1 - \alpha_i) \frac{V_{nt} M_{i,nt}}{P_{i,nt}}, \]

\[ P_{Y,nt} C_{nt} + V_{nt} M_{i,nt} = W_{nt} L_{nt} + D_{nt} M_{nt}. \]

### B.3 Generalized Version of the Melitz Model

In order to show what role the love-of-variety effect plays in the Melitz model, let us introduce correction for this effect in the technology of production of final aggregate. Assume that the final aggregate technology is given by

\[ Y_{nt} = \sum_{i=1}^{N} \left[ M_{ni,t}^{\lambda \phi - \frac{1}{\sigma^x}} \left[ \int_{v \in \Omega_{ni,t}} \left( \omega_{ni,t} x_{ni,t}(v) \right) \frac{\omega_{ni,t}^x}{\sigma^x} \, dv \right] \frac{\omega_{ni,t}^x}{\sigma^x} \right]^{\frac{\eta^x}{1 - \eta}}, \]
With Pareto distribution of efficiencies of production, we have that

\[ x_{ni,t} (v) = M_{ni,t}^{(\sigma^*-1)\bar{\phi}_{YM}} \omega_{ni}^{\sigma^*-1} \left( \frac{p_{ni,t} (v)}{\bar{P}_{ni,t}} \right)^{-\sigma^*} \left( \frac{P_{ni,t}}{\bar{P}_{ni,t}} \right)^{1-\eta^*} Y_{nt}. \]

\[ P_{ni,t} = M_{ni,t}^{\bar{\phi}_{YM}} \int_{\nu \in \Omega_{ni,t}} (p_{ni,t} (v) / \omega_{ni})^{1-\sigma^*} dv \]

\[ P_{nt} = \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{N} P_{ni,t}^{1-\eta^*} \right]^{1-\eta^*}. \]

The profit that producer of variety \( v \in \Omega_{it} \) can earn in market \( n \) is given by

\[ D_{ni,t} (v) = \frac{1}{\sigma^*} p_{ni,t} (v) x_{ni,t} (v) - W_{nt} \Phi_{ni,t} \]

\[ = \frac{1}{\sigma^*} M_{ni,t}^{(\sigma^*-1)\bar{\phi}_{YM}} \left( \frac{\sigma^*}{\sigma^*-1} \frac{\tau_{ni,t} W_{it}}{\omega_{ni} \sigma^* M_{ni,t}^{\sigma^*-1} z^*_i (v)} \right) \left( \frac{P_{ni,t} Y_{nt}}{\sigma^* W_{nt} \Phi_{ni,t}} \right)^{1-\sigma^*} P_{ni,t}^{\eta^*} Y_{nt} - W_{nt} \Phi_{ni,t}. \]

As long as \( D_{ni,t} (v) \geq 0 \), variety \( v \in \Omega_{it} \) will be sold in country \( n \). Condition \( D_{ni,t} (v) = 0 \) gives the cutoff efficiency \( z^*_{ni,t} \) such that only producers with \( z_i (v) \geq z^*_{ni,t} \) serve market \( n \).

After some algebra, we get

\[ \frac{z^*_{ni,t}}{z^*_{min,i}} = M_{ni,t}^{\bar{\phi}_{YM}} \left( \frac{\sigma^*}{\sigma^*-1} \frac{\tau_{ni,t} W_{it}}{\omega_{ni} \sigma^* M_{min,i}} \right) \left( \frac{P_{ni,t} Y_{nt}}{\sigma^* W_{nt} \Phi_{ni,t}} \right)^{1-\sigma^*} P_{ni,t}^{\eta^*} P_{nt}^{\frac{1}{\sigma^* - 1}}. \]

With Pareto distribution of efficiencies of production, we have that

\[ M_{ni,t} = M_{ii} \int_{z_{ni,t}^*}^{\infty} dG_i (z) = M_{ii} \left( 1 - G_i (z_{ni,t}^*) \right) = M_{ii} \left( \frac{z_{ni,t}^*}{z^*_{min,i}} \right)^{-\sigma^*.} \]

This gives

\[ \left( \frac{z_{ni,t}^*}{z^*_{min,i}} \right)^{1-\bar{\phi}_{YM}} = M_{ji}^{\bar{\phi}_{YM}} \left( \frac{\sigma^*}{\sigma^*-1} \frac{\tau_{ni,t} W_{it}}{\omega_{ni} \sigma^* M_{ni,t}^{\sigma^*-1} z_{min,i}} \right) \left( \frac{P_{ni,t} Y_{nt}}{\sigma^* W_{nt} \Phi_{ni,t}} \right)^{1-\sigma^*} P_{ni,t}^{\eta^*} P_{nt}^{\frac{1}{\sigma^* - 1}}. \]

Next, let us find the bilateral price indices. We have

67
\[ p_{ni,t}^{1-\sigma^m} = M_{ni,t}^{(\sigma^m-1)\phi_{Y,M}^{-1}} M_{it} \int_{z_{ni,t}^{\min}}^{\infty} \left( \frac{\sigma^m}{\sigma^m - 1} \cdot \frac{\tau_{ni,t}^M W_{it}^{\phi_{Y,M}^{-1}}}{\omega_{ni} S_{\phi_{Y,M}^{-1}}} \right)^{1-\sigma^m} dG_i (z) \]

\[ = \theta^M z_{\min,i}^{\sigma^m} \left( \frac{\sigma^m}{\sigma^m - 1} \cdot \frac{\tau_{ni,t}^M W_{it}^{\phi_{Y,M}^{-1}}}{\omega_{ni} S_{\phi_{Y,M}^{-1}}} \right)^{1-\sigma^m} M_{ni,t}^{(\sigma^m-1)\phi_{Y,M}^{-1}} M_{it} \int_{z_{ni,t}^{\min}}^{\infty} z^{\sigma^m - \sigma^m - 2} dz \]

\[ = \frac{\theta^M}{\theta^m + 1 - \sigma^m} \left( \frac{\sigma^m}{\sigma^m - 1} \cdot \frac{\tau_{ni,t}^M W_{it}^{\phi_{Y,M}^{-1}}}{\omega_{ni} z_{\min,i}^{\sigma^m} S_{\phi_{Y,M}^{-1}}} \right)^{1-\sigma^m} M_{ni,t}^{(\sigma^m-1)\phi_{Y,M}^{-1}} M_{it} \left( \frac{z_{ni,t}^{\sigma^m}}{z_{\min,i}^{\sigma^m}} \right)^{\sigma^m - \sigma^m - 1} \]

(40)

In order to ensure that the right-hand side of this expression is finite, we need to make the technical assumption that \( \theta^m > \sigma^m - 1 \).

Without risk of confusion, let us redefine constant \( \theta \) in definition (27) of \( \Phi_{ni,t} \) to be \( \theta \equiv \phi_{Y,M} - \frac{1}{\sigma^m} \). Without correction for the love-of-variety effect (i.e., when \( \phi_{Y,M} = 1 / (\sigma^m - 1) \)), we have the same definition of \( \theta \) as in the main text. Substituting the expression (39) for the cutoff threshold into (40) and using the definition of \( \Phi_{ni,t} \), we get:

\[ p_{ni,t}^{1-\sigma^m} = \frac{\theta^m}{\theta^m + 1 - \sigma^m} \left( \tau_{ni,t}^M P_{\phi_{Y,M}^{-1}} / \omega_{ni} \right) - \frac{\theta^m}{\theta^m - \phi_{Y,M}^{-1} \sigma^m} \left( \frac{P_{Y,nt} Y_{nt}}{\omega_{ni} S_{\phi_{Y,M}^{-1}}} P_{ni,t}^{\sigma^m - \eta^m} P_{ni,t}^{\eta^m-1} \right)^{\phi_{Y,M}^{-1} \sigma^m - \phi_{Y,M}^{-1} \sigma^m} \]

where

\[ P_{\phi_{Y,M}^{-1}} \equiv \frac{\omega_{ni} S_{\phi_{Y,M}^{-1}} M_{ni,t}^{\phi_{Y,M}^{-1}}}{\omega_{ni} S_{\phi_{Y,M}^{-1}} M_{ni,t}^{\phi_{Y,M}^{-1}}} \]

Solving for \( p_{ni,t} \), we get

\[ p_{ni,t}^{1-\eta^m} = \left( \frac{\theta^m}{\theta^m + 1 - \sigma^m} \right)^{(1-\phi_{Y,M}^{-1}) \phi_{Y,M}^{-1}} \left( \tau_{ni,t}^M P_{\phi_{Y,M}^{-1}} / \omega_{ni} \right)^{-\phi_{Y,M}^{-1}} \left( \frac{P_{Y,nt} Y_{nt}}{\omega_{ni} S_{\phi_{Y,M}^{-1}}} P_{ni,t}^{\sigma^m - \eta^m} P_{ni,t}^{\eta^m-1} \right)^{\phi_{Y,M}^{-1} \sigma^m - \phi_{Y,M}^{-1} \sigma^m} \]

where

\[ \xi \equiv \frac{1}{\eta^m - \phi_{Y,M}} \theta^m + 1 \]
This allows us to find expression for the price index,

\[ P_{i,nt} = \left( \frac{\theta^M}{\theta^M + 1 - \sigma^M} \right)^{-\left( \frac{1}{\sigma^M} - \bar{\phi}_{Y,M} \right)} \left( \frac{P_{i,nt}Y_{nt}}{\sigma^M W_{nt}} \right)^{-\theta} L_{i,nt}^{-\phi_{i,\perp}} \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{N} \left( \frac{F_{i,nt}^\theta \tau_{X,nt}^M}{\sigma^M F_{i,nt}} P_{X,nt} / \omega_{ni} \right) \right]^{-\theta M^2} \].

Next, bilateral trade flows are given by:

\[ \chi_{ni,t} = M_{it} \int_{\Omega_{ni,t}} p_{ni,t}(v) \chi_{ni,t}(v) dv = \left( \frac{p_{ni,t}}{P_{i,nt}} \right)^{1-\eta^M} P_{i,nt}Y_{nt}. \]

Substituting expressions for price indices, we get

\[ \chi_{ni,t} = \lambda_{ni,t} P_{i,nt} Y_{nt}, \]

where

\[ \lambda_{ni,t} = \frac{\left( \Phi_{ni,t}^\theta \tau_{ni,t}^M P_{X,nt} / \omega_{ni} \right)^{-\theta M^2}}{\sum_{i=1}^{N} \left( \Phi_{ni,t}^\theta \tau_{ni,t}^M P_{X,nt} / \omega_{ni} \right)^{-\theta M^2}}. \]

Let us now find profits. For this, we need to have the expression for \( z_{ni,t}^* \). After some algebra, we get

\[ \left( \frac{z_{ni,t}^*}{z_{\min,i}} \right)^{1-\bar{\phi}_{X,M} \theta^M} = \frac{\tau_{ni,t}^M P_{X,nt} / \omega_{ni}}{P_{ni,t}} \frac{\phi_{M} - \phi_{X,M}}{\sigma^M} \left( \frac{1}{\sigma^M - 1} - \theta \right) \left( \frac{\chi_{ni,t}}{\sigma^M W_{nt} F_{ni,t}} \right) \left( \frac{1}{\sigma^M} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma^M - 1}} \frac{L_{i,nt}^{-\phi_{i,\perp}}}{\sigma^M} \left( \frac{1}{\sigma^M - 1} \right). \]

Next, we have

\[ \frac{\tau_{ni,t}^M P_{X,nt} / \omega_{ni}}{P_{ni,t}} = \left( \frac{\theta^M}{\theta^M + 1 - \sigma^M} \right)^{-\left( \frac{1}{\sigma^M} - \bar{\phi}_{X,M} \theta^M \right)} \left( \frac{P_{ni,t}}{P_{y,nt}} \right)^{(1-\eta^M)\theta} \left( \frac{P_{i,nt}Y_{nt}}{\sigma^M W_{nt} F_{ni,t}} \right)^{\theta} L_{i,nt}^{-\phi_{i,\perp}} \left( \frac{\chi_{ni,t}}{\sigma^M W_{nt} F_{ni,t}} \right)^{\theta - \phi_{i,\perp}} L_{i,nt}^{-\phi_{i,\perp}}, \]

which allows us to find

\[ \left( \frac{z_{ni,t}^*}{z_{\min,i}} \right)^{\theta^M} = \left[ \frac{\theta^M + 1 - \sigma^M}{\theta^M \sigma^M} \cdot \frac{\chi_{ni,t}}{W_{nt} F_{ni,t}} \right]^{-\frac{1}{\sigma^M}} \frac{\Phi_{\perp,M} - \Phi_{\perp,M}}{\sigma^M} \frac{\chi_{ni,t}}{W_{nt} F_{ni,t}}^{-\phi_{i,\perp}} \frac{L_{i,nt}^{-\phi_{i,\perp}}}{\sigma^M}. \]
and

\[ M_{ni,t} = \left( \frac{z_{ni,t}^*}{z_{\min_i}} \right)^{\theta^M} M_{it} = \left( \frac{\theta^M + 1 - \sigma^M}{\theta^M \sigma^M} \cdot \frac{\chi_{ni,t}}{W_{nt} F_{ni,t}} \right) \left[ M_{it}^{\theta_{it} - \phi_{it,1}} L_{r,nt}^{\theta_{it} - \phi_{it,1}} \right]^{-\frac{1}{\theta^M}}. \]

To get average profits of country \( i \) from exports to \( n \), we need to calculate the following expression:

\[ D_{ni,t} = \frac{1}{\sigma^M} \cdot \frac{\chi_{ni,t}}{M_{it}} - W_{nt} \left[ M_{it}^{\theta_{it} - \phi_{it,1}} L_{r,nt}^{\theta_{it} - \phi_{it,1}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\theta^M}} F_{ni,t} \cdot \frac{M_{ni,t}}{M_{it}} \]

\[ = \frac{1}{\sigma^M} \cdot \frac{\chi_{ni,t}}{M_{it}} - \frac{\theta^M + 1 - \sigma^M}{\theta^M \sigma^M} \cdot \frac{\chi_{ni,t}}{M_{it}} \]

\[ = \frac{\sigma^M - 1}{\theta^M \sigma^M} \cdot \frac{\chi_{ni,t}}{M_{it}}. \]

Hence, total average profits of country \( i \) are

\[ D_{it} = \sum_{n=1}^{N} D_{ni,t} = \frac{\sigma^M - 1}{\sigma^M \theta^M} \cdot \frac{\chi_{it}}{M_{it}}, \]

where \( \chi_{it} \) is total output of intermediates in country \( i \). We can find that, as in the Krugman model,

\[ \chi_{it} = \frac{\sigma^M}{\sigma^M - 1} W_{it} L_{X,i,t}. \]

The amount of country \( n \)’s labor that country \( i \) uses to serve country \( n \)’s market is

\[ L_{r,ni,t} = \left[ M_{it}^{\theta_{it} - \phi_{it,1}} L_{r,nt}^{\theta_{it} - \phi_{it,1}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\theta^M}} F_{ni,t} M_{ni,t} = \frac{\theta^M + 1 - \sigma^M}{\theta^M \sigma^M} \cdot \frac{\chi_{ni,t}}{W_{nt}}. \]

Hence, the total amount of country \( n \)’s labor used to serve its market is

\[ L_{r,nt} = \sum_{i=1}^{N} L_{r,ni,t} = \frac{\theta^M + 1 - \sigma^M}{\theta^M \sigma^M} \cdot \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} \chi_{ni,t}}{W_{nt}} \]

\[ = \frac{\theta^M + 1 - \sigma^M}{\theta^M \sigma^M} \cdot \frac{P_{y,nt} Y_{nt}}{W_{nt}}. \]

This allows us to write

\[ P_{y,nt} = \left( \frac{\theta^M}{\theta^M + 1 - \sigma^M} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma^M - 1}} L_{r,nt}^{-\phi_{r,1}} \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{N} \left( F_{ni,t} \chi_{ni,t} P_{X,i,t} / \omega_{ni} \right)^{-\theta^M} \right]^{-\frac{1}{\theta^M}}. \]
or

\[ P_{\gamma,nt} = \left( \frac{\theta^M}{\theta^M + 1 - \sigma^M} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma^M - 1} + \phi_f, \ell} \left( P_{\gamma,nt}Y_{nt} \right)^{-\phi_f, \ell} \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left( F_{n_i, \ell t_i, t_{n_i}, \ell} P_{X, nt} / \omega_{n_i} \right) \right]^{-\theta^M \xi} \left[ \sigma^M \right]^{-\theta^M \xi}. \]

Also, we can write

\[ L_{f, nt} = \frac{\rho + 1 - \sigma^M}{\theta^M \sigma^M} \cdot \chi_{nt} \cdot P_{\gamma, nt}Y_{nt} = \left( \frac{1}{\sigma^M - 1} - \frac{1}{\theta^M} \right) P_{\gamma, nt}Y_{nt} L_{M X, nt}. \]

**Equilibrium System of Equations** In order to write the equilibrium system in the isomorphic form, we need to do transformations of some of the equilibrium conditions. Define trade deficit as the value of net exports of varieties,

\[ TB_{nt} \equiv \chi_{nt} - P_{\gamma, nt}Y_{nt}. \]

We can write

\[ L_{f, nt} = \frac{\rho + 1 - \sigma^M}{\theta^M \sigma^M} \cdot \chi_{nt} \cdot P_{\gamma, nt}Y_{nt} = \left( \frac{1}{\sigma^M - 1} - \frac{1}{\theta^M} \right) P_{\gamma, nt}Y_{nt} L_{M X, nt}. \]

Using expression \( \chi_{nt} = \frac{\sigma^M}{\sigma^M - 1} W_{nt} L_{M X, nt} \), we can write

\[ \left( \frac{1}{\sigma^M - 1} - \frac{1}{\theta^M} \right) \frac{TB_{nt}}{\chi_{nt}} L_{M X, nt} = \left( \frac{\rho + 1 - \sigma^M}{\theta^M \sigma^M} \right) \frac{TB_{nt}}{W_{nt}}. \]

Define

\[ L_{\chi, nt} \equiv L_{M X, nt} + \left( \frac{1}{\sigma^M - 1} - \frac{1}{\theta^M} \right) L_{M X, nt} = \left( \frac{\sigma^M}{\sigma^M - 1} - \frac{1}{\theta^M} \right) L_{M X, nt}. \]

With this definition the labor market clearing condition can be written as

\[ L_{\chi, nt} + L_{f, nt} = L_{nt} + \left( \frac{\rho + 1 - \sigma^M}{\theta^M \sigma^M} \right) \frac{TB_{nt}}{W_{nt}}. \]

Next, rewrite condition for \( \chi_{nt} \),

\[ \chi_{nt} = \frac{\sigma^M}{\sigma^M - 1} W_{nt} L_{M X, nt} = \frac{1}{\sigma^M - 1} \cdot W_{nt} L_{\chi, nt}. \]

71
Manipulate the expression for $P_{X_{nt}}$,

\[ P_{X_{nt}} = \frac{\sigma^M}{\sigma^M - 1} \cdot \frac{W_{nt}}{z_{\min,n} \Theta_{X_{nt}} Z_{X_{nt}} M_{nt}^{\phi_{X_{nt}}} \left[ \frac{L_{X_{nt}}^M}{\sigma_{nt}^M} \right]} \]

\[ = \frac{\sigma^M}{\sigma^M - 1} \left( \frac{\sigma^M}{\sigma^M - 1} \right) \frac{D_{nt}^{\sigma^M - 1} W_{nt}^{1 - \frac{\sigma^M - 1}{\sigma^M}}}{z_{\min,n} \Theta_{X_{nt}} Z_{X_{nt}} M_{nt}^{\phi_{X_{nt}}} L_{X_{nt}}^M D_{nt}^{\sigma^M - 1} W_{nt}^{1 - \frac{\sigma^M - 1}{\sigma^M}}}. \]

Using the facts that $D_{nt} = \frac{\sigma^M}{\sigma^M - 1} \cdot \frac{X_{nt}}{M_{nt}}$ and $W_{nt} = \left( 1 - \frac{\sigma^M - 1}{\sigma^M} \right) \frac{X_{nt}}{L_{X_{nt}}}$, we get

\[ P_{X_{nt}} = \frac{D_{nt}^{\sigma^M - 1} W_{nt}^{1 - \frac{\sigma^M - 1}{\sigma^M}}}{\Theta_{X_{nt}} Z_{X_{nt}} M_{nt}^{\phi_{X_{nt}}} L_{X_{nt}}^M D_{nt}^{\sigma^M - 1} W_{nt}^{1 - \frac{\sigma^M - 1}{\sigma^M}}}, \]

where

\[ \Theta_{X_{nt}}^M \equiv \left( \frac{\sigma^M - 1}{\sigma^M} \right)^{\sigma^M - 1} \left( 1 - \frac{\sigma^M - 1}{\sigma^M} \right)^{1 - \frac{\sigma^M - 1}{\sigma^M}} \left( \frac{\sigma^M}{\sigma^M - 1} \right)^{-1} \Theta_{X_{nt}}^{1 + \min,n}. \]

Let $X_{nt} \equiv X_{nt}/P_{X_{nt}}$ be the real output of varieties. By substituting expressions for $D_{nt}$ and $W_{nt}$ into the above expression for $P_{X_{nt}}$ we get

\[ X_{nt} = \left( \Theta_{X_{nt}} M_{nt}^{\phi_{X_{nt}}} L_{X_{nt}}^M \right) \left( \frac{P_{Y_{nt}} Y_{nt}}{\sigma^M W_{nt}} \right)^{-\phi_{X_{nt}}}, \]

where

\[ \Theta_{X_{nt}} \equiv \left( \frac{\sigma^M}{\sigma^M - 1} - 1 \right)^{-1} \Theta_{X_{nt}}^{1 + \min,n}. \]

Next, we have

\[ \sum_{i=1}^{N} \left( f_{ni,t}^\phi \tau_{ni,t}^M P_{X_{ni}}/\omega_{ni} \right)^{-\phi_{X_{ni}}^\theta} = \left( \frac{\sigma^M}{\sigma^M - 1} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma^M - 1} - \phi_{X_{ni}}} \left( \frac{P_{Y_{ni}} Y_{nt}}{\sigma^M W_{nt}} \right)^{-\phi_{Y_{ni}}^\theta} \left( f_{ni,t}^\phi \tau_{ni,t}^M P_{X_{ni}}/\omega_{ni} \right)^{-\phi_{Y_{ni}}^\theta}, \]

and so

\[ \lambda_{ni,t} = \left( \frac{\sigma^M}{\sigma^M - 1} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma^M - 1} - \phi_{X_{ni}}} \left( \frac{P_{Y_{ni}} Y_{nt}}{\sigma^M W_{nt}} \right)^{\phi_{Y_{ni}}^\theta} \left( f_{ni,t}^\phi \tau_{ni,t}^M P_{X_{ni}}/\omega_{ni} \right)^{-\phi_{Y_{ni}}^\theta}, \]

72
which gives
\[ \frac{\lambda_{ni,t} P_{y,nt} Y_{nt}}{F_{ni,t}^\theta \tau_{ni,t}^M P_{x,nt} / \omega_{ni}} = \left( \frac{\theta^M}{\theta^M + 1 - \sigma^M} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma^M - 1} - \phi_{FL}} \left( \frac{1}{\sigma^M} - \phi_{FL} \right)^{\theta^M} \left( \frac{P_{y,nt} Y_{nt}}{\sigma^M W_{nt}} \right)^{\phi_{FL} \theta^M} \]

\[ \times \left( F_{ni,t}^\theta \tau_{ni,t}^M P_{x,nt} / \omega_{ni} \right)^{-\left(1 + \theta^M \sigma^M \lambda_{ni,t} \right)} \left( \frac{P_{y,nt} Y_{nt}}{\sigma^M W_{nt}} \right)^{\phi_{FL} \theta^M} \]

Taking both sides to the power of \( \frac{\theta^M \sigma^M}{1 + \theta^M \sigma^M} \), we get
\[ \left( \frac{\lambda_{ni,t} P_{y,nt} Y_{nt}}{F_{ni,t}^\theta \tau_{ni,t}^M P_{x,nt} / \omega_{ni}} \right)^{\frac{\theta^M \sigma^M}{1 + \theta^M \sigma^M}} = \left[ \left( \frac{\theta^M}{\theta^M + 1 - \sigma^M} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma^M - 1} - \phi_{FL}} \left( \frac{1}{\sigma^M} - \phi_{FL} \right)^{\theta^M} \left( \frac{P_{y,nt} Y_{nt}}{\sigma^M W_{nt}} \right)^{\phi_{FL} \theta^M} \right]^{\frac{\theta^M \sigma^M}{1 + \theta^M \sigma^M}} \]

\[ \times \left( F_{ni,t}^\theta \tau_{ni,t}^M P_{x,nt} / \omega_{ni} \right)^{-\theta^M \sigma^M \lambda_{ni,t} \sigma^M} \left( \frac{P_{y,nt} Y_{nt}}{\sigma^M W_{nt}} \right)^{\phi_{FL} \theta^M} \]

Summing over \( i \) and doing some algebra, we get
\[ Y_{nt} = \left( \frac{\theta^M}{\theta^M + 1 - \sigma^M} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma^M - 1} - \phi_{FL}} [\sigma^M]^{-\phi_{FL}} \left( \frac{P_{y,nt} Y_{nt}}{W_{nt}} \right)^{\phi_{FL}} \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{N} \left( \frac{\lambda_{ni,t} P_{y,nt} Y_{nt}}{F_{ni,t}^\theta \tau_{ni,t}^M P_{x,nt} / \omega_{ni}} \right)^{\frac{\theta^M \sigma^M}{1 + \theta^M \sigma^M}} \right]. \]

Let us redefine iceberg trade costs as
\[ \tau_{ni,t} \equiv \left( \frac{F_{ni,t}}{F_{ni,t}} \right)^\theta \tau_{ni,t}. \]

Under Assumption 1, the redefined iceberg trade costs \( \tau_{ni,t} \) satisfy \( \tau_{ni,t} \geq 1 \) for all \( n, i, \) and \( t \), and they also satisfy the triangle inequality.\(^30\) Using the definition of \( \tau_{ni,t} \), we can write the expression for the final aggregate as
\[ Y_{nt} = \left( \frac{\theta^M}{\theta^M + 1 - \sigma^M} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma^M - 1} - \phi_{FL}} [\sigma^M]^{-\phi_{FL}} F_{ni,t}^{\theta} \left( \frac{P_{y,nt} Y_{nt}}{W_{nt}} \right)^{\phi_{FL}} \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{N} \left( \frac{\lambda_{ni,t} P_{y,nt} Y_{nt}}{\tau_{ni,t}^M P_{x,nt} / \omega_{ni}} \right)^{\frac{\theta^M \sigma^M}{1 + \theta^M \sigma^M}} \right]. \]

Let us write \( F_{ni,t}^{\theta} = \Theta_{y,n}^M Z_{y,n,t} \), where \( Z_{y,n,t} \) is supposed to be the same exogenous shock as

\(^{30}\)In Assumption 1 we use the definition of \( \theta \) from the main text, i.e., we use \( \theta \equiv \frac{1}{\sigma^M - 1} - \frac{1}{\theta^M}. \) Formally speaking, for the purposes of the current appendix we need to modify Assumption 1 and use the definition \( \theta \equiv \phi_{y,M} - \frac{1}{\sigma^M}. \) This slight abuse of notation should not create confusion.
in the unified model. Define

\[
\Theta_{y,n} \equiv \left( \frac{\theta^M}{\theta^M + 1 - \sigma^M} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma^M - 1}} - \phi_{_{f,L}} [\sigma^M]^{-\phi_{_{f,L}}} \Theta_{y,n}^M.
\]

Then we can write

\[
Y_{nt} = \Theta_{y,n} Z_{y,n} \left( \frac{P_{y,n} Y_{nt}}{W_{nt}} \right) \phi_{_{f,L}} \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{N} \left( \frac{\lambda_{ni,t} P_{y,n} Y_{nt}}{\tau_{ni,t} P_{x,ni} / \omega_{ni}} \right) \frac{\theta^M}{1 + \sigma^M} \right]^{\frac{1}{1 + \sigma^M}}.
\]

Combining all expressions and definitions, we get the equilibrium system in isomor-
plays in the generalized Melitz model. The love-of-variety effect impacts
the above system in two places. First, it impacts the trade elasticity, which is given by the

\[
V_{nt} = \beta E_t \left\{ \frac{P_{y,nt}}{P_{y,n,t+1}} \cdot \frac{U_1 (C_{nt+1}, L_{nt+1})}{U_1 (C_{nt}, L_{nt})} \left[ D_{nt+1} + (1 - \delta) V_{n,t+1} \right] \right\},
\]

\[
- \frac{U_2 (C_{nt}, L_{nt})}{U_1 (C_{nt}, L_{nt})} = \frac{W_{nt}}{P_{y,nt}},
\]

\[
M_{n,t+1} = (1 - \delta) M_{nt} + M_{i,nt},
\]

\[
X_{nt} = \left( \Theta_{x,n} M_{nt} \phi_{x,M} \frac{\phi_{x,M}^{\alpha - 1}}{\phi_{x,M}^{\sigma - 1}} \frac{L_{x,nt} + \sigma M}{X_{nt}} \right) M_{nt}^{\phi_{x,M}^{\alpha - 1}} L_{x,nt}^{1 - \phi_{x,M}^{\alpha - 1}},
\]

\[
Y_{nt} = \Theta_{y,n} Z_{y,nt} \left( \frac{P_{y,m} Y_{nt}}{W_{nt}} \right) \phi_{y,t} \left[ N \left( \frac{\lambda_{ni,t} P_{y,nt} Y_{nt}}{\tau_{ni,t} P_{x,nt}/\omega_{ni}} \right) \frac{\theta^n}{\theta^m} \right]^{1 + \frac{\theta^n}{\theta^m}}
\]

\[
M_{i,nt} = \Theta_{i,n} Z_{i,nt} L_{i,nt}^{\alpha_i} Y_{nt}^{1 - \alpha_i},
\]

\[
L_{x,nt} + L_{i,nt} = L_{nt} + \frac{\theta^m + 1 - \sigma M}{\theta^m \sigma M} \cdot TB_{nt},
\]

\[
C_{nt} + Y_{i,nt} = Y_{nt},
\]

\[
\sum_{n=1}^{N} \lambda_{ni,t} P_{y,nt} Y_{nt} = P_{x,nt} X_{nt},
\]

\[
\lambda_{ni,t} = \frac{\left( \tau_{ni,t} P_{x,nt}/\omega_{ni} \right)^{-\frac{\theta^n}{\theta^m}}}{\sum_{i=1}^{N} \left( \tau_{ni,t} P_{x,nt}/\omega_{ni} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma^n}}}.
\]

\[
M_{nt} = \frac{\sigma^M - 1}{\sigma^M \theta^M} \cdot \frac{P_{x,nt} X_{nt}}{D_{nt}},
\]

\[
L_{x,nt} = \left( 1 - \frac{\sigma^M - 1}{\sigma^M \theta^M} \right) \frac{P_{x,nt} X_{nt}}{W_{nt}},
\]

\[
L_{i,nt} = \frac{V_{nt} M_{i,nt}}{W_{nt}},
\]

\[
Y_{i,nt} = (1 - \alpha_i) \frac{V_{nt} M_{i,nt}}{P_{i,nt}},
\]

\[
P_{y,nt} C_{nt} + V_{nt} M_{i,nt} = D_{nt} M_{nt} + W_{nt} L_{nt}.
\]

Let us discuss the role that the strength of the love-of-variety effect — given by pa-
parameter \( \phi_{y,M} \) — plays in the generalized Melitz model. The love-of-variety effect impacts
the above system in two places. First, it impacts the trade elasticity, which is given by the
exponent of \( \tau_{ni,t} \) in the expression for trade shares \( \lambda_{ni,t} \) and is equal to \( \theta^n \xi \) with

\[
\xi = \frac{1}{\left( \frac{1}{\eta^m} - \phi_{y,M} \right) \theta^m + 1}.
\]
Second, if we remove labor externality in the fixed costs of serving markets by assuming that $\phi_{F,L} = \vartheta$, then the strength of economies of scale in production of the final aggregate will be given by $-\vartheta$ with $\vartheta = \phi_{Y,M} - \frac{1}{\sigma\mu}$. Importantly, not all combinations of the trade elasticity and the strength of economies of scale in production of the final aggregate in the unified model can be mapped into a valid trade elasticity $\theta^m \zeta$ in the generalized Melitz model, if we keep parameter restriction that $\phi_{F,L} = \vartheta$. For example, the value $\psi_Y = \frac{1}{\eta^M - 1}$ can be used in the unified model, but not in the corresponding Melitz model. Indeed, having $\psi_Y = \frac{1}{\eta^M - 1}$ in the unified model implies that in the corresponding generalized Melitz model we need to have $\vartheta = -\psi_Y = -\frac{1}{\eta^M - 1}$ and $\phi_{Y,M} = -\vartheta + \frac{1}{\sigma\mu} = \frac{1}{\eta^M - 1} + \frac{1}{\sigma\mu}$. But this, in turn, implies that the denominator in expression (41) for $\zeta$ is zero. In other words, having $\psi_Y = \frac{1}{\eta^M - 1}$ in the unified model implies a non-valid value for $\zeta$ in the corresponding generalized Melitz model.

If we relax parameter restriction that $\phi_{F,L} = \vartheta$, and, thus, allow for labor externalities in the fixed costs of serving markets, then the only place where parameter $\phi_{Y,M}$ impacts the equilibrium system in the generalized Melitz model is the trade elasticity. Then any combination of trade elasticity and the strength of economies of scale in production of the final aggregate in the unified model can be mapped into the corresponding parameters in the generalized Melitz model. Thus, we can have isomorphism. However, in this case, the trade elasticity in the generalized Melitz model is governed by two free parameters: $\eta^M$ and $\phi_{Y,M}$. So, one of these parameters is redundant for the purposes of isomorphism. It makes more economic sense to adjust parameter $\eta^M$ — elasticity of substitution between varieties produced in different countries — rather than $\phi_{Y,M}$ to change the trade elasticity. Hence, parameter $\phi_{Y,M}$ is not needed in this case. This is why we choose to not to have correction for the love-of-variety in the generalized Melitz model in the main text, i.e., in the main text we have $\phi_{Y,M} = \frac{1}{\sigma^M - 1}$, $\vartheta \equiv \frac{1}{\sigma^M - 1} - \frac{1}{\sigma\mu}$, and

$$
\zeta = \frac{1}{\left(\frac{1}{\eta^M - 1} - \frac{1}{\sigma^M - 1}\right) \theta^M + 1}.
$$
B.3.1 Steady State of Standard Melitz Model:

In steady state:

\[
- \frac{U_2(C_n, L_n)}{U_1(C_n, L_n)} = \frac{W_n}{P_{y,n}}
\]

\[
P_{x,nt} = \frac{\sigma^M \Theta^m}{\sigma^M \Theta^m - \sigma^m + 1} \Theta_{x,nt}^{-1} \left[ \Theta_{i,n} \frac{1}{1/\beta - 1 + \delta} \cdot \frac{\sigma^m - 1}{\sigma^M \Theta^m - \sigma^m + 1} \right]^{-\phi_{y,M}} \frac{W_n}{L_{x,nt}}^{\phi_{x,nt} + \phi_{y,M}}
\]

\[
Y_{nt} = \Theta_{i,n} \left( \frac{P_{i,nt} Y_{nt}}{W_{nt}} \right) \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{N} \left( \frac{\lambda_{ni,t} P_{i,nt} Y_{nt}}{\tau_{ni,t} P_{X,nt} / \omega_{ni}} \right) \right]^{-\theta^M \xi} \frac{1}{1 - \theta^M \xi} \cdot \frac{1}{\theta^M \sigma^m} \cdot TB_{nt}
\]

\[
L_{x,nt} = \left( 1 + \frac{\delta}{1/\beta - 1 + \delta} \cdot \frac{\sigma^m - 1}{\sigma^M \Theta^m - \sigma^m + 1} \right) L_{nt}
\]

\[
+ \left( 1 + \frac{\delta}{1/\beta - 1 + \delta} \cdot \frac{\sigma^m - 1}{\sigma^M \Theta^m - \sigma^m + 1} \right) \left[ \frac{\tau_{ni,t} P_{X,nt} / \omega_{ni}}{\lambda_{ni,t} P_{i,nt} Y_{nt}} \right]^{-\theta^M \xi} \frac{1}{1 - \theta^M \xi} \cdot \frac{1}{\theta^M \sigma^m} \cdot TB_{nt}
\]

\[
\sum_{n=1}^{N} \lambda_{ni,t} P_{y,nt} Y_{nt} = P_{x,nt} X_{nt},
\]

\[
\lambda_{ni,t} = \frac{\left( \tau_{ni,t} P_{X,nt} / \omega_{ni} \right)^{-\theta^M \xi}}{\sum_{l=1}^{N} \left( \tau_{nl,t} P_{X,nt} / \omega_{ni} \right)^{-\theta^M \xi}}
\]

\[
P_{x,nt} X_{nt} = \frac{\sigma^M \Theta^m}{\sigma^M \Theta^m - \sigma^m + 1} L_{x,nt},
\]

\[
L_{i,n} = \frac{\delta}{1/\beta - 1 + \delta} \cdot \frac{\sigma^m - 1}{\sigma^M \Theta^m - \sigma^m + 1} L_{x,nt},
\]

\[
P_{i,nt} Y_{nt} = P_{x,nt} X_{nt} - \frac{\theta^M + 1 - \sigma^m}{\theta^M \sigma^m} \cdot TB_{nt},
\]

\[
W_n L_n = \left( 1 + \frac{\delta}{1/\beta - 1 + \delta} \cdot \frac{\sigma^m - 1}{\sigma^M \Theta^m - \sigma^m + 1} \right) W_n L_{x,n} - \frac{\theta^M + 1 - \sigma^m}{\theta^M \sigma^m} \cdot TB_{nt},
\]

\[
M_n = \left( \Theta_{i,n} / \delta \right) L_{i,n},
\]

\[
M_{i,n} = \Theta_{i,n} L_{i,n},
\]

\[
V_n = \frac{W_n}{\Theta_{i,n}},
\]

\[
D_n = \left( \frac{1}{\beta} - 1 + \delta \right) \frac{W_n}{\Theta_{i,n}},
\]

\[
C_n = Y_n.
\]
C Additional Tables with Moments

We tabulate below model moments for various extensions and sensitivity analysis.

C.1 Calibrated Processes

In Table 11 we provide moments for standard formulations of the IRBC, Krugman, and Melitz models, where we calibrate processes for $Z_{x,i,t}$ for the Krugman and Melitz models so that the implied processes for $S_{x,i,t}$ in these models are the same as the process for $S_{x,i,t}$ in the IRBC model. All other parameters of the Krugman and Melitz models have standard calibrations from Table 2. Parameter values of the IRBC model are exactly the same as in the standard calibration from Table 2. So, columns 2, 5, and 8 in Table 11 are identical to the same columns in Table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Complete Markets</th>
<th>Bond Economy</th>
<th>Financial Autarky</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IRBC (1)</td>
<td>Krug (2)</td>
<td>Mel (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho_{x,11}, \rho_{x,22}$</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho_{x,12}, \rho_{x,21}$</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_{x,1}, \sigma_{x,2}$</td>
<td>0.0073</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.0079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_{x,12}, \sigma_{x,21}$</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Parameter values for the IRBC model are the same as in Table 2.

Table 10: Calibrations for $Z_{x,i,t}$ that give the same process for $S_{x,i,t}$ across models

Standard calibration for the IRBC model implies that under all financial market structures (after applying the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter of 1600) we have Std $(S_{x,i,t}) = 0.947$, Corr $(S_{x,i,t-1}, S_{x,i,t}) = 0.718$, and Corr $(S_{x,1,t}, S_{x,2,t}) = 0.284$. In Table 11 we provide parameterizations of $Z_{x,i,t}$ processes for the Krugman and Melitz models that imply $S_{x,i,t}$ processes with the same moments as in the IRBC model.

C.2 Comparison Across Models

We show robustness checks on comparison across various models below for financial autarky and the bond economy.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moment</th>
<th>Complete Markets</th>
<th>Bond Economy</th>
<th>Financial Autarky</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Data (1)</td>
<td>IRBC (2)</td>
<td>Krug (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ( \left( \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{i,1}}, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>2}{P</em>{i,2}} \right) )</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ( (C_1,C_2) )</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ( \left( \frac{P_{i,1}L_1}{P_{i,1}}, \frac{P_{i,2}L_2}{P_{i,1}} \right) )</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>−0.48</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ( (L_1,L_2) )</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>−0.51</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ( (S_{x,1},S_{x,2}) )</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ( \left( \frac{\text{TB}_1}{\text{GDP}_1}, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{i,1}} \right) )</td>
<td>−0.49</td>
<td>−0.49</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ( \left( \frac{X_{x,1}}{P_{i,1}}, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{i,1}} \right) )</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ( \left( \frac{X_{x,2}}{P_{i,1}}, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{i,1}} \right) )</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ( \left( \frac{\text{ReR}}{\text{GDP}_1}, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{i,1}} \right) )</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std (ReR)</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Data moments are from Heathcote and Perri (2002), Table 2. All series have been Hodrick-Prescott filtered with a smoothing parameter of 1600. Time index is dropped from notation for brevity. \( \text{GDP}_n = W_nL_n + R_nK_n \), \( X_{ni} = \frac{P_{x,ni}}{P_{x,ni}}X_{ni} \), \( \text{TB}_1 = P_{x,1}X_1 - P_{x,1}Y_1 \), \( \text{ReR} = \frac{P_{x,2}}{P_{x,1}} \). Processes for \( Z_{x,i} \) were calibrated so that processes for \( S_{x,i} \) in Krugman and Melitz models are the same as process for \( S_{x,i} \) in IRBC model.

Table 11: Moments from standard formulations of models with the same processes for \( S_{x,i} \) across models
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moment</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Bench</th>
<th>Krug</th>
<th>Mel</th>
<th>Mel</th>
<th>IRBC</th>
<th>Krug</th>
<th>Mel</th>
<th>IRBC</th>
<th>Krug</th>
<th>Mel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corr ( \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{1,t}} , \frac{\text{GDP}<em>2}{P</em>{2,t}} )</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ( C_1, C_2 )</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ( \frac{P_{1,t} I_1}{P_{1,t}} , \frac{P_{2,t} I_2}{P_{2,t}} )</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ( L_1, L_2 )</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>−0.02</td>
<td>−0.02</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ( S_{x,1}, S_{x,2} )</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ( X_{12}, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{1,t}} )</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ( TB_1, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{1,t}} )</td>
<td>−0.49</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std ( \frac{TB_1}{\text{GDP}_1} )</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ( \frac{X_{11}}{P_{1,t}}, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{1,t}} )</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ( \frac{X_{12}}{P_{1,t}}, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{1,t}} )</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ( \frac{\text{ReR}}{P_{1,t}}, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{1,t}} )</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Data moments are from Heathcote and Perri (2002), Table 2. All series have been Hodrick-Prescott filtered with a smoothing parameter of 1600. Time index is dropped from notation for brevity. \( \text{GDP}_n = W_n L_n + R_n K_n \), \( X_{ni} = P_{x,ni}, X_{ni} \), \( TB_1 = P_{x,1} X_1 - P_{y,1} Y_1 \), \( \text{ReR} = P_{r,2} / P_{r,1} \). Column 2 corresponds to the standard calibration of the IRBC model and is identical to column 8 in Table 3. Columns 3-5 are for the case of investment in terms of final aggregate in otherwise standard calibrations of Krugman and Melitz models. For column 5, there is no shock in the final aggregate sector. Columns 7-9 are for the case of \( \sigma = 0.5 \) in otherwise standard calibrations of IRBC, Krugman, and Melitz models. Columns 10-12 are for the case of \( \sigma = 6 \) in otherwise standard calibrations of IRBC, Krugman, and Melitz models.

**Table 12:** Robustness checks. Financial autarky.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moment</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Bench</th>
<th>Krug</th>
<th>Mel</th>
<th>Mel</th>
<th>IRBC</th>
<th>Krug</th>
<th>Mel</th>
<th>IRBC</th>
<th>Krug</th>
<th>Mel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ( \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{1,1}} ), ( \frac{\text{GDP}<em>2}{P</em>{1,2}} ) )</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ( C_1, C_2 )</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ( \frac{P_{1,1}^I}{P_{1,1}}, \frac{P_{2,1}^I}{P_{2,1}} ) )</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>-0.37</td>
<td>-0.36</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.72</td>
<td>-0.58</td>
<td>-0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ( L_1, L_2 )</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.36</td>
<td>-0.55</td>
<td>-0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ( S_{X,1}, S_{X,2} )</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ( S_{X,1}, S_{X,2} )</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std ( \frac{\text{TB}_1}{\text{GDP}_1} )</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>-0.59</td>
<td>-0.48</td>
<td>-0.48</td>
<td>-0.47</td>
<td>-0.46</td>
<td>-0.60</td>
<td>-0.60</td>
<td>-0.53</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ( \frac{\text{TB}_1}{\text{GDP}_1} )</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ( X_{i1} ), ( \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{1,1}} ) )</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ( X_{i2} ), ( \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{1,1}} ) )</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ( \text{ReR} ), ( \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{1,1}} ) )</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Data moments are from Heathcote and Perri (2002), Table 2. All series have been Hodrick-Prescott filtered with a smoothing parameter of 1600. Time index is dropped from notation for brevity. \( \text{GDP}_n = W_n L_n + R_n K_n \), \( X_{ni} = P_{X,ni} X_{ni} \), \( \text{TB}_1 = P_{x,1} X_1 - P_{y,1} Y_1 \), \( \text{ReR} = P_{r,2} / P_{y,1} \). Column 2 corresponds to the standard calibration of the IRBC model and is identical to column 5 in Table 3. Columns 3-5 are for the case of investment in terms of final aggregate in otherwise standard calibrations of Krugman and Melitz models. For column 5, there is no shock in the final aggregate sector. Columns 7-9 are for the case of \( \sigma = 0.5 \) in otherwise standard calibrations of IRBC, Krugman, and Melitz models. Columns 10-12 are for the case of \( \sigma = 6 \) in otherwise standard calibrations of IRBC, Krugman, and Melitz models.

Table 13: Robustness checks. Bond economy.
C.3 Investment in Terms of Labor

We show results below for a variant of an IRBC model in which investment is done in terms of labor.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moment</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Compl. Markets</th>
<th>Bond Economy</th>
<th>Fin. Autarky</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>IRBC $Z_{i,n} = 1$</td>
<td>IRBC $Z_{i,n} = Z_{x,n}$</td>
<td>IRBC $Z_{i,n} = 1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ($\frac{GDP_1}{P_{i,1}}$, $\frac{GDP_2}{P_{i,2}}$, $\frac{C_1}{C_2}$)</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ($\frac{P_{i,1}}{P_{i,1}}$, $\frac{P_{i,2}}{P_{i,1}}$)</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ($L_{i,1}$, $L_{i,2}$)</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ($S_{X,1}$, $S_{X,2}$)</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>-0.84</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
<td>-0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ($S_{Y,1}$, $S_{Y,2}$)</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ($TB_{i,1}$, $\frac{GDP_1}{P_{i,1}}$)</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std ($\frac{TB_{i,1}}{GDP_1}$)</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ($X_{21}$, $\frac{GDP_1}{P_{i,1}}$)</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ($X_{12}$, $\frac{GDP_1}{P_{i,1}}$)</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ($ReR$, $\frac{GDP_1}{P_{i,1}}$)</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Data moments are from Heathcote and Perri (2002), Table 2. All series have been Hodrick-Prescott filtered with a smoothing parameter of 1600. Time index is dropped from notation for brevity. GDP$_n$ = $W_nL_n + R_nK_n$, $X_{ni} = P_{x,n}X_{ni}$, TB$_{i,1} = P_{x,1}X_1 - P_{y,1}Y_1$, ReR = $P_{x,2}/P_{y,1}$. All results in columns 2-7 are for the case of investment done in terms of labor in otherwise standard IRBC model. For columns 2, 4, 6, there is no shock in the investment sector, while for columns 3, 5, 7, the shock to the investment sector is the same as the shock in the intermediate goods sector.

Table 14: Standard IRBC model with investment in terms of labor.

C.4 Uncorrelated Shocks Across Countries and No Spillovers

We show results below when we vary externalities in the model under financial autarky and the bond economy. This is for the case of uncorrelated shocks across countries and no spillovers in the productivity process.
Table 15: Moments from calibration with decreasing returns, uncorrelated shocks, and no spillovers. Shock to the intermediate goods sector. Financial autarky.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moment</th>
<th>Data (1)</th>
<th>Bench (2)</th>
<th>$\psi_{X,K}$ (3)</th>
<th>$\psi_{X,L}$ (4)</th>
<th>$\psi_Y$ (5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corr $\left(\frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{p</em>{y,1}}, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>2}{p</em>{y,2}}\right)$</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr $(C_1, C_2)$</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr $\left(\frac{p_{1,1}I_1}{p_{y,1}}, \frac{p_{2,2}I_2}{p_{y,2}}\right)$</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr $(L_1, L_2)$</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr $(S_{x,1}, S_{x,2})$</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>−0.01</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr $(S_{y,1}, S_{y,2})$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr $\left(\frac{\text{TB}_1}{\text{GDP}_1}, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{p</em>{y,1}}\right)$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std $\left(\frac{\text{TB}_1}{\text{GDP}_1}\right)$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr $\left(\frac{\text{X}<em>{1,1}}{p</em>{y,1}}, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{p</em>{y,1}}\right)$</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr $\left(\frac{\text{X}<em>{1,2}}{p</em>{y,1}}, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{p</em>{y,1}}\right)$</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr $\left(\text{ReR}, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{p</em>{y,1}}\right)$</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Data moments are from Heathcote and Perri (2002), Table 2. All series have been Hodrick-Prescott filtered with a smoothing parameter of 1600. Time index is dropped from notation for brevity. GDP$_n = W_nL_n + R_nK_n$, $X_{ni} = P_{y,ni}X_{ni}$, TB$_1 = P_{y,1}X_1 - P_{y,1}Y_1$, ReR = $P_{y,2}/P_{y,1}$. 
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moment</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Bench</th>
<th>$\psi_{X,K}$</th>
<th>$\psi_{X,L}$</th>
<th>$\psi_Y$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr $\left( \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{1,1}}, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>2}{P</em>{1,2}} \right)$</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>$-0.02$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr $(C_1, C_2)$</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>$0.11$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr $\left( \frac{P_{1,1}I_1}{P_{1,1}}, \frac{P_{1,2}I_2}{P_{1,3}} \right)$</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>$-0.34$</td>
<td>$-0.31$</td>
<td>$-0.25$</td>
<td>$-0.36$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr $(L_1, L_2)$</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>$-0.03$</td>
<td>$-0.02$</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>$-0.09$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr $(S_{X1}, S_{X2})$</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>$-0.01$</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>$-0.04$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr $(S_{Y1}, S_{Y2})$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr $\left( \frac{\text{TB}_1}{\text{GDP}_1}, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{1,1}} \right)$</td>
<td>$-0.49$</td>
<td>$-0.60$</td>
<td>$-0.58$</td>
<td>$-0.60$</td>
<td>$-0.60$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std $\left( \frac{\text{TB}_1}{\text{GDP}_1} \right)$</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr $\left( \frac{X_{12}}{P_{1,1}}, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{1,1}} \right)$</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr $\left( \frac{X_{12}}{P_{1,1}}, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{1,1}} \right)$</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr $\left( \frac{\text{ReR}}{\text{GDP}_1}, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{1,1}} \right)$</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Data moments are from Heathcote and Perri (2002), Table 2. All series have been Hodrick-Prescott filtered with a smoothing parameter of 1600. Time index is dropped from notation for brevity. $\text{GDP}_n = W_n L_n + R_n K_n, X_{ni} = P_{Xni} X_{ni}, \text{TB}_1 = P_{X1} X_1 - P_{Y1} Y_1, \text{ReR} = P_{Y2} / P_{Y1}$.

Table 16: Moments from calibration with decreasing returns, uncorrelated shocks, and no spillovers. Shock to the intermediate goods sector. Bond economy.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moment</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Bench</th>
<th>$\psi_{X,K}$</th>
<th>$\psi_{X,L}$</th>
<th>$\psi_Y$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corr (\frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{1,t}} , \frac{\text{GDP}<em>2}{P</em>{2,t}})</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr (\text{C}_1, \text{C}_2)</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr (\frac{P_{1,t}L_{1,t}}{P_{1,t}} , \frac{P_{2,t}L_{2,t}}{P_{3,t}})</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr (\text{L}_1, \text{L}_2)</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr (\text{S}_X, \text{S}_Y)</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr (\frac{\text{TB}_1}{\text{GDP}_1}, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{1,t}})</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std (\frac{\text{TB}_1}{\text{GDP}_1})</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr (\frac{X_{21}}{P_{1,t}}, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{1,t}})</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr (\frac{X_{12}}{P_{1,t}}, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{1,t}})</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr (\text{ReR}, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{1,t}})</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Data moments are from Heathcote and Perri (2002), Table 2. All series have been Hodrick-Prescott filtered with a smoothing parameter of 1600. Time index is dropped from notation for brevity. \(\text{GDP}_n = W_n L_n + R_n K_n, \chi_{ni} = P_{x,ni} \chi_{ni}, \text{TB}_1 = P_{x,1} \chi_1 - P_{y,1} Y_1,\) \(\text{ReR} = P_{y,2} / P_{y,1}\).

Table 17: Moments from calibration with decreasing returns, uncorrelated shocks, and no spillovers. Shock to the final goods sector. Financial autarky.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moment</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Bench</th>
<th>$\psi_{X,K}$</th>
<th>$\psi_{X,L}$</th>
<th>$\psi_Y$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr($\frac{\text{GDP}<em>n}{P</em>{t,1}}$, $\frac{\text{GDP}<em>2}{P</em>{t,2}}$)</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr($\frac{P_{t,1}}{P_{t,3}}$, $\frac{P_{t,2}}{P_{t,3}}$)</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr($\text{GDP}_n$, $\text{GDP}_2$)</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>-0.59</td>
<td>-0.55</td>
<td>-0.52</td>
<td>-0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr($\text{GDP}_n$, $\text{GDP}_2$)</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr($\text{GDP}_1$, $\text{GDP}_2$)</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>-0.51</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr($\text{GDP}_n$, $\text{GDP}_n$)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr($\frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{t,1}}$, $\frac{\text{GDP}<em>2}{P</em>{t,1}}$)</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
<td>-0.69</td>
<td>-0.64</td>
<td>-0.73</td>
<td>-0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std($\frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{t,1}}$)</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr($\frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{t,1}}$, $\frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{t,1}}$)</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr($\frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{t,1}}$, $\frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{t,1}}$)</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr($\frac{\text{ReR}}{P_{t,1}}$, $\frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{t,1}}$)</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Data moments are from Heathcote and Perri (2002), Table 2. All series have been Hodrick-Prescott filtered with a smoothing parameter of 1600. Time index is dropped from notation for brevity. GDP$_n = W_n L_n + R_n K_n$, $X_{ni} = P_{x,ni} X_{ni}$, TB$_1 = P_{x,1} X_1 - P_{y,1} Y_1$, ReR = $P_{y,2}/P_{y,1}$.

Table 18: Moments from calibration with decreasing returns, uncorrelated shocks, and no spillovers. Shock to the final goods sector. Bond economy.
C.5  Correlated Shocks Across Countries and No Spillovers

We show results below when we vary externalities in the model under financial autarky and the bond economy. This is for the case of correlated shocks across countries and no spillovers in the productivity process.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moment Data</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
<th>(7)</th>
<th>(8)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corr (\frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{\text{P}</em>{1,1}}), (\frac{\text{GDP}<em>2}{\text{P}</em>{1,2}}) (\psi_{X,\text{K}})</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr (\text{C}_1, \text{C}<em>2) (\psi</em>{X,\text{L}})</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr (\frac{\text{P}<em>{1,1}\text{I}<em>1}{\text{P}</em>{1,2}}), (\frac{\text{P}</em>{2,1}\text{I}<em>2}{\text{P}</em>{2,2}}) (\psi_{X,\text{Y}})</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr (\text{L}_1, \text{L}<em>2) (\psi</em>{Y})</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr (\text{S}<em>{X1}, \text{S}</em>{X2}) (\psi_{Y})</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr (\frac{\text{TB}_1}{\text{GDP}<em>1}), (\frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{\text{P}</em>{1,1}}) (\psi</em>{X,\text{K}})</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr (\frac{\text{X}<em>{11}}{\text{P}</em>{1,1}}), (\frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{\text{P}</em>{1,1}}) (\psi_{X,\text{L}})</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr (\frac{\text{X}<em>{12}}{\text{P}</em>{1,1}}), (\frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{\text{P}</em>{1,1}}) (\psi_{Y})</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr (\frac{\text{ReR}}{\text{GDP}<em>1}), (\frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{\text{P}</em>{1,1}}) (\psi</em>{Y})</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std (\frac{(\text{ReR})}{\text{GDP}<em>1}) (\psi</em>{Y})</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Data moments are from Heathcote and Perri (2002), Table 2. All series have been Hodrick-Prescott filtered with a smoothing parameter of 1600. Time index is dropped from notation for brevity. GDP\(n = W_n L_n + R_n K_n, X_{ni} = P_{X,n}X_{ni}, TB_1 = P_{X,1}X_1 - P_{Y,1}Y_1, ReR = P_{Y,2}/P_{X,1}.

Table 19: Moments from calibration with decreasing returns, correlated shocks, and no spillovers. Financial autarky.
\[
\begin{array}{cccccc}
\text{Moment} & \text{Data} & \text{Bench} & \psi_{X,K} & \psi_{X,L} & \psi_Y \\
\hline
\text{Corr} \left( \frac{\text{GDP}_1}{P_{1,1}}, \frac{\text{GDP}_2}{P_{1,2}} \right) & 0.58 & 0.30 & 0.28 & 0.37 & 0.23 & 0.32 & 0.01 & 0.44 \\
\text{Corr} \left( C_1, C_2 \right) & 0.36 & 0.45 & 0.43 & 0.43 & 0.42 & 0.41 & 0.26 & 0.56 \\
\text{Corr} \left( \frac{P_{1,1}I_1}{P_{1,1}}, \frac{P_{1,2}I_2}{P_{1,2}} \right) & 0.30 & -0.09 & -0.17 & 0.05 & -0.12 & -0.08 & -0.49 & 0.34 \\
\text{Corr} \left( L_1, L_2 \right) & 0.42 & 0.18 & 0.10 & 0.35 & 0.13 & 0.24 & -0.15 & 0.33 \\
\text{Corr} \left( S_{X,1}, S_{X,2} \right) & 0.29 & 0.29 & 0.28 & 0.35 & 0.22 & 0.31 & 0.29 & 0.29 \\
\text{Corr} \left( \frac{\text{TB}_1}{\text{GDP}_1}, \frac{\text{GDP}_1}{P_{1,1}} \right) & -0.49 & -0.50 & -0.51 & -0.50 & -0.51 & -0.50 & -0.61 & -0.16 \\
\text{Corr} \left( \frac{X_{2,1}}{P_{1,1}}, \frac{\text{GDP}_1}{P_{1,1}} \right) & 0.32 & 0.41 & 0.39 & 0.38 & 0.38 & 0.39 & -0.05 & 0.80 \\
\text{Corr} \left( \frac{X_{1,2}}{P_{1,1}}, \frac{\text{GDP}_1}{P_{1,1}} \right) & 0.81 & 0.97 & 0.97 & 0.98 & 0.96 & 0.97 & 0.93 & 0.86 \\
\text{Corr} \left( \frac{\text{ReR}}{\text{GDP}_1}, \frac{\text{GDP}_1}{P_{1,1}} \right) & 0.13 & 0.45 & 0.45 & 0.35 & 0.47 & 0.41 & 0.56 & -0.10 \\
\text{Std} \left( \text{ReR} \right) & 2.23 & 0.20 & 0.20 & 0.15 & 0.22 & 0.18 & 0.26 & 0.13 \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

Notes: Data moments are from Heathcote and Perri (2002), Table 2. All series have been Hodrick-Prescott filtered with a smoothing parameter of 1600. Time index is dropped from notation for brevity. GDP = W_nL_n + R_n.K_n, X_{ni} = P_{x,1}X_{ni}, TB_1 = P_{x,1}X_1 - P_{x,1}Y_1, ReR = \frac{P_{x,2}}{P_{x,1}}.

Table 20: Moments from calibration with decreasing returns, correlated shocks, and no spillovers. Bond economy.
C.6 Correlated Shocks Across Countries and Spillovers

We show results below when we vary externalities in the model under financial autarky and the bond economy. This is for the case of correlated shocks across countries and spillovers in the productivity process.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moment</th>
<th>Data Bench</th>
<th>$\psi_{X,K}$</th>
<th>$\psi_{X,L}$</th>
<th>$\psi_{Y}$</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ($\frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{y,1}}$, $\frac{\text{GDP}<em>2}{P</em>{y,2}}$)</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ($C_1, C_2$)</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ($\frac{P_{y,1}L_1}{P_{y,1}}$, $\frac{P_{y,2}L_2}{P_{y,1}}$)</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ($L_1, L_2$)</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>-0.57</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ($S_{X,1}, S_{X,2}$)</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ($\frac{TB_1}{\text{GDP}_1}$, $\frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{y,1}}$)</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ($\frac{X_{11}}{P_{y,1}}$, $\frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{y,1}}$)</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ($\frac{X_{12}}{P_{y,1}}$, $\frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{y,1}}$)</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr ($\frac{\text{ReR}}{\text{GDP}<em>1}$, $\frac{P</em>{y,1}}{P_{y,1}}$)</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std (ReR)/$\text{GDP}<em>1/P</em>{y,1}$</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Data moments are from Heathcote and Perri (2002), Table 2. All series have been Hodrick-Prescott filtered with a smoothing parameter of 1600. Time index is dropped from notation for brevity. GDP$_n = W_nL_n + R_nK_n$, $X_{n_i} = P_{x,n_i}X_{n_i}$, $TB_1 = P_{x,1}X_1 - P_{y,1}Y_1$, ReR = $P_{y,2}/P_{y,1}$.

Table 21: Moments from calibration with decreasing returns, correlated shocks, and spillovers. Financial autarky.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moment</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Bench</th>
<th>$\psi_{X,K}$</th>
<th>$\psi_{X,L}$</th>
<th>$\psi_Y$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Corr (\frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{x,1}}, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>2}{P</em>{x,2}})</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.12</td>
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<td>0.76</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.83</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Corr (\frac{P_{x,1}L_1}{P_{x,1}}, \frac{P_{x,2}L_2}{P_{x,2}})</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.46</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.83</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Corr (L_1, L_2)</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>-0.42</td>
<td>-0.71</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>-0.57</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.28</td>
<td>-0.68</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.49</td>
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<td>0.28</td>
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<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>-0.53</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>-0.53</td>
<td>-0.48</td>
<td>-0.68</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(4) Corr (\frac{\text{TB}_1}{\text{GDP}_1}, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{x,1}})</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
<td>-0.54</td>
<td>-0.55</td>
<td>-0.53</td>
<td>-0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.53</td>
<td>-0.48</td>
<td>-0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Corr (\frac{X_{21}}{P_{x,1}}, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{x,1}})</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.29</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.82</td>
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<tr>
<td>(6) Corr (\frac{X_{12}}{P_{x,1}}, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{x,1}})</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
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<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) Corr (\frac{\text{ReR}}{\text{GDP}_1}, \frac{\text{GDP}<em>1}{P</em>{x,1}})</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>0.40</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.60</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.04</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Std (\frac{\text{ReR}}{\text{GDP}<em>1/P</em>{x,1}})</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.16</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.18</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.12</td>
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</table>

**Notes:** Data moments are from Heathcote and Perri (2002), Table 2. All series have been Hodrick-Prescott filtered with a smoothing parameter of 1600. Time index is dropped from notation for brevity. GDP$_n = W_n L_n + R_n K_n, X_{ni} = P_{x,ni} X_{ni}, TB_1 = P_{x,1} X_1 - P_{x,1} Y_1, \text{ReR} = P_{x,2}/P_{x,1}$.

Table 22: Moments from calibration with decreasing returns, correlated shocks, and spillovers. Bond economy.
D Additional Impulse-Response Functions

We report below impulse response functions to a 1% productivity shock at home for the cases of financial autarky and bond economy when we vary capital, labor, and final good externalities.

Notes: The plots show responses for 1% shock to the exogenous component of productivity in the intermediates sector in country 1, \( Z_{X,1} \). All horizontal axes measure number of quarters after the shock. All vertical axes — except for the figures for the current account and trade balance — measure percent deviation from steady state. The figures for the current account and trade balance measure the number of percentage points. The case with \( \psi_{X,K} = 0 \) corresponds to the benchmark calibration of the unified model with no externalities, uncorrelated shocks (i.e., \( \sigma_{X,12} = \sigma_{X,21} = 0 \)), and no spillovers in the productivity process (i.e., \( \rho_{X12} = \rho_{X21} = 0 \)). Calibrations for the cases with \( \psi_{X,K} = 0.3 \) and \( \psi_{X,K} = -1 \) differ from the case with \( \psi_{X,K} = 0 \) only in having capital externality in the production of intermediates (with the corresponding value for \( \psi_{X,K} \)). All cases are for financial autarky. The red solid lines on the plots for \( S_{X,1} \) and \( S_{X,2} \) — in addition to responses of \( S_{X,1} \) and \( S_{X,2} \) for the case of \( \psi_{X,K} = 0 \) — also correspond to responses of \( Z_{X,1} \) and \( Z_{X,2} \) for all values of \( \psi_{X,K} \).

Figure 4: Impulse-response functions for \( Z_{X,1} \). Capital externalities in the intermediate goods sector. Financial autarky.
Notes: The plots show responses for 1% shock to the exogenous component of productivity in the intermediates sector in country 1, $Z_{X,1}$. All vertical axes — except for the figures for the current account and trade balance — measure percent deviation from steady state. The figures for the current account and trade balance measure the number of percentage points. The case with $\psi_{X,K} = 0$ corresponds to the benchmark calibration of the unified model with no externalities, uncorrelated shocks (i.e., $\sigma_{X,12} = \sigma_{X,21} = 0$), and no spillovers in the productivity process (i.e., $\rho_{X,12} = \rho_{X,21} = 0$). Calibrations for the cases with $\psi_{X,K} = 0.3$ and $\psi_{X,K} = -1$ differ from the case with $\psi_{X,K} = 0$ only in having capital externality in the production of intermediates (with the corresponding value for $\psi_{X,K}$). All cases are for the bond economy. The red solid lines on the plots for $S_{X,1}$ and $S_{X,2}$ — in addition to responses of $S_{X,1}$ and $S_{X,2}$ for the case of $\psi_{X,K} = 0$ — also correspond to responses of $Z_{X,1}$ and $Z_{X,2}$ for all values of $\psi_{X,K}$.

Figure 5: Impulse-response functions for $Z_{X,1}$. Capital externalities in the intermediate goods sector. Bond economy.
Notes: The plots show responses for 1% shock to the exogenous component of productivity in the intermediates sector in country 1, $Z_{X,1}$. All horizontal axes measure number of quarters after the shock. All vertical axes — except for the figures for the current account and trade balance — measure percent deviation from steady state. The figures for the current account and trade balance measure the number of percentage points. The case with $\psi_{X,L} = 0$ corresponds to the benchmark calibration of the unified model with no externalities, uncorrelated shocks (i.e., $\sigma_{X,12} = \sigma_{X,21}$), and no spillovers in the productivity process (i.e., $\rho_{X,12} = \rho_{X,21} = 0$). Calibrations for the cases with $\psi_{X,L} = 0.7$ and $\psi_{X,L} = -1$ differ from the case with $\psi_{X,L} = 0$ only in having labor externality in the production of intermediates (with the corresponding value for $\psi_{X,L}$). All cases are for financial autarky. The red solid lines on the plots for $S_{X,1}$ and $S_{X,2}$ — in addition to responses of $S_{X,1}$ and $S_{X,2}$ for the case of $\psi_{X,L} = 0$ — also correspond to responses of $Z_{X,1}$ and $Z_{X,2}$ for all values of $\psi_{X,L}$.

Figure 6: Impulse-response functions for $Z_{X,1}$. Labor externalities in the intermediate goods sector. Financial autarky.
Notes: The plots show responses for 1% shock to the exogenous component of productivity in the intermediates sector in country 1, $Z_{X,1}$. All horizontal axes measure number of quarters after the shock. All vertical axes — except for the figures for the current account and trade balance — measure percent deviation from steady state. The figures for the current account and trade balance measure the number of percentage points. The case with $\psi_{X,L} = 0$ corresponds to the benchmark calibration of the unified model with no externalities, uncorrelated shocks (i.e., $\sigma_{X,12} = \sigma_{X,21}$), and no spillovers in the productivity process (i.e., $\rho_{X,12} = \rho_{X,21} = 0$). Calibrations for the cases with $\psi_{X,L} = 0.7$ and $\psi_{X,L} = -1$ differ from the case with $\psi_{X,L} = 0$ only in having labor externality in the production of intermediates (with the corresponding value for $\psi_{X,L}$). All cases are for the bond economy. The red solid lines on the plots for $S_{X,1}$ and $S_{X,2}$ — in addition to responses of $S_{X,1}$ and $S_{X,2}$ for the case of $\psi_{X,L} = 0$ — also correspond to responses of $Z_{X,1}$ and $Z_{X,2}$ for all values of $\psi_{X,L}$.

Figure 7: Impulse-response functions for $Z_{X,1}$. Labor externalities in the intermediate goods sector. Bond economy.
Notes: The plots show responses for 1% shock to the exogenous component of productivity in the intermediates sector in country 1, $Z_{X,1}$. All horizontal axes measure number of quarters after the shock. All vertical axes — except for the figures for the current account and trade balance — measure percent deviation from steady state. The figures for the current account and trade balance measure the number of percentage points. The case with $\psi_Y = 0$ corresponds to the benchmark calibration of the unified model with no externalities, uncorrelated shocks (i.e., $\sigma_{X12} = \sigma_{X21}$), and no spillovers in the productivity process (i.e., $\rho_{X11} = \rho_{X21} = 0$). Calibrations for the cases with $\psi_Y = 0.2$ and $\psi_Y = -1$ differ from the case with $\psi_Y = 0$ only in having externality in production of the final aggregates (with the corresponding value for $\psi_Y$). All cases are for financial autarky.

Figure 8: Impulse-response functions for $Z_{X,1}$. Externality in the final aggregates sector. Financial autarky.
Notes: The plots show responses for 1% shock to the exogenous component of productivity in the intermediates sector in country 1, $Z_{X,1}$. All horizontal axes measure number of quarters after the shock. All vertical axes — except for the figures for the current account and trade balance — measure percent deviation from steady state. The figures for the current account and trade balance measure the number of percentage points. The case with $\psi_Y = 0$ corresponds to the benchmark calibration of the unified model with no externalities, uncorrelated shocks (i.e., $\sigma_{X,12} = \sigma_{X,21}$), and no spillovers in the productivity process (i.e., $\rho_{X,12} = \rho_{X,21} = 0$). Calibrations for the cases with $\psi_Y = 0.2$ and $\psi_Y = -1$ differ from the case with $\psi_Y = 0$ only in having externality in production of the final aggregates (with the corresponding value for $\psi_Y$). All cases are for the bond economy.

Figure 9: Impulse-response functions for $Z_{X,1}$. Externality in the final aggregates sector. Bond economy.